Some Thoughts Regarding MoH Awards
Jonn’s earlier article concerning the scarcity of Medal of Honor (MoH) recipients during the GWOT piqued my curiosity. So I decided to do a little digging and number crunching – and see just where the numbers led.
Here’s the data I was able to find quickly, from various internet sources, for 5 major US conflicts since 1900. These conflicts were World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the post-9/11 GWOT. I didn’t look up data for the first Gulf War; no MoHs were awarded during that conflict. I also excluded Somalia; that conflict, while arguably the real opening shots of the GWOT, is generally not considered a part of the GWOT. But even including the 2 MoHs awarded in Somalia doesn’t change what follows substantially. .
Here are the numbers.
World War I: Number serving in-theater: approx 2.2M Number of MoHs: 119 Rate: 0.00541% (5.41 per 100,000) World War II: Number serving overseas: approx 12M Number of MoHs: 472 Rate: 0.00393% (3.93 per 100,000) Korea: Number serving in-theater: approx 1.789M Number of MoHs: 146 Rate: 0.00816% (8.16 per 100,000) Vietnam: Number serving in-country: 2.6 M Number of MoHs: 258 Rate: 0.00992% (9.92 per 100,000) GWOT: Number serving in-country: approx 1.3M Number of MoHs: 16 Rate: 0.00123% (1.23 per 100,000). . .
I think the numbers rather speak for themselves. But I’ll give my 2 cents worth about them anyway.
Yeah, the current conflict got the short end of the stick with respect to the number of MoHs awarded so far. The numbers make that pretty damn clear.
A few further thoughts:
1. Prior to the GWOT, the historical modern rate of award for the MoH during major conflicts ranged between 0.00393% and 0.00992%. That’s a rough range of somewhere around 4 to 10 out of every 100,000 military personnel deployed in harm’s way.
2. World War I was primarily an infantry war, but at that time the concept of handing out medals was still relatively new; processes for doing so in a modern large war were developed on the fly. Still: with only a year or so of real combat, the rate of award for the MoH seems reasonable to perhaps a bit low, historically, for a largely infantry war like World War I.
3. Prior to the GWOT, World War II saw the lowest MoH rate. It is also the US war where Naval and Air Corps service in harm’s way was most extensive. No slight to our nautical or aeronautical sister services – but service at sea or in the air in general offers far fewer opportunities for the level of heroism required for award of the MOH than does land combat, so a lower rate of MoHs for this World War II should be expected. Fewer opportunities means fewer awards. Also, during World War II there were multiple theaters; multiple theaters means more of those deployed overseas were likely in relatively “safe” rear areas providing support. I couldn’t find or derive a good number for those serving where shooting was actually happening in World War II; the best I could find was that 75% of the military served “overseas”.
4. Korea and Vietnam were, in essence, infantry wars in Asia against foes that didn’t “play nice” with respect to the Geneva Convention. Their rates of MoH award are, as might be expected, higher than in other conflicts.
5. That said, the Vietnam War MoH rate numbers give me pause. Many units did acquire a reputation for being “easy” regarding awards during Vietnam. A man I once knew (an artillery officer who served in Vietnam) once told me that it was a running joke when he served there that officers inprocessing to Vietnam should have just signed for their award “packet” (BSM, VSM, VCM, and possibly Air Medal) during in processing in order to streamline things when they left. Award inflation reputedly included many awards for valor. Stories of undeserved Silver Stars being relatively commonplace exist; I can’t assess whether such stories are accurate or not – but where there’s smoke, there’s often fire. While I believe the services all avoided MoH inflation during Vietnam, I guess it’s possible some might have occurred. And the rate of MoH award in Vietnam is unusually high when compared to other US major conflicts – nearly 1 in 10,000. Dunno.
6. During the GWOT, the MoH has been awarded at a rate of nut much more than 1 out of every 100,000 troops serving in harm’s way. That’s barely 1/4 as often as during World War II, and about 1/8 as often as during Vietnam. And the GWOT – like World War I, Korea, and Vietnam – has been primarily a single-theater, “up-close-and-personal” infantry war. Something just doesn’t seem right.
. . .
Why? Well, I personally think it’s probably one last institutional legacy of Vietnam. Specifically, I think this is an over-reaction to the perception of awards abuse and inflation in Vietnam – which was, to some degree, IMO accurate. (How much is another question entirely.) But the correction has been far too severe. American troops haven’t become less brave today than they were in previous conflicts, and during the GWOT substantial opportunities for battlefield heroism have existed. The reluctance to award the MoH seems to me to be due to an excessive and misplaced fear of “cheapening” the MoH as is perceived happened to some awards in Vietnam. That’s a valid concern – but if anything, the effect appears to have been to slight many deserving heroes.
This has an unintended consequence: it sends an unintended message to the military itself, and to America. Few or no MoHs implies almost no one was no one worthy, that the fighting wasn’t severe and protracted, and that there simply wasn’t much battlefield heroim. But that’s decidedly not the case for either Iraq or Afghanistan.
