Plus ça change . . . .
. . . plus c’est la même chose.
It sure does rhyme: US reaction to Moscow aggression echoes Carter’s in 1980
Title kinda says it all.
On a related subject: the following two articles might be of help in understanding the background of the current Crimean situation.
The Transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine – this article was ostensibly written shortly after the transfer of the Crimea from the Russian SFR to the Ukranian SFR in 1954.
This one map helps explain Ukraine’s protests – the article provides a fairly good overview of the political, linguistic, and ethnic situation in today’s Ukraine.
Category: Foreign Policy
I will submit that US reaction to Russia isn’t as muted as everyone is claiming. Just because it’s not in the media, doesn’t mean there’s no response. No, we’re not rolling in there with guns and tanks, but there’s no need to. According to his speech from two days ago, he’s already walking back some of his actions. While the situation is far from stable, it is stabilizing.
Oh, and if anyone is interested, I did blog about the situation in Ukraine recently.
http://thelibertyzone.wordpress.com/2014/02/21/this-is-where-i-was-born/
We reacted “strongly” to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 too, Nicki. But in terms of concrete actions, we did little – because at the time we could do little that would have any real effect on the situation.
The Soviets didn’t leave Afghanistan for over 9 years.
In terms of concrete actions we can take some actions that are not in the military realm. This is a bit of a different situation. Crimea did vote to leave Ukraine. Problem is that this is against the Ukrainian constitution. Crimea has no authority to unilaterally make decisions that impact the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Ukrainians will ultimately need to decide this little dilemma – hopefully without meddling from Russia or the West.
Nicki: agreed, we can take a variety of nonmilitary actions – from diplomatic protests to cutting cultural ties to economic sanctions to withdrawing our Ambassador. How effective any of them will be is anyone’s guess.
I also agree that the final status of the Crimea should be a problem for the Ukrainians and Crimeans to work out. Unfortunately, I just don’t see Russia standing by and letting that happen.
I see Russia backing the result of a Crimean referendum in favor of unification with Russia, regardless of what the Ukraine wants. I think Russia feels that the Crimea is historically Russian territory and that they’re reversing a Soviet-era historical anomaly by reunifying it with the rest of Russia. At this point, I also think they’re willing to do so by force if necessary.
I also don’t see anyone out there with the will – or, frankly, the means – of preventing that from happening.
There are things that bother me about this. Putin and Medvedev both have been very dedicated to integrating Russia into the world stage as not just a legitimate player on the world stage, but also a “derzhava.” They joined the WTO last year. They’ve been very careful to follow the letter of international law (if not the spirit). They’ve been working on Russia’s legitimacy. All of a sudden… this? This was an uncharacteristically stupid move that has sent the ruble tumbling, has created instability on their borders and set the world against them. Given the fact that the ruble’s value has been inextricably tied to their inability to execute past armaments programs, and given the magnitude of this current one, I’m not sure I understand what they’re doing from an economic point of view. Especially now that they’ve quietly begun to walk back their war drums.
Much of Europe is dependent on Russia for oil and for natural gas. Russia is likewise dependent on the EU countries for revenue.
I don’t understand Putin’s rather heavy-handed approach to retrieving ownership of the Crimea. It’s not how you do business in any economy.
However, it may be the only way he knows how to operate: walk in and take over.
He could have used a less aggressive method and gotten the same results.
Ex-PH2: depends on the ultimate objective.
If the ultimate objective was commercial concessions on the part of the Ukraine, IMO you’re correct. However, if the ultimate objective was the reunification of the Crimea with Russia, I can’t see the Ukraine voluntarily allowing that without at least the threat of hostilities or a fait accompli.
It’s the timing of this move by Putin, Hondo, that is most peculiar.
It comes hard on the heels of more than one gaffe by bodaprez and jawbone sKerry, in addition to all the other well-publicized bad ideas by this (lack of) administration, such as cutbacks in the military, and that little dustup last fall with closing national monuments to the public and to veterans. Rememeber that one? And there are many, many more, e.g., removing senior military officers on what I’ve felt are rather thin excuses.
It’s one thing to do something that may or may not be necessary. It is another thing to advertise it all over God’s creation. It’s like liviing in a bad neighborhood and leaving all your doors unlocked, with a sign out front that say ‘Door’s open. Rob me.’
