Horrific WC-130 Crash That Killed 9
Emergency responders move equipment across Route 21 in Port Wentworth, Georgia, where a WC-130 cargo plane from the Puerto Rico Air National Guard crashed on May 2. The plane was on its way to Tuscon, Arizona, where it was to be decommissioned. All nine people on board were killed. (Sean Rayford/Getty Images)
Military.com | By Oriana Pawlyk
The Air Force WC-130H aircraft veered to the left on the runway, almost rolling into the grass before the crew was able to get it airborne.
The pilot quickly made the decision to return to the Georgia airfield they had just departed. The pilot directed the shutdown of engine one, operating on the remaining three.
“Coming back,” the pilot repeated five times over the next 30 seconds.
Investigators said that within those few seconds the pilot improperly applied nine more degrees with the left rudder, “which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the [mishap aircraft’s] departure from controlled flight.”
No other “meaningful direction” was given to the crew other than an order to “brace” just before impact.
The plane was airborne for two minutes overall before it crashed down into Georgia State Highway 21 roughly 1.5 miles northeast of the Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport, killing all aboard.
A newly released mishap report determined that the WC-130 crash that claimed the lives of nine members of the Puerto Rico Air National Guard earlier this year was largely due to pilot error. But troubling engine and maintenance issues documented in the aging aircraft raise more questions about the cause of the catastrophic May 2 mishap.
The last link in the accident chain, the catastrophic end to the flight. From what is written here, seems there was an intermittent propeller rpm fluctuation issue on the Number One engine (outboard, left wing). Maintenance was conducted and the problem couldn’t be reproduced.
The fluctuations occurred again right at rotation- the lurch to the left. The crew managed to get the bird aloft and made the right decision to return to the field. I think from the video they feathered Number One then. Maneuvering with an engine out isn’t something most aircraft routinely do; it’s an emergency condition after all, but one pilots are trained to handle. The end factor seems to be pilot error, but the links that put that aircraft in that condition at that place is a matter for the Accident Board for discover- and it did. What was discovered isn’t pretty. What a terrible day.
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I wonder how much of that was “it’s going to the boneyard, so don’t bother.”
I hope to hell that wasn’t the case, and if it was some people should be imprisoned.
Follow the link.
This comment deleted at the request of Ex-PH2.
AW1Ed
If one engine can only maintain 98%, the thinking may have been to operate the other three at 98%, i.e., detune to the least effective or limiting factor.
Broadly speaking, losing a left engine is particularly critical as the mechanical advantage of the right engine(s) has more leverage due to a longer “arm” from the longitudinal axis of rotation.
Losing the outboard left engine is probably worse than losing the left inboard engine as the area of the left wing with the malfunctioning engine leaves that portion of the left wing in a drag situation. Once again, the “arm” has a greater deleterious moment by being farther out on the wing than the inboard engine.
I have never flown anything like a C130 and am only speaking in respect to the perils of multi-engine operations, in general. If memory serves, C130s have enormous vertical stabilizers. Given the distance from the lateral axis, the wings, the rudder would have the greatest impact on stability during low airspeed, high pitch configurations.
For sure, the pilot and crew of that aircraft knew all of that aerodynamic stuff. Using too much rudder in their configuration would almost certainly result in a spin.
What were they thinking?
Rule one of engine out procedure in multi-engine planes is never turn in the direction of the dead engine.
Exception to every rule, rgr. In the P-3, shutting down #1 in-flight was done all the time to conserve fuel. It was just a part of doing business, completely unremarkable, and the pilots would maneuver as needed for the tactical situation.
Other than that I would agree.
Really, where does it say that in the C-130 Dash-1.
I don’t care what it says in the flight manual for the aircraft. All multi-engine pilots are trained that in an emergency engine-out situation when close to terra firma, one does not turn in the direction of the engine not producing power. If one does so, it increases adverse yaw and puts the aircraft in a side slip, further increasing drag and loss of lift on the wing with the dead engine. The pilot here apparently identified the failed/failing engine and feathered his prop, but he failed to properly aviate (another rule one after identifying the bad engine). When he kicked in too much left rudder in a turn into the feathered engine (left turn) he did it as he was approaching min. controllable airspeed, forcing more adverse yaw and a stall of the left wing. At that altitude and point in time it was game over. I might also point out many, many engine-out accidents on departure involve a turn into the failed engine when trying to get back to the departure airport/runway.
In conclusion, that is why the accident report found pilot error was the major cause of the crash. I might also add that it is not uncommon for multi-engine pilots to train shutting down an engine to practice engine-out emergency procedures (or as AW1Ed points out, to conserve fuel), but it is done at thousands of feet AGL, not hundreds, and upon take-off/departure.
Amen.
Just a question, rgt769: couldn’t this accident have been prevented if the pilot had shut down the outboard engine on the opposite wing? I’m just thinking it might have stabilized the plane somewhat.
