“We . . . pushed our luck one day too long”
The Air Force is often ribbed about being the least military of the services, and about being the least “hardcore”. Frankly, there’s an element of truth to that. Life in the USAF appears to be closer to civilian life than any of the other services. USAF facilities and working conditions are generally better than in the other services. It’s a running joke that when building a base the USAF first builds the clubs, MWR facilities, and housing, starts building the runways – then runs out of money and asks Congress for a supplemental appropriation to finish the runways and buy the planes. (smile)
Still, elements of the USAF serve at risk like the other services. At times, they serve valiantly – and tragically.
What follows is a short version of one such incident. The story was suppressed for years, and though now public it is still is not well known. It is the story of the fall of Lima Site 85 – a facility that did not at the time officially exist.
Background
US military involvement in Laos officially ended in 1962, when the US agreed to respect Laotian neutrality. The Laotian Civil War, however, continued. The US and North Vietnam thus continued to support opposing sides in that conflict – the US, the Royal Laotian government under Prince Souvana Phouma, the North Vietnamee the Pathet Lao.
After the 1962 neutrality agreement, US support to and activity in Laos for a time was largely clandestine. The same is true of later US operations in Laos which supported the widening war in Vietnam. This remained the case in 1964 and 1965, as US bombing campaigns (e.g., Operation Barrel Roll) in Laos were not publicly acknowledged.
However, the start of sustained air operations against North Vietnam – Operation Rolling Thunder – pointed out the operational need for navigational aids for those US bombing operations. These could be most effectively provided from northeastern Laos – which was within a reasonable distance of both Hanoi and Haiphong, primary targets of Rolling Thunder operations. The site chosen was Phou Pha Thi – a mountain in northeastern Laos approximately 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border. An unmanned TACAN was installed at that location in August 1966.
While useful, TACAN was not sufficient support for US bombing operations in North Vietnam. During the Southeast Asian rainy season – roughly Nov through April – visual bombing was often not feasible. Because of the decision to officially observe Laotian neutrality, the US was unable to deploy military forces to Laos or establish military facilities there. The decision was therefore made to establish a clandestine AN/TSQ-81 radar site at Phou Pha Thi.
The site would be staffed by USAF personnel who would be temporarily discharged from active duty and employed as civilian “technicians”, and who would then be reinstated in the USAF on completion of their duties in Laos. (The process was referred to as “sheep dipping”, and was essentially the same process applied to U-2 pilots working for the CIA while the U-2 was overflying the Soviet Union.) The program was called “Heavy Green”. The site at Phou Pha Thi was referred to as Lima Site 85 – the designation of a nearby clandestine CIA airfield supporting Laotian forces under Gen Vang Pao.
The AN/TSQ-81 radar at Lima Site 85 was installed over several months in 1967. It became operational in November of that year. Once operational, this allowed precision bombing of targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during all weather conditions.
Defense of Lima Site 85 was provided by indigenous Laotian forces and their Thai allies. Indeed, initially only US CIA personnel on-site were armed – the “civilian” personnel assigned to the site were forbidden to carry arms for virtually the entire time that the site was in operation.
The site was a mountaintop site, with sheer cliffs on 3 sides. These were thought to be impassible and were left unguarded by local forces. The fourth side was well defended by Laotian and Thai forces. Thai troops also provided local security at the operational mountaintop radar/TACAN site.
However, past experience should have argued otherwise. Phou Pha Thi had previously been captured by Pathet Lao forces in 1959 – by an assault involving scaling one of these supposedly impregnable cliff faces. Ignoring this past history was to prove a serious mistake.
Early Enemy Reaction
The North Vietnamese were well aware of the new capability provided by the AN/TSQ-81 at Phou Pha Thi, and began actions to target it in early 1968. They began moving NVA and Pathet Lao forces to the area. In one of the few documented North Vietnamese air raids of the Vietnam War, they attacked the site by air using two AN-2 biplanes on 12 January 1968. (The air attack caused minor damage, but the site was quickly returned to operational status.) Both attacking aircraft were shot down by a CIA paramilitary officer – Glenn Woods – using an AK-47. Woods was a passenger in an Air America Bell 212 helicopter piloted by Air America pilot Theodore Moore that responded during the North Vietnamese air attack.
However, intelligence reports and other indications showed continuing massing of NVA and Pathet Lao forces around Lima Site 85. Probing attacks showed continued enemy interest. By mid-February, the mountain was surrounded by enemy forces approximately 12 km away. Documents had also been captured which gave plans for an enemy attack on the facility.
