Soviet vs. US comparison in A’stan
In this morning’s Wall Street Journal (it may require subscription), Yaroslav Trofimov compares the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the current US operations there;
There are major differences between the two conflicts. For one, unlike the isolated Soviet Union, America operates in Afghanistan under a United Nations mandate, part of a coalition of 42 allies. Allied dead, currently 1,528, are barely one-ninth the Soviet toll. Afghan civilian deaths are a small fraction of the estimated one million killed in the 1980s.
Afghans who compare the two campaigns acknowledge the differences, yet argue that these aren’t always in America’s favor. An examination of this debate over the Soviet experience offers an insight into what American troops are up against — and the issues President Obama must weigh as he decides the course of an unpopular and costly war he didn’t start.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also faced a troop-increase request during his first year, for a war he had inherited. Soviet generals in 1985 asked for tens of thousands more soldiers to bolster their 100,000-strong contingent, roughly the same size as the current Western force in Afghanistan.
Trofimov tries to give cover to Obama and Gates for taking so long to make up their minds about troop increases, but it falls flat. There is no excuse for delaying the inevitable. Obama knows he can’t re-elected if he quits in Afghanistan despite the unpopularity of the war – Americans don’t tolerate quitting and Obama would get all of the blame, no matter what Americans tell pollsters.
Category: Barack Obama/Joe Biden, Military issues, Terror War
I’ve asked this several times before, but never get a response. What does victory in Afghanistan look like?
To me it is:
1. When Afghanistan can talk care of themselves without having to worry about terrorist attacks. Because the top down effect does not work as it does over here.
2. The elimination of the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a threat in the area.
3.After that is done, try to remove the influces of the Warlords so that a new group does not replaces the Taliban there.
Those are just some of the things I would like to see happen.
Spork,
Those are certainly lofty goals. However, it would require remaking Afghanistan’s entire structure. The country, as with many in that part of the world, was created by outside forces. The Warlords are tribal elders and cheiftans whose power goes back centuries. Moreover, overthrowing that power feeds into the Pashtun belief that they have been fighting enemies bent on destroying their culture and way of life for centuries.
Secondly, eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in the area is likely to be nearly impossible if the theatre of operations is not expanded to include Pakistan. Looking at recent history, Al Qaeda has not needed a base of operations in any one country to attack western intersts. Moreover, there have been reports of the strategic use of the Afghan theatre as a sort of training ground whereby would be terrorists test their metal against U.S. forces and take what they learned home. Additionally, denying them Afghanistan does not deny them other areas. Esssentially it becomes a game of whack-a-mole.
Would it not be better to turn military power to tightening our border security and coastal defenses?
Hey Joe…Howya doin?…
It should be noted that I am basing this off of my time in Iraq.
I do not think it would, because it can work with each village because the all about operate on their own. What needs to happen is for us to know how this system works so we can help them. He talks about this in detail.
http://www.armystrongstories.com/blogger/nathan-moore/
Except that you cannot view the village elders that way. From what I have seen with the local villages elders work in a different way. The Warlords almost act like reckless mercenaries rather then villages elders.
Except Afghanistan was being used a training center well before we got there. So I do no agree with the view that we have helped them by being there.
How would soldiers help because the 9/11 attackers got in legally. There is no way that stationing soldiers on the border will change things as far as security goes.
But it was its social agenda — women’s literacy, land reform and abolition of the dowry — that infuriated the conservative Afghan society and inflamed an Islamist insurgency.
–Interesting article. Trofimov has a point here; these are still controversial ideas in much of the country and doubtless contribute to insurgent ranks.
But there are other factors which buttressed the anti-Soviet, anti-DRA groups that aren’t in evidence today. For example, he doesn’t mention the Soviet-DRA destruction of villages that displaced and alienated so many rural dwellers. The devastation of Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure is still an issue; before the civil war, Afghanistan was a net food exporter. Soviet artillery and air power drove millions into refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan, from whence they were recruited, armed, and sent back to fight across the border. The Soviets also somewhat naively deployed soldiers from the Central Asian SSRs; this didn’t always go over well with Afghan allies, much less their enemies.
Trofimov seems to downplay the impact of improved roads and radio networks spreading outwards from the capital but also provincial cities like Herat and Kandahar. My guess is that these developments will be even more transformative than the introduction of gunpowder to local tribal feuds.