Just speculating.
Yes but not advisable on climbout after take-off. I am not familiar with the flight performance of the C-130, but most multi-engine aircraft do not have enough power to climb on half-their engines producing power. Shutting down another properly performing engine would not seem to be a recommended engine-out procedure when in a climb-out shortly after take-off. This pilot would have been better served by maintaining a level climb at max power on the other three engines until he reached several thousand feet AGL and then making a shallow turn to the right to go back to the field. Also, he had to have been trained on how to safely fly this airplane with one engine shut down; he just failed to do so, likely in the heat of the moment. In flying aircraft, errors in judgment can quickly put you in the dirt.
Ex PH2:
Your snap judgments, limited knowledge, and outright ignorance of flying operations shines brightly. I’ll bet your life (Ex-PH2), the slain pilot of the aircraft did not wake up and say, “I’m going to purposely kill my crew today.” Second, what were the copilot, navigator, and flight engineer in the cockpit doing? Did you see their flying experience? This was an accident! My fifteen years of flying in the USAF, safety background, aircraft investigator training, and experience conducting numerous safety investigations undoubtedly beats your…4 years in the Navy as a Photographer Mate? I could careless about your brother’s taildragger with one engine. Do you know the difference between engine sounds at 98% versus 100%? Can you hear the outboard engine over the inboard from the cockpit of a C-130? Better yet, which side of the aircraft is the number 1 engine? Which seat was the aircraft commander sitting? What were the cockpit indications? Did he have a faulty instrument? Why did he bank left and not right? Why did his crew say nothing? What were the flight manual procedures for this emergency?
Read and Learn…
First and foremost, anyone not part of the safety investigation board does not have the complete picture. The accident investigation board is a separate board where fault is assigned. The Safety board convenes first, and looks for all the reasons the mishap could have occurred. Personnel can be given a promise of confidentiality to say the truth, even if it is incriminating. The Safety board’s findings are not releasable to the public. Oppositely, the accident investigation is releasable. This is where aircrew can request or hire legal teams. There are no promises of confidentiality. Judgement is based upon the evidence collected, not analyzed by the safety investigation board. I have read safety reports that conclude different casual factors than the Accident boards judgement. It is not uncommon.
Bottom Line: Your criticism of pilot is completely unjustified. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, “it is better to be though of a fool, than to type utterly stupid and inexcusable statements and remove all doubt.”
May the entire crew rest in peace. Flying is dangerous. Mechanics and aircrew make mistakes. The question of criminality is not for anyone on this website to decide with the limited knowledge available.
You are correct concerning your question of criminality. But we can ask questions, even with our limited skill set. For example;
Why did they PIC turn the aircraft 9 degrees more – it seems apparent the aircraft was already in a left turn on a wing with an engine out.
Why didn’t the PIC fly straight ahead, climbing to an altitude where he could better assess the situation and make a more informed decision? Why decide to immediately return to the airport?
Did something happen in the cockpit that distracted the crew from flying the aircraft? Did they get so immersed in dealing with the problem that they ignored the aircraft? It wouldn’t be the first time something like that happened. The most extreme example of that is the crash of Eastern Airlines Flt. 401. The crew was so preoccupied with a burnt out landing gear indicator light that they didn’t notice the autopilot had been disengaged and the aircraft had started a shallow descent in CWS mode. It was this crash that caused many airlines to start CRM (Crew Resource Management) programs that are ongoing programs with every airline today.
Something else I forgot to add in my first comment.
The PIC never declared an emergency, from everything I’ve read. That makes his decision to immediately return to the airport more perplexing.
Geez. I just keep adding.
Evilone03 forgot to tell us that while there are tow separate boards, they aren’t mutually exclusive. In fact, despite what he would have us believe, the Safety Investigation Board’s report comes in two parts. The first part, the factual component, is sent to the Accident Investigation Board and commences the investigation to determine the actual cause of an accident.
I was able to obtain a copy of the investigative report for a mishap of which I was a named witness. The actual cause though was in the Safety report and I am not allowed to see it. Just the Investigation report took the help of my Senator to obtain.
Army ATC,
Thank you for clarifying some of the finer points of the AIB and SIB. My reply was written in haste due to Ex PH2’s asinine comment.
I noticed ExPH2 took her comment down. Her last statement was the 8 souls should rest in peace, the pilot should float around because he allowed the crash to happen. The only words I can think to express for such an ignorant statement are not worth typing here.