Bottom line: the process appears effectively broken. IMO, it needs fixing. “Poor is the nation that has no heroes; but beggared is the nation that has and forgets them.”
Just my thoughts, and I might well be out to lunch. But my gut tells me I’m not.
_________________
Postscript: I’m still not personally convinced no one in the 1991 Gulf War was worthy of the MoH. However, ground operations during that war were short enough and the enemy so clueless that maybe that was the case.
Dunno. I wasn’t on active duty during the Gulf War; and I wasn’t mobilized during that conflict. So I don’t really have any personal experiences on which to form an opinion about the matter.
But I still have trouble believing it.
Category: Military issues, Veterans Issues, Who knows
Hondo: I think one other factor to consider is the number of other medals that have come into existence since the end of WWII. IIRC the likes of the bronze star for valor, air medal, etc, are for the most part post-WWII awards.
Back in the 1800’s, the MoH was literally the only medal given out for valor. So it was the MoH or nothing. That explains the huge numbers of MoH awarded, for example, in the Civil and Indian wars (I think at Wounded Knee, which was in essence a massacre, something like 50 or 70 MoH’s were awarded.)
So getting back to your point, perhaps the reason we are seeing fewer MoH awards is that people who in the past would have gotten the MoH are getting the SSM, BSM, Air Medal, etc.
Actually, the DSC and DSM were created for World War I; the LOM, BSM, Air Medal, and Commendation Medal were created during World War II. Outside of the DoD awards, the only personal awards created since World War II that I know of are the MSM and Achievement Medals.
So I don’t really think that’s it.
The Silver Star was created prior to WWII (in 1932), but was retroactive to WWI. It was presented to those who had been recognized by Division (or above) citations.
While the Silver Star as we know it today was indeed created in 1932, it was the direct successor to the Citation Star. The Secretary of War unilaterally ordered the conversion in 1932, as you stated. Recipients of the previous Citation Star were entitled to the Silver Star as a modern-day replacement.
The Citation Star was was created during World War I, by Act of Congress, on 9 July 1918. The Secretary of War thus converted an existing, previously-authorized award when he created the modern-day Silver Star in 1932. The previous law served as authority for the new award.
A bit of trivia: both the Citation Star and Silver Star were originally authorized as Army-only awards. Prior to World War II, the Navy had no authority to award it. Congress did not formally authorize the Silver Star under that name until 1942. That year, Congress also extended authority to the Navy to award it.
Elaborating a bit – Looking back at your stats, it’s clear to me that it was Vietnam that is the outlier.
It might be interesting to see a breakdown of when during the war the MoH’s were awarded.
Because one explanation of the apparent excessive MoH awards could be that as popularity of the war sank, the MoH was more likely to be awarded in a cynical attempt to bolster public support for it.
Vietnam isn’t really the sole outlier – Korea isn’t that far behind (8.16 vice 9.92 per 100,000). The others are all much lower.
I think the fact that both of those was were (1) almost exclusively infantry wars (2) against enemies that didn’t much give a damn about the Geneva Convention probably raised the MoH rates for both. But it’s possible that Vietnam also saw a bit of MoH award inflation – as I alluded to in the article above.
Hondo, from what I’ve read here, it appears that you have not factored in the length of time infantry units were engaged with enemy forces. In that respect, Vietnam lasted much longer than any of the other wars you cite.
That is with the exception of the GWOT. But you also have to consider the total numbers of infantry engagements and also the unit sizes of those engagements.
I also think you are correct that the larger role of combat aviation has to be factored in. However. in Vietnam, far more helicopter assets were employed for troop transport than as air-to-ground combat platforms.
Poetrooper: while Vietnam on paper lasted for 12+ years (1961-1973), significant US ground involvement was limited to about half that time – mid-1965 to late 1971 (and the latter half of 1971 is somewhat debatable, as US forces were drawing down quite rapidly in 1970-1971 and by the latter half of 1971 were primarily performing support/base defense vice active combat operations seeking to engage enemy forces).
MoH awards in Vietnam bear that out. Of the MoHs awarded in Vietnam, roughly 95% (unless I’ve miscounted, all but 12) were awarded for acts of heroism occurring between June 1965 and late 1970.
In contrast, World War II lasted close to 4 years – 3 yrs 8 mo, to be precise – and involved both far more troops and far more combat. Korea lasted 3 yrs 1 mo, and like Vietnam was also a predominantly infantry war. So while Vietnam was different, it’s not completely unique in US history in being a long, predominantly infantry war.
Regarding the GWOT: OIF saw major combat operations for as long as did Vietnam (6+ years), and involved probably 40% as many soldiers (estimated; while it was ongoing, Iraq got the lion’s share of US “boots on the ground” in the CENTCOM AOR; I’d guess 75-80%). Afghanistan has been ongoing for over a decade now. In total, approximately 1/2 as many people (est 1.3 million) have served in-country between Iraq and Afghanistan as served in-country in Vietnam.