Due to the importance of Lima Site 85 to USAF operations in North Vietnam and its political sensitivity, it was controlled by the US Ambassador to Laos, William H. Sullivan. As primary user, the 7th Air Force had extensive input into the site’s operations. This was to prove problematic; Sullivan reputedly vigorously exercised his authority over US activities in Laos, and his relationship with the US military was often antagonistic.
This combination led to several issues regarding operations at Lima Site 85. Because of political considerations, Lao and Thai forces provided site security; US personnel operating the Lima Site 85 facilities were at first completely unarmed and were authorized an insufficient quantity of small arms weapons only a few days prior to the loss of the site. Only Ambassador Sullivan could order the site abandoned – the local site commander did not have this authority – but 7th Air Force’s position was that the site was critical and must be maintained in operation as long as possible. Finally, operational site defense and evacuation procedures were not terribly well-thought-out or practiced, and were lacking in contingency planning in the event of unexpected enemy action.
Sullivan had been advised by the CIA that Lima Site 85’s security past approximately 10 March 1968 was problematic due to enemy activity. However, due to its extreme importance to US air operations in North Vietnam, the 7th Air Force indicated in a 5 March 1968 correspondence that the site “”would not be evacuated until capture appeared imminent”.
Site Capture
After a substantial period of relative calm after the January 1968 air raid, the NVA and Pathet Lao began their final attack on Lima Site 85. A rocket/mortar/artillery barrage on the evening of 10 March 1968 signaled the beginning of the final enemy assault.
During the night, the site’s operational personnel directed air attacks against local targets. However, late that evening Ambassador Sullivan ordered the partial evacuation of the site at first light the following morning. At 0515 the next morning, Ambassador Sullivan changed this order to a full evacuation.
Unfortunately, during the night a team of 33 North Vietnamese sappers had scaled the western cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. At approximately 0300, they began their attack.
Surprise was complete. It is believed that 11 of the 19 US personnel on site were killed outright during the initial assault or died from their wounds not long afterwards. North Vietnamese accounts later received by the US, as well as later interviews conducted with North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao personnel participating in the attack, indicate no prisoners were taken.
The eight US personnel remaining alive at that point were split into multiple groups. Five US personnel had spent the night on a ledge below the operational site (they had been off-duty during the night and had chosen to sleep on the ledge that night vice in their normal lodging area – a decision that likely saved their lives during the initial attack); three were still alive at this point, though two were wounded. Others were on the mountaintop, wounded but still alive. The CIA personnel were at other locations in the vicinity.
The survivors on the ledge were joined by another wounded survivor from the mountaintop and were extracted by an Air America Bell 212 at approximately 0730 on 11 March 1968. Immediately after extraction, one of the survivors was mortally wounded by hostile fire from the ground and died while en route to Thailand.
Air America aircraft and USAF HH-3 helicopters evacuated the remaining survivors, plus a number of wounded Laotian and Thai troops, from various locations on the mountain. Evacuation was completed by approximately 0946 on 11 March 1968.
Site Destruction
As a clandestine facility, Lima Site 85’s operational assets had been rigged for destruction. There is some evidence that site personnel may have disabled or removed at least some of the explosives originally rigged for demolition due to concerns regarding the possibility of sympathetic detonation from enemy mortar/artillery/rocket fire targeting the mountaintop. In any case, the site’s destruction plan (described by various sources as involving the use of both explosive and incendiary devices) was not executed due the enemy achieving complete tactical surprise during their attack.
Due to the clandestine nature of Lima Site 85, a concerted effort was made to destroy any remaining equipment and facilities after the site had been captured. This was accomplished by the USAF on 13 March 1968 via aerial bombardment with high explosive and incendiary weapons. However, during these attacks a USAF aircraft and its pilot were lost.
US Losses
A total of 19 US personnel were present at Lima Site 85 at the time of its loss. Of these 19 US personnel, 8 were accounted for immediately afterwards; 11 were missing in action (MIA) and presumed killed or captured. The 11 US personnel MIA were later all declared killed-in-action/body not recovered (KIA/BNR). An additional USAF pilot was lost during post-battle air operations at Lima Site 85 when his aircraft was shot down.
Seven US personnel returned alive from Lima Site 85: Capt. Stanley J. Sliz, SSgt. John Daniel, SSgt. Bill Husband, SSgt. Jack Starling, Sgt. Roger Huffman, Howard Freeman, and John Spence. Freeman and Spence were CIA paramilitary personnel. (One source differs and refers to one of these individuals as a “Huey Marlow”; it is unclear as to which of these CIA individuals the name “Huey Marlow” refers). Huffman was a USAF Combat Controller present at the site to coordinate local air support.
CMsgt. Richard Etchberger was mortally wounded during the evacuation. He died of his wounds while enroute to Udorn AB, Thailand.
Eleven US personnel were not