We can ask all questions regarding the accident. That is natural and expected. Getting the answers to these questions from the SIB is not expected. From the perspective of the SIB, there are numerous factors to analyze. Mechanical failure, component failure, flight manual procedures, training, and culture are the big five. One can get the indications of an emergency and do everything right, but what if there were no emergency…just a faulty light or noise? Are the flight manuals incorrect? I’m part of a test organization (both DT and OT), where I review the flight manuals. Steps get re-written. Notes, Cautions, and Warnings are added. The old adage, notes, cautions, and warnings are written in blood is true. Training…why did he turn left? Was he taught to expedite getting the aircraft on the ground instead of taking airborne and diagnosing? What does the C-130 community do? What does his unit do? Are they different, and if so why? What was the crew coordination like? Why did his crew stay quiet? Did he shut them down previously or were they more type B personality? Were they trained to speak up or were they flipping through the checklists to find the correct emergency procedure?
In the end, nine service members are dead from a mishap. Families are heart-broken and DoD lost highly trained warriors.
There was a great mini series back in the late 90”s called “Survival in the Sky” I used It for mandatory viewing for both maintenance & pilots for years. Its a little dated, but covers everything from CRM, Weather, Design failures, Pilot and Maintainers. Best series Ive ever seen regarding aviation mishaps. I retired in 2015 after 31 years in the business.
I call BULLSHIT Evilone03. Ex PH2 did not make a snap judgment, she reported the same thing most of us read – pilot error. I have some Air Force time in flying units, actually typed an accident board report for an F-102 once, and served in PACAF IG Safety Division where my job was preparing the quarterly brief for the CINC. So I’ve been exposed to some of this material and rarely was pilot error determined. The O-2 jock who did a barrel roll over the field on his last mission and plowed in was pilot error. I don’t recall many others.
Club Manger, USA ret:
Call bullshit all you want. You don’t have the credentials, the evidence, or the expertise to make the call. You did time in a flying unit…as the snack bar OIC/NCOIC, admin, janitor? Congrats on your typing of an accident board forty plus years ago for a pilot who performed an aerobatic maneuver too low. I’ll bet your life, before the pilot executed that stunt, he wasn’t thinking he was going to plow it in. They are mishaps/accidents. I have yet to be on a board, nor read a safety report, where it stated the pilot intentionally caused his/her death, and the death of the crew. When you are winged aircrew who has the evidence of the SIB and the promise of confidentiality, or have access to AFSAS, I’ll care what you think. Call what you want about my assessment. Her comment about the pilot not resting in peace is bullshit.
You’ve made your point. Move on.
You should do a better job of reading what I wrote. BTW, I typed the accident report 52 years ago and the barrel roll was during Nam in (probably) 71. Since you are a retired O-3 I’ll give you credit for having some enlisted time which translates to you should also display a little common sense. Regardless, nothing is going to placate you so “Well Ain’t That Nice”.
In rethinking my response it was not sufficient to address your high and mighty fucking attitude (forgive me Chaplin). First you belittled Ex PH2 for being a photo mate. Then me for being admin or janitor. You are damn Skippy I was admin at the time and damn proud of it. It was probably me who typed the OER causing you to retire as an O-3. I sure hope you displayed better management skills as a high and mighty accident investigator then you did on this blog. Let me know if you need a translation for “Well Ain’t That Nice”.
EVilonezero3: I fly gliders.
Thank you Ex PH2 for removal of the comment.
The war isn’t between us here my friends.
With the exception of a few non-hackers the gang at TAH is pretty much all on the same wavelength regarding all things military.
It is imperative at this time that we hang together, or we will certainly hang separately and getting in food fights between us is not the way to win the current cold civil war we are all fighting in our own theatres with our own separate methods.
We’re not the enemy, we need to remember that. Latrine Licker Larsyboi always loved to see us argue about things that supposedly were out of our realm…
We sometimes need a referee.
In the meantime, check out some of the great music from Two Steps From Hell.
I’m going out to slay Dragons, Nazgul and Orcs until tomorrow morning…
Star Sky…
Having been the sole witness to a mishap and gone through the grueling interrogation by the investigation team I can only say that things happen so quickly it is difficult to assign blame in the absence of mechanical failure.
Pilot error becomes all that is left and it is very hard to swallow.
May the crew rest forever in level flight.
In any airplane once you get below minimum controllable airspeed in flight you have lost the ability to make effective flight control inputs. It is like turning the steering wheel in your car without it changing your direction of travel. If the pilot cannot increase airspeed and regain control, the plane is coming down.
Amen. Better to have a controlled emergency landing than an uncontrolled crash.
May God bless all of the crew and may they rest in Peace.
Always sad and very frustrating when something like this occurs.
No one will ever know exactly what happened here. Despite extremely careful examination of every piece of anything left behind, including voice recordings, best guess is what we have and all we will ever have.
Of course, it was pilot error. Had the pilot and crew done everything right, every mechanical device on board worked perfectly, the stars all aligned in the heavens, and whatever else was needed, the aircraft would have flown and nine souls would still be with us. A series of mishaps, miscalculations, overcorrections, inability to overcome mechanical failures, and/or other factors conspired to not allow the pilot to maintain control.