It really does look as though Vlad is yanking the chain to see what will happen and how far he can actually go.
Ex-PH2: yeah, the phrase carpe diem certainly comes to mind for me here. I’m guessing it did for Putin as well.
“It really does look as though Vlad is yanking the chain to see what will happen and how far he can actually go.”
That’s my take. Vlad the Impaler has read his opposition (us and the EU) correctly, and is pushing for all he can get.
Obama wouldn’t make a decent pimple on Putin’ butt, IMO.
Nicki: perhaps the financial repercussions are having a calming effect, and will keep Russian troops out of the eastern Ukraine.
However, I just don’t see Russian troops “walking back” across the Strait of Kerch at this point. Maybe I’m wrong.
Well, we do need to remember that Russia already has military assets there. Putin is walking a very fine line between “occupation” and protection of naval assets. His speech the other day clearly said that a) the demonstrations were legit, and Yanukovych was a corrupt douchebag b) there will be no military intervention, as there’s no need c) There are no plans to annex the Crimea.
For those of you who read Russian, there’s good analysis here: http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=17270
I just don’t feel like translating the entire damn thing.
Here’s a machine translation of the link Nicki posted above. I don’t read Russian, so I’ll have to defer to her on whether or not this “gets the gist” of it or not. But it appears to make sense, so maybe it’s close. Unfortunately, it also seems to predate today’s declaration of intent to hold a referendum on separating the Crimea from the Ukraine and rejoining Russia on 16 Mar. 03/04/2014 War will not … yet Tatiana Stanovoy Russian President Vladimir Putin said after a long pause, finally publicly answered questions from reporters about the situation with Ukraine and Russia’s position on the Crimea. Putin allowed himself to go public only when he had a chance to present not a hawk, and peacemaker. Prewar bluff over would be no war. Judging by the statements of the head of state, a large bargaining begins. Putin made some important statements that make it easier to predict and further steps of the Kremlin, and to understand the overall strategic policy of Moscow towards Ukraine and Crimea. Perov – partly legitimized Maidan. Vladimir Putin acknowledged the domestic political motives of protesters to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych. The latter was quite harshly criticized for corruption, regional policy. Thus Putin essentially bypassed theme “ownership” of the West to the “revolution” and began to speculate theme Ukrainian fascists. The question now is limited to the issue of the legitimacy of the new government. Revolution recognized unconstitutional coup. However, the situation with the words Putin does not seem so bad. Enough legitimacy to one of three conditions: the death of the incumbent President Viktor Yanukovych, a statement of voluntary resignation, impeachment. We can assume that sends a signal to Moscow: dialogue around Kiev can go efficiently and Russia Yanukovych could push for the resignation (which will open the way for formal recognition of the new government), if Kiev together with the West will meet Moscow. Second – military intervention in the near future will not be. Then Putin’s position was quite clear: the war with Ukraine is impossible, but as the main threat to Russia, this factor will retain… Read more »
It’s sort of close. Here’s the thing – today’s referendum means shit. Crimea has no authority to make decisions on the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a whole. A nationwide referendum and perhaps a change in Ukrainian law would be in order here. Then, if Kyiv still refused to allow the Crimeans to go, Russia MIGHT have standing, but overall they don’t, and Putin appears to accept that.
Also, I have no idea why Russia still fears Ukraine joining NATO. First of all, that would require a repeal of a law passed a few years ago prohibiting Ukraine from joining any military alliance, and second, there’s no appetite for enlargement in NATO. None.
Carter…now Obama. Who says history does not repeat itself.
Ya think?
The last Democratic president with “balls” was JFK. Clinton had them too, but a different type.
JFK has the reputation of having been a decisive and dynamic leader in foreign policy matters. But I’m not sure that reputation is deserved.
He certainly wasn’t decisive regarding the Bay of Pigs, refusing to commit US forces and leaving the invasion force stranded. Khrushchev manhandled him at the Vienna Summit in 1961. He dithered concerning what to do about Laos for some time, and finally agreed to a “settlement” that effectively ceded the eastern half or more of that country to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. He similarly half-stepped along in Vietnam, adding smallish numbers of additional US forces here and there vice making a decision to either go to war or go home. And even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, some on the Joint Staff thought JFK had been too timid in not invading Cuba and deposing Castro.
