Human error led to failed US Navy ballistic missile intercept test
The Navy Times is reporting a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) review of a recent failed ballistic missile intercept test launched form USS John Paul Jones was a result of mistaken input, instead of a failure of the SM-3 Block IIA missile or an issue with the Navy’s Aegis combat system. A tactical data-link controller was programmed to identify the incoming missile as friendly, which caused the SM-3 to self detonate in flight.
The head of MDA did not comment on the human error, but said in a statement that the ongoing review confirmed it wasn’t an issue with the SM-3 Block IIA missile or the Navy’s Aegis combat system. “Though the review is still in process, the SM-3 IIA interceptor and Aegis Combat System have been eliminated as the potential root cause,” of the failure, said Air Force Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves, the director of MDA.
“We are conducting an extensive review as part of our standard engineering and test processes, and it would be inappropriate to comment further until we complete the investigation.”
This is the fourth flight test of the SM-3 Block IIA, and the second time it has been launched from a ship. A successful ship borne launch to intercept was conducted last February. The finding of human error is a relief to the contractors and military advancing Ballistic Missile Defense technology in the face of current threats.
“As unfortunate as this might be, it’s a good thing that this wasn’t a technology issue or some deeper failure that needs to be investigated at great length and time,” Karako said. “There is no reason to believe the basic capability that has already been demonstrated has any new problems.”
USS John Paul Jones has replaced the original missile defense ship, USS Lake Erie, which is currently deployed to the Asia-Pacific area.
Category: Politics
Basically they blamed an enlisted operator.
As always, if someone is gonna burn, it’s gonna be a blueshirt.
Huh, in Star Trek it’s always the red shirts.
Deck Division has a new Boatswains Mate striker in 3… 2… 1…
Human error. It can start wars.
Or this, maybe? Watch the last 30 seconds or so very carefully. (smile)
“The Bedford Incident” is an excellent early Cold War ASW movie- one of the very few Navy flicks I’ll shut up and watch.
Isn’t that the one where Christopher Reeve shows up as a young equipment operator uncredited?
Nope. Unless he showed up as a 12-year old operator.
“Yeah, he just looks young. Trust me!”
“I said LUNCH, not LAUNCH”
If it is the software in the ACS that caused the system to misinterpret an exercise hostile as a friend and thus trigger the self destruct I don’t think you can eliminate the ACS as root cause.
Multi-million-dollar test FUBARed because somebody clicked the wrong icon, thus hastening the adoption of SKYNET and dooming us all. I’d hate to be that guy.
ICBMs have IFF? My Infantryman brain no comprehend.
If ever there was a case of “Friendly fire isn’t”…
The John Paul Johns. . . Now where have I heard that before. . . Oh Yes!
I’m on a boat! I’m on a boat! Take a good hard look at the M—- F—- boat!
John Paul JONES, that should read. . .
Darn “just as you hit POST COMMENT noticing of errors”!!
Junior Officers should be seen but not heard, and rarely seen.
This is why.
*grin*
There’s a good reason SWOs eat their young
The fact that it was “human error” is arguable if by “programing error” they’re referring to an error in the system’s software. Most advanced systems include software components as integral parts of the weapon system. If one of those malfunctions or is designed improperly (e.g., does what it’s programmed to do, but the software design is not correct and causes the system to malfunction), the error is generally attributed to the system – not the human operating it.
Even if it was due to a bona fide human error (e.g., an error in setting up the test, or during conduct of the test, on the part of one of the test personnel), that still doesn’t give me much of a “warm and fuzzy”. Human errors happen during crisis situations too. For an example, consider virtually any “friendly fire” incident.
It is an article of faith among computer programmers that one can make a system fool-proof, and then the universe builds a bigger fool.
And that if there is artificial intelligence, it logically follows that there must also be artificial stupidity.
. . . which is capable of making dumb decisions at the rate of literally hundreds of thousands (if not millions) per second, given today’s processor speeds for multi-core processors.
Am I the only one comforted by the fact that the missile performed perfectly by detonating before striking a target flagged as ‘Friendly’ in the systems test?
The missile system seems to have worked perfectly, just not within the test parameters of striking a given target. In this case avoiding the friendly strike gives useful data for that safety function and allows for better test procedures development.
Sometimes we learn the most from our mistakes. (and yes, I am aware the military likes to bury mistakes.)
This was more than a white hat malfunction…this was or should have been a rehearsed varsity squad event…a ship to which I was assigned missed a Battle E because of an exercise surface to air engagement fuck up…CSO never made 0-5…and who knows but hot running skipper never made flag either…it’s not just a white hat heading to the “mess decks”…
I have to agree- I’ve been involved in test more than long enough to know Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) is choreographed down to a gnat’s ass- this was a failure on several levels. The up side is this will be fixed, at least until Graybeard’s better fool shows up once again.
Maybe JPJ should stick to fighting aliens…
https://youtu.be/lNfX5RalJZ8