Yes, conditions are different today. But IMO that cannot possibly be all that’s going on. The numbers are simply too skewed with respect to any other major war we’ve fought in the past century other than the 1991 Gulf War. And the ground component of the Gulf War lasted only 4 days – not 13+ years.
I posted the link to the HRC awards statistics website on the other thread. One thing that stood out to me is the difference in the award of the Silver Star from Vietnam to the current conflicts. Something like 30X as many Silver Stars were awarded in Vietnam for the Army. Now, I know that there is no really good measure for measuring intensity of various conflicts, but there were about 8X as many KIA in Vietnam than in the GWOT fights. That just doesn’t seem right-either there were far too many then, or far too few now (I lean towards the latter explanation).
I think it’s some of both, 68W58. I’ve seen stories indicating that the Silver Star was awarded “liberally” in some units in Vietnam.
Dunno if that’s true or not, but where there’s smoke . . . .
As stated elsewhere, and the numbers seem to bear this out, is that Bronze Stars are handed out pretty liberally, or at least at the same rate as previous conflicts, while Silver Stars and above are awarded much less frequently.
Could this also be traced back to some of the stuff that went on in Kosovo as well?
Are the incidents of the Service crosses being awarded also as scarce as the MOH or are they higher, lower, about the same as prior wars?
Vietnam 840 DSCs, GWOT-28, 30X as many then.
Can’t speak for the USN, USMC, or USAF, Enigma4you – but in the Army, it’s not even close.
In World War I, Soldiers received 100 MoHs – and 6,430 DSCs.
In World War II, Soldiers received 332 MoHs – and 4,427 DSCs.
In Korea, Soldiers received 92 MoHs – and 715 DSCs.
In Vietnam, Soldiers received 170 MoHs and 840 DSCs.
To date in the GWOT, the totals are 10 MoHs, 28 DSCs.
Great article and analysis!
Adding the length of each conflict above also reveals a metric that can be further analyzed … correlation to length of conflict.
In addition, to your observation regarding the number awarded to per 100,000 … without getting into names … a number of GWOT MoH submissions were either denied and or reduced to Crosses.
Won’t dispute that, MCPO – but it also looks like there’s a problem with the Service Crosses as well. See my reply to Enigma4you above for Army data by war on same.
It should also be pointed out that awarding the MOH required an Act of Congress. During the Bush years of the GWOT, it was nearly impossible for Congress to even agree on what it meant to support the troops vs. support the war.
There were a number of packets that were sent to various congress critters who just ignored them because they didn’t support the war or the proposed recipient wasn’t politically connected. I have no doubt that some of the awards, while justified, were awarded over others because of family connections the recipient had.
Actually, Flag – I don’t believe any Congressional involvement is required if the award recommendation is submitted in a timely manner. And even if it’s not, only a Congressional recommendation seems to be required.
http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/process.html
Hondo, is it possible the ROE in the GWOT played a part in that we couldn’t engage as much as in previous actions?
Also, didn’t we use much more close air support in GWOT?
Regards,
I don’t doubt that may have played a small part. However, I just don’t see that to be a factor of 4 to factor of 8 difference. Something else IMO is at work to reduce the rate of award that much.
The same basic skewing (e.g, much less common) seems to be taking place, at least in the Army, regarding award of the DSC and SS as well.
Another thing to throw in to the modern award matrix is ” rank does not merit”. Look at the number of junior troops and even NCO’s with V’s on their Achievement or Commendation medals.
Good point. However I have a Navy Achievement Medal with V device from 1968 for Vietnam Service. The Marine Corps awarded it in 1993. In my company no one that I know of received a BSM, SSM or higher. Except officers. If you read some of the citations for MOH from Vietnam, there is a huge difference in some of the citations for what it took to get one. Plus 73% (or 67%) depending on the source were awarded posthumously. I suppose if you were to divide the number of KIA by the number of MOH awards it might be a better comparison. I do remember at the time folks would say if you jumped on a grenade and it went off, that was worthy of an MOH. If it did not, Navy Cross or SSM.
Not that it changes the current rate at all but to be fair to Vietnam MOHs you would have to also add a factor in for continuous combat operations. I did that using 2.83 years for WWI, 3.66 years for WWII, 3.0 years for Korea, 10.66 years for Vietnam.
WWI – 1.91 MOH per 100,000 per year of combat operations.
WWII – 1.07 MOH per 100,000 per year of combat operations.
Korea – 2.72 MOH per 100,000 per year of combat operations.
Vietnam – 0.93 MOH per 100,000 per year of combat operations.
These are just time of U.S. involvement and do not take into account actual day for day combat activity, but I think it makes a good point and might explain why there are so few for the 13 years of operations post 9/11. But I have no way to compare actual in theatre OPTEMPO from conflict to conflict.
Greats Chiefs think alike .. I made the same observation above, however I spared the math!
I have a few issues with the above analysis.
1. US combat operations in World War I lasted only 1.1 year (13 months) – at best. The first US combat troops arrived at the front in October 1917; the armistice began in Nov 1918. However, even that is misleading. US troops didn’t really arrive at the front in quantity in France until 1918, or take over large segments of the front until May 1918.
In fact, US involvement in World War I lasted only 20 months in total – Apr 1917 (declaration of war) to Nov 1918 (armistice).
2. While the US was involved in Vietnam for 10+ years, the vast majority of the MoHs awarded – all but 12 – were awarded for acts occurring between June 1965 and Sep 1970. Thus using a 10+ year period for normalization is at best misleading.
3. I’m not really sure what you mean by “rate per 100,000 per year”. A rate is a comparison of two items measured in different units. I understand awards per year (annual rate of awards) or awards per 100,000 individuals in harm’s way. I don’t understand mixing the three.
Ah … good thing I spared my math let alone my spelling!
I agree with you and that is why I qualified it by saying that I had no way of comparing OPTEMPO between the conflicts. I simply used the days commonly referred to as our start of official involvement and disengagement. Your point is well taken.
My rates are just a correction of another rate. The number of MOHs per individual scaled to the unit of time appropriate. Both of our comparisons fail for the same reason, the unit of time is pretty much impossible to quantify, not to mention the intensity of action over that time.
Hondo,
You know way too much about Math…
I can’t help but wonder how much impact the “Me” generation has had with this also. I can unfortunately picture a senior officer getting his drawers in a twist because 1) somebody’s going to get an award I won’t get, 2) I don’t have the time for this paperwork crap, 3) gee, I don’t want to try to convince GEN whoever to endorse and forward this award. What happens to my OER if he thinks this award is too much…
We’ve all been there when we tried to get an award for a trooper. Could we be seeing the same thing on a much higher level?
I think the number who served is only one factor in this calculus. Compare the number of KIA and WIA in the other wars. WWII had 291,557 KIA and over 600,000 WIA vs. GWOT with 6830 KIA and 52,229 WIA. Korea had 33,741 KIA, 101284 WIA. This could suggest the environment was just way different, call it level of intensity, whatever. I served in ODS and two tours in OEF as an infantryman, we never faced the kind of fighting our predecessors faced on the beach at Normandy where American casualties were 1465 KIA, 3184 WIA, 1928 MIA. That was on one day. Just my two cents.
World War II also saw close to 10x as many people deploy in harm’s way – 12 million vice around 1.3 million are the best figures I can find. Doing the math, that means proportionally the GWOT has had a total casualty rate of 4.54%. World War II had a total casualty rate of 7.43%.
Similarly, Korea’s total casualty rate was about the same as that in World War II (7.54%).
Yes, those two wars were higher intensity. But based on total casualty rates, they weren’t 3 to 8 times higher – which the disparity in MoH award rates would lead one to believe. The ratio works out to somewhat over 1.6 times higher intensity if one uses total casualty rates as a metric.
I think you need to also look at what constituted the official “theatre” of each conflict.
WWII.was any spot beyond the limits of CONUS and the three mile limit.
Korea was only the peninsula and contiguous waters.
Vietnam was basically only Vietnam and close in waters (remember the brigade over ADM Borda’s authority for the V device)
So kind of an apples to oranges comparison.
Agreed – for World War II. In the other 4 cases, I was able to find numbers for the theater of concern (France for World War I, Korea for Korea, in-country for Vietnam, and Iraq/Afghanistan for GWOT).
If someone can find more accurate numbers for World War II than “served overseas” – e.g., what fraction of US military forces in World War II actually served in places where there were bullets flying – I’d be damned happy to re-run the calculations. Under those circumstances, I’d guess the MoH award rate for World War II would go up significantly.
Unfortunately, those numbers don’t seem to be readily available. If they are, I certainly haven’t found them. And I’ve looked.
The best I can find is that approx 16 million served in the US military during World War II, and that roughly 3/4 served “overseas”.
I was thinking in the other direction.
For Korea it might be instructive to add in the service members in Japan who supported air operations into the country and the significant naval forces overhead.
Hondo: Something else has occurred to me, too: The current wars, as terrible as they can be, are pretty small in terms of the numbers of troops in contact and I think that has a bearing on the type and frequency of awards.
Last year I read Robin Moore’s book about the Special Forces in Vietnam and I was astonished at just how many SF camps were overrun. Not only that, looking at the Vietnam and Korean wars, how many times did the US take on battalion, brigade or even division sized units? And of course in Korea they took on the whole Chinese Army.
Contrast that with Afghanistan and Iraq. What is the largest element that has engaged a US unit? Company size? (Maybe a battalion if you stretch the meaning of “battalion” to “a couple hundred ragged guerillas?”) And that’s only happened a few times. Most of our engagements are against small groups, 10 to maybe 50 enemy, max.
On the friendly side, too, Korea had Army-level operations, and even in Vietnam there were operations that involved multiple divisions (US, RVN and allied) all maneuvering over the same battle space. From what I’ve seen most of the current US operations involve maybe a battalion, if that.
That’s and interesting point. Perhaps a look at award of the Medal of Honor and Service Crosses during the “low intensity operations” of the 20th Century might be useful.
There were some awards of the Silver Star and Navy Cross in China after WWII, as well as some other in conflicts that few remember.
http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/02_awards/silverstar/4_Congo/congo_1964.html
There have also been “peacetime” awards of the Silver Star on occasion. As I recall, either 1 or 2 (I think 2) were awarded for actions occurring on the Korean DMZ in late 1985 during the Soviet defector incident at Panmunjum.
Hondo-CPT Bert Mizusawa http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/02_awards/silverstar/6_PostRVN/06_korea.html
Assuming these are accurate (and since they are consistent, I’d guess they are), apparently there were 4 awarded for that incident – albeit well after the fact.
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-07-20/news/0007200011_1_lamb-bronze-star-silver-star
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/29/268404336/a-medal-of-valor-thirty-years-in-coming
Yes, as well as several others during the 60’s on the DMZ.
The General Order for the award in Congo is an illuminating document as it includes multiple Bronze stars for non combat zone locations and multiple DFCs and Air Medals for peacetime activities. I can only remember there being one non-combat DFC/Air Medal during my 30 years of service, so perhaps there is some credence to this being a bigger problem in general.
Prior to 2000, award of the Bronze Star for service or achievement did not require physical presence in a Combat Zone – merely supporting combat operations. The matter came to a head in 1999 in Kosovo, when the USAF and USN awarded a fair number of BSM’s to folks who never deployed from home station for supporting operations there.
This led to one of the rare cases where Congress stepped in and did something right. Congress at that point changed Federal law to require someone be in receipt of IDP/HFP in order to receive the BSM.
I’ve written about that before here
http://valorguardians.com/blog/?p=34350
While its hard to judge definitely, as HF/IDP didn’t exist until the early 80’s, it appears that the BSM orders would have met the modern criteria.
I’ll give Congress credit for getting it half right. After instituting the HF/IDP requirement for the BSM, they should have also eliminated the award of the MSM and DMSN in places where HF/IDP is authorized.
While I think the Air Force went way overboard during the Kosovo Air Campaign, I can see the point in their argument to a certain extent. If a guy in WWII hanging bombs or pulling maintenance on a B-17 in England qualified for the BSM, why not a guy/gal doing the same thing in Italy/Germany during Kosovo? Both were equally distant from the front and faced similar “danger”, while equally contributing to the mission. My understanding was that we didn’t have a problem with Airman stationed in Thailand during the Vietnam war who were awarded the BSM.
I’m hopeful that the current Congressional directed awards review (due out in summer 2015) will recommend some fixes, but I’m not that optimistic.
Combat pay (today, formally IDP/HFP) has existed since Korea – 1952, to be precise.
http://militarypay.defense.gov/reports/qrmc/11th_QRMC_Supporting_Research_Papers_Files/SR09_Chapter_6.pdf
So, no: unless the individual was drawing IDP/HFP (or whatever it was called at the time), BSMs awarded for service outside a designated combat zone prior to 2000 would not qualify today. Receipt of IDP/HFP is now a legal requirement to receive the BSM. It’s why civilians no longer can receive one.
Don’t blame Congress for that latest bit of stupidity allowing award of non-combat decorations like the MSM in combat zones. From 1969 until 2004, that was verboten. DoD changed the rules on that internally in 2004.
In 2004, the services reacted to the award of “cheapie” BSMs for duty in safe rear locations like Kuwait, Qatar, etc . . . that were combat zones in name, but were really nothing more than peacetime hardship duty tours. Rather than drop the “combat zone” designation for such locations, the services decided to allow the award of non-combat decorations in a combat zone for “non combat service”.
The resulting cluster-f**k was predictable. A previously clear situation now became subject to abuse, and indeed shortly was abused. I know of multiple instances where an individual left Iraq with a CAB – and an MSM for “non-combat service”. At the same time, others in the same unit assigned to HQ in Kuwait who never saw shots fired in anger (and never even heard a shot fired in anger unless they made a “tourist trip” to Iraq or Afghanistan to visit deployed forward elements) got BSMs.
That doesn’t pass the “smell test”, and is idiotic – as well as just plain wrong. But it indeed happened.
Saw BSMs awarded to enlisted as “service” awards after DS/DS – E6 and above: BSM, E5 and below: ARCOM.
Officers got MSMs. All the wife of one of my friends got was a PH and a flag. Gotta love that “friendly” fire.
Thanks for the info. Looks like we have Don Rumsfeld and Dr. Chu for that.
The whole “Combat Zone” designation is out dated and based on combat between nation states and not an amorphous network that views national boarders as but a line on the map. Its probably just time to do away with it all together, and either you serve in an area that meets the HF/IDP standard and support the operation or not. (I’m thinking of how the Philippines was handled as an example, but that’s a discussion for another day). As an aside, you know that Syria is not part of the combat zone?
FWIW. I believe that there is significant reticence to award MOH and DCS (and perhaps the SS also) to living service members due to the out sized importance that the award may have on future selections/promotions. That probably says more about how poor the evaluation systems are than anything else, but it is what it is.
Um, regarding Syria and IDP/HDP:
http://www.stripes.com/news/dod-announces-changes-to-imminent-danger-pay-1.260479
See the para beginning, “The following areas were recertified . . . .”
They were re-certified for HF/IDP (as was most of Saharan and East Africa) only.
Syria has never been part of the Combat Zone, due to it being an allied country during Desert Storm. It was not included in the OEF combat zone (which pretty much included all the CENTCOM countries with any US presence) due to it being a part of the EUCOM footprint at the time.
By the time Syria and Lebanon became part of CENTCOM the political winds had shifted and it was impractical to add them.
For legal purposes – including award of the BSM – designation as an IDP area is what’s required. It’s also what’s required to qualify for for Combat Zone Tax Exclusion as well.
Commonly, the entire area designated for IDP/HFP has been referred to as the “combat zone”. The current policy of declaring huge tracts of land that have zero ongoing hostilities as qualified for IDP/HFPd (and thus part of the “combat zone”) is misguided. But we’ve been doing it since DS/DS.
Hondo, If only it was that simple. “Combat Zone” has a very specific legal meaning in the US Code and it actually is separate from HF/IDP status. As they laws that established the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion and HF/IDP were enacted 35 years or so apart, they are not directly linked and each has its own process for who can turn on/off each. The President has the sole authority to establish and disestablish a Combat Zone via Executive Order, which then kicks in the tax exclusion (as well as some other benefits). The SECDEF has the authority to establish the locations where HF/IDP is authorized. As a result of the disconnect, there are locations where the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion is still in effect, but HF/IDP is no longer authorized (currently this now includes much of the Arabian Peninsula, waters of the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, and Albania). When DOD completed its review of HF/IDP and announced in December of last year that it would cut off many of this location effective this summer, the intent was for the White House to complete and issue an Executive Order that also closed much of this combat zone also. Obviously, that didn’t happen. My wild ass guess is that it won’t happen any time soon as we are now flying combat missions from aircraft carriers and land bases in the region. I am 100% in agreement with you that this is out of control. For years, there were folks who were receiving the tax benefits and HF/IDP while not really being exposed to realistic levels of danger. However, on the other hand, there were also folks who were serving in dangerous isolated locations, without significant US support or protection, who were taking the fight to the enemy by working with and thru local forces, who were not receiving the full benefits that Congress intended because they fell on the wrong side of some predetermined line where the Combat Zone designation was not in effect. (Individuals who served in Lebanon and Syria over the last 13… Read more »
Appending the above: Yes, we have had some big battles – the second battle of Fallujah comes to mind. I think there were a couple thousand enemy fighters there dislodged by (I think) a brigade combat team from the Army and one from the Marines.
But I think if you look at the history of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, battles like that were rare. In Vietnam, by contrast, we were fighting the equivalent of a Fallujah every couple of weeks and in Korea it was like that pretty much every day.
Precisely, Jumper. In Vietnam there were constant, ongoing battalion and brigade sized operations that led to frequent engagements with enemy forces of equal or greater size. Those engagements were almost entirely infantry and close air support.
Not sure that’s it, PT.
Special Forces peak strength during Vietnam was only about 13,000 – and I don’t all of them were ever deployed to Vietnam at the same time. Even if they were, that’s only about 2.5% of peak US strength in Vietnam.
I don’t believe Special Forces in Vietnam generally fought as large units. I could be wrong.
Special Forces soldiers wee awarded 19 MoHs in Vietnam – or roughly 7.4% of the total. That’s about 3x the number of MoHs you’d expect to be awarded to a group that comprised at most 2.5% of the deployed forces.
I think something else is in play. Not sure what.
Special Forces teams generally were supporting Company and Battalion size units while they were performing their missions (especially early in the war).
COL (then CPT) Roger Donlon’s award for the defense of a BN size camp at Nam Dong and SFC Eugene Ashley posthumous award for the defense another BN size camp at Lang Vie are but two of the best know examples. Each of the camps were attacked by Regimental size or better NVA units.
In both of those actions, SF was at those camps in a force-multiplier role – e.g., they were there to train and assist indigenous forces. At Lang Vei, only 24 US personnel were present. At Nam Dong, only 1 SF ODA – augmented by a single Australian advisor – was there.
Poetrooper’s point was that Vietnam involved US large-unit maneuver and fighting in comparison with the GWOT – thus (presumably) offering more opportunity for heroism. SF’s experience and award rate shows that is not the underlying difference. Fighting while advising/assisting (by US standards) relatively poorly-equipped and poorly-trained indigenous force is hardly the same as fighting in a large-scale battle as part of a larger US force. I’d guess the former (advisor/trainer role) would offer more such opportunities. I could be wrong.
“I don’t believe Special Forces in Vietnam generally fought as large units. I could be wrong”
Depends on what you mean by “Large units?” From my recollection it was normal for an ODA to be attached as advisors (i.e. combat leaders in most cases) to a much larger CIDG, Montagnard, LLDB (VN SF) or other indigenous unit. So while the US element might have just been one ODA (12 men), they were often fighting as part of a battalion or even a brigade.
True. But in most cases, the combat capability of those indigenous units was not anywhere close to the same as that of a similarly-sized US unit. With exceptionally rare exceptions, they were not as well equipped, trained, supplied, or supported as equivalent US units.
Poetrooper’s implication was that the reason the US experience in Vietnam was different was that it was largely a “large US unit/large engagement war” – leading to more opportunities for heroism (and thus proportionally more awards of the MoH) than the GWOT. My point is that SF didn’t fight that way in Vietnam (as part of large US units) – but SF’s rate of being awarded the MoH was far in excess of what would be expected by raw numbers. If anything, it seems that indicates that small US teams embedded with indigenous forces in Vietnam had proportionally more opportunities for heroism than US conventional units.
Vietnam award inflation? Say it ain’t so Joe…I mean John Kerry.
re: WWII “…service at sea or in the air in general offers far fewer opportunities for the level of heroism required for award of the MOH than does land combat…”
There are a lot of sailors, marines, and soldiers of the WWII Pacific campaign who would have issue with that remark. Heroic it is for one to thrown oneself on a grenade to save a comrade. But, should the entire crew of a tin can get the MOH for taking torpedoes meant for a carrier? Time after time, crews of Allied Navy small ships literally sacrificed themselves to buy time for other assets to survive.
Europe was the “important” war. Nimitz fought the Pacific war with table scraps for two years before new ships, aircraft, and reinforcements began to arrive.
Outside of the many “D-days” of our forces in the Pacific, there is one story that every veteran should know:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar
http://www.bosamar.com/
The truth is, in pitched warfare like WWII, when opposing forces each had considerable destructive capabilities, the instances of both heroism and cowardice are replete throughout, regardless of uniform, platform, or theater.
By the same token you have to ask to what extent do the actions of a ship reflect the will of the commander. CDR Evans was awarded the MoH for his actions during the Battle of Samar, and rightly so, and the rest of the “tin can sailors” fought heroically, but a ship’s commander exerts a degree of control over his ship that is probably impossible for land component commanders. A soldier can usually run from a fight, not so much a sailor.
My late father and one uncle were World War II Navy vets, FormerUSN. Three other uncles were Army in the same War (one by blood, two by marriage).
The two Navy vets came home whole from that war. Of the three Army vets, one came home whole; one came home severely shot up and permanently disabled. The third came home in a box.
One of them came home with a SS. It wasn’t one of the three who came home whole.
I am not denigrating naval or air service (my dad later continued his service in the USAF). But I’ll stand by my statement: the naval and sir services simply don’t in general offer the same number of opportunities for members to display combat heroism as do the ground arms.
A primary reason is that by design modern sea or air combat is virtually always conducted from substantial standoff distance – distance generally measured in hundreds to thousands of meters. Ground combat is not.
No disrespect intended, and my sincere respect for the service and sacrifices of your family.
Let us agree on the point that close danger and direct contact with enemy forces is a deciding factor for valor, which typically focuses on ground troops. Yet, it depends on the conflict.
Navy pilots have a tendency to fly lower than the AF, Marines even lower, and A10 pilots might as well be grunts. Then, there are the Navy river rats who consistently drive into hellfire.
Overall, I wonder if it really doesn’t just boil down to politics. For example, I was a 4-oh cold warrior in ASW, but never even got a Navy achievement medal, though something highly prevalent among cooks and drivers for captains and admirals. I was a blackshoe in an aviation command and had a reputation for making things happen regardless of whom was bothered by it, so go figure.
My personal philosophy: I am sincerely thankful for the sacrifice of each and every person who has given more than their fair share for preservation of freedom and triumph over evil. Ya don’t have to have a medal to impress me.
Another Stat I think that relects on the % of the award is how many people were KIA per MOH awarded.
Im WWI there were about 445 men KIA for every one MOH awarded the totals are as follows
WW1 445-1
WW2 616-1
Korea 146-1
Vietnam 258-1
GWOT 325-1
Another comment on the WW2 ratio, a good portion of the casualties were Army Air Corps and US Navy.
While ground combat can provide witnesses to bravery, the loss of a ship ( or a campartment of it) and an Aircraft is often instaneous and catostrophic.
There are probably scores of Airmen and sailors whose unwitnessed last deeds were extremely heroic but were never witnessed.
World War II casualty data actually supports the point I made above.
Published figures say 16 million served in the US military during World War II, with approx 75% serving overseas (and thus in harm’s way). Conveniently, 1945 manpower figures for the services (USN/USMC/US Army) total approximately 12 million. So for a rough approximation, I’m using those numbers for the numbers deployed overseas during World War II. (I’m not including the USCG as their number of WIA is not available; I’m also not including US Merchant Marine casualties.)
Using those numbers and MicroSoft Excel, I get the following:
Manpower:
Army, 68.2%; Navy, 27.9%, USMC, 3.9%
Dead:
Army, 78.5%; Navy, 15.5%, USMC, 6.1% (these don’t add to 100% due to roundoff error)
Wounded:
Army, 84.2%; Navy, 5.6%, USMC, 10.2%
Total Casualties:
Army, 82.1%; Navy, 9.3%, USMC, 8.6%
Other sources say that the Army Air Forces incurred roughly 12% of the US Army’s casualties in World War II (though they were more highly skewed towards KIA than even the Navy’s figures) and had a total casualty rate 1/2 that of the Army overall (5.1% for AAF, approx 10% for the Army overall).
Bottom line: your chances were much better of making it home alive if you were Navy or AAF than if you were in one of the predominantly ground elements (Army or USMC).
Thing with the AAF is that it was usually an “all or nothing” deal.
The AAF suffered about 52,000 KIA, which is more than the Navy or USMC.
They died with a full belly and after a good nights sleep in clean sheets but were just as dead.
I was looking up some of the casualty rates among bomber crews during certain periods of the air war, and they exceeded that of Iwo Jima.
That is true. However, the same was more-or-less for the Navy as well. Far more people in the Navy were KIA than WIA – roughly a 2:1 ratio, if I recall correctly. That’s not as skewed as the AAF’s ration of about 3:1, but it’s still the opposite from what the guys on the ground experienced.
And in both the AAF and Navy, you had a much better overall chance of going home alive than if you were non-AAF Army or USMC. Ditto for your chances of going home uninjured.
Now we are skinning the cat. Great conversation.
Cause of death now factors in.
Survival rates althought high in recent years due to advancements in protective equipment and field level medical care no doubt would have an effect if we were to use above numbers. However, I now respectfully ask Hondo to look more closeley at the numbers considering some of the metrics offered.
Not to debunk Hondo’s premise but to see if all other numbers support original therory.
Again, very interesting conversation.
All else being equal, the ratio of KIA to MoH recipients should be expected to decline over time due to continuing advances in protective gear, medical technology, and MEDEVAC speed.
World War I’s ratio may be skewed (not sure which way) due to it being our first major modern war, and also the first in which multiple decorations were available for battlefield heroics. Naval and AAF losses during World War II (ships’ crews and aircrews lost w/o witness – and thus with no recognition for any heroic acts that might have been performed during their loss) IMO probably accounts for the unusually high ratio of KIA to MoH recipients in that conflict.
Neither reason explains why the ratio for the GWOT is so unusually high compared to Korea and Vietnam – which have very comparable KIA to MoH recipient ratios. (The correct ratio for Korea seems to be about 250:1 vice 146:1 – 146 was the number of MoHs awarded during Korea, and the total lost in Korea was 36,516.)
Serious question…is there any data on how many people were submitted for the MoH and had their awards downgraded?
I’d guess the services have (or could get) those numbers. I’d also guess it will be a cold day in hell before they release them publicly unless ordered to by Congress or the courts.
Has anyone factored in award revisits long after the war? I don’t want to imply award inflation on review but it seems we’ve seen a number of WII and Vietnam awards 40 and 70 years after the war. Was over. I won’t pretend to know the numbers but with a rare award like the MoH even 10 is more than statistically significant.
There really haven’t been that many – around 20 for World War II, and about half that for Vietnam if I recall correctly.
Without those, you’d still have over 450 MoHs awarded for World War II and nearly 250 awarded for Vietnam. The numbers would change, but not greatly.
The biggest reason for the “Late” awards happened in the 1990s when there was a call for a review of awards for minorities. Several Lower awards were upgraded to the MOH because it was believed that race played a role in the lesser awards beig given.
As a quick addition after “correcting” the awards from WW2 7 African Americans were awarded the MOH. Interesting enough the KIA to Medal of Honor Ratio For Africam Americans was about 100 KIA for eery one Medal of Honor.
Real interesting thread. Here are are a couple thoughts I have. Regarding GWOT. Iraq MOH 4 all Posthumously awarded, now I wonder how many of the DSC and NC were downgraded MOH? For instance SGT Rafael Peralta KIA in Operation Phantom Phury. Or perhaps the Corporal Jonathan Yale and Lance Corporal Jordan Haerter and their heroism in Ramadi. Or Perhaps SGTMAJ Kasal. I am sure there are others.
Then Afghanistan MOH there are 12, all living. Now I don’t mean to diminish the conditions these men fought under or their acts of heroism. I didn’t serve in that theater,though many of my friends did and the stor
ies I hear of Wardak,Korengal and Sangin are rough to put it litely.
I guess my point is how much does politics play? OEF is blessed by the UN and awarded the UN medal and OIF is not.