The mystique of JFK lives on due to his personal charisma and early death. However, the reality is that his administration’s foreign policy accomplishments don’t hold up all that well under scrutiny.
No, but his decision to run a Naval blockade was decisive. Not that I agree with all that. We’ve gone back to accepting Vietnam. Cuba is no worse.
That’s open to debate. Some of the JCS were advocating outright invasion of Cuba. If I recall correctly accounts I’ve read, LeMay in particular was reportedly incensed at the imposition of a naval “quarantine” vice an order to bomb the missile sites, invade Cuba, and depose Castro.
When “great powers” (read: Stalin) draw lines on a map, it doesn’t always reflect the facts on the ground. Granted, Putin’s actions have been heavy-handed by our standards (restraint by his standards?). Could it be that parts of the Ukraine logically belong in Russia?
I don’t think Putin enjoys doing this, by some tortured Russian logic he feels he has to. Once cooler heads prevail, one could hope for an amicable separation like the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
As someone else pointed out, this is simply nothing more than a land grab.
And why not?
With the fall of US unipolarity, take what you can when you can.
Just look around.
We are to worried about gay marriage and elections to worry what is happening around the world.
And those oceans are not as large as they used to be.
Know what I mean?
Has anyone been asking what the Ukrainian people themselves want?
Joe: read the linked WaPo article. It’s pretty clear that the Ukranian population is fairly well divided on the issue of whether to align to the northeast (Russia) or the west (EU), somewhere around 50/50. The last 2 presidential elections have been split, with a pro-western candidate winning in 2004 and a pro-Russian candidate winning in 2010. Parliamentary elections were split similarly.
The eastern and southern parts of the are more heavily pro-Russian, while the northern and western areas are generally pro-western. The language divide (Ukrainian and Russian are related but different Slavic languages) is along similar lines.
Ethnic mix is similar, with ethnic Russian minorities of varying numbers in most areas but most heavily concentrated in the east and south. The exception is the Crimea, where ethnic Russians are the majority. The trans-Dniestr region next to Moldova is also problematic, as if I recall correctly it also has a non-Ukrainian ethnic majority (Bulgarian/Romanian/Russian).
Bottom line: I’m guessing the Ukrainian people as a whole are divided on the issue, pretty much along lingutistic and ethnic lines. Overall, I’d guess the split is somewhere around 50/50, give or take – but that varies hugely by location.
Actually, recent polls say there’s a slight majority that wants closer to the West, and about 42 percent want Russia. Pro-Ukrainians on the ground are shrieking bloody murder, saying the majority that wants the West is actually much bigger than that and that the polls are rigged by pro-Russian forces. There’s a lot of rhetoric on both sides right now.
Nicki: I did say “somewhere around 50/50”. 51-42-7 (with the last being “undecided/no opinion”) isn’t that far from an even split. It also sounds about right to me nation-wide, given the fact that the Ukraine is somewhat more than 50% ethnically Ukranian and some from either ethnic group will vote “crossways” for other reasons (family ties, business, ideology, etc . . . ).
I would like to see the breakouts by region, though. I’m guessing those show about the same splits that maps of past elections and language patterns show.
On the one hand, if the Ukraine split up it would be one more case of the Balkanization of the world. One would like to think multiethnic, multilingual countries could flourish and prosper as in Belgium or Canada. But even those very civilized countries have secessionist movements. Maybe in some countries the internal pressures are too great, and the historical animosities are too bitter to coexist peacefully. I don’t think there is a general rule, like “preserve all multiethnic countries”, or “let all multiethnic countries split up along ethnic lines”. Exceptionalism and jingoism aside, it’s tough problem, and not just in the Ukraine.
Joe: I would agree – the problem’s not an easy one at all.
I will also say that, looking at history, a common culture/language/ethnic background appears to be more important than political ideology in determining which nations persist over time. China and Japan remain China and Japan, regardless of the ideology of their rulers and form of government.
Their former imperial conquests, however, don’t in general remain a part of China and Japan. IMO this is precisely why China today is busily attempting to settle ethnic Chinese in Xinkiang and Tibet, and to erase the previous culture of those regions – neither of which were previously Chinese by culture or ethnic origin.