Whether it is reasonable to expect the pilot to have overcome whatever factors were in play is impossible simply because we do not know what he was facing exactly.
In my limited experience with this topic it would seem pilot error is the easy out when it’s not clear if other factors were involved. In any emergency, whether in aircraft flight situations or a ground vehicle situation or at sea when something isn’t working properly on the equipment (or even working at all) people make the best judgment they can in that moment based on training and experience.
Sometimes that judgment isn’t enough and tragedy results. Here’s hoping those families find a way to address their grief that allows them some comfort moving forward.
Sounds like it will all come down to the Maintenance log book and whoever signed off on the big red X as to aircraft flying status of that particular aircraft will be the target in the sights of the investigators.
Not a pilot, have been a pax on many a flight. Brother was a wing wiper on everything the AF inventory had from 72 thru 99. He had made the comment that the Chief’s always told him, and he always told his maintainers. You work on and fix this aircraft as if you are going to be flying it with your family on it. He related that on several occasions, the Air Craft Commander would try to over ride his deadlining of the plane, “just because some widget isn’t looking right on the test jig.” From the article, looks like there is some “blame” to go all around. The only people we want to have one less safe landing in proportion to take offs are lying posing lawers. Peace be to the families of these crewmembers. Another example showing that wearing of the uniform can be a dangerous occupation every time, every day.
From the article above:
‘The pilot quickly made the decision to return to the Georgia airfield they had just departed. The pilot directed the shutdown of engine one, operating on the remaining three.
“Coming back,” the pilot repeated five times over the next 30 seconds.
Investigators said that within those few seconds the pilot improperly applied nine more degrees with the left rudder, “which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the [mishap aircraft’s] departure from controlled flight.”’
Pulled engine #1 off line/feathered it, then applied left rudder, which would cause the aircraft to yaw in the direction of engine #1, which in turn would put the aircaft into a skid.
Sounds like the aircraft may have experienced a skidded turn stall at relatively low altitude, from which recovery would be impossible.
As AW1Ed rightly says above: “What a terrible day.”
I recall the video- chilling, and I’ll not post it here.
That’s the thing that always bothers me, whether it’s an IED going off under a US vehicle or a crash. It’s nasty stuff but for the family and friends of those lost, well, you get it.
As in most fatal mishaps, there was no S[ingle] P[oint] O[f] F[ailure]. (SPOF). Whether aircraft, parachutes, weapons, etc., over the years we have engineered most SPOFs out of the system. Read report after report and you will find a common theme: “A” happened. Well, that alone would not have caused the mishap, but then; “B” happened. That made things more dangerous, but the flight was still survivable if correct procedures had been followed, but; “C” happened, and departure from controlled flight was impossible. In this case, it was: “A” The maintenance crew used the wrong tachometer and incorrect procedure in an effort to bring the #1 engine up to full RPM and torque, as a result, the #1 engine would continue to fail to produce full power even after “the repair.” But they didn’t know this because … “B” Contrary to maintenance requirements, they did not run the engine in a “proof of repair” run after the work. They just signed the repair work as “completed.” Then, “C” The pilot, making the first flight of the day and after an engine repair had been made, elected to make a rolling takeoff. The preferred — but not required procedure after engine work — is come to a full stop, set the brakes, run up the engines (making sure all was well), then releasing the brakes to commence the takeoff roll. Anyway … “D” The flight engineer, whose full time mission in life during takeoff is to scan the sets of four dials in front of him that tell him how the four engines are performing, totally missed the dials reporting that the #1 engine was generating 2/3rds the RPM and torque of the other three engines. Easy to say, but as soon as he saw power dipping on #1, he could have called “reject takeoff” and the aircraft was still at low speed with plenty of runway in front to come to a stop, but … “E” When the #1 engine dropped RPM and torque during the takeoff run after a rolling start, it took a while for the pilot to… Read more »
Thanks, Charles, for that accurate and detailed analysis.
Good analysis; step E may have occurred a bit differently. The F/E’s only job at that point is to monitor those four gauge stacks for engine performance. If the fluctuations occurred early in the roll-out he would have announced so, loudly.
I postulate the engine gave no such indications until just before rotation, hence the lurch to the left mentioned in the article.
The crew still managed to get the bird in the air, and the rest of the incident was as written.
Very sad, either way.
I have been schooled. Thanks Charles. Was a lot of local news coverage when this happened, it being right down the road basically, and a major depot level facility 15 air miles away. Back when I was a road warrior, I worked the area of the take off and the crash. Travelled Hwy 21 many a time. Sad beyond saying for the crew. The collateral damage on the ground could have been a whole lot worse. Assigning blame doesn’t bring any one back, but it should help save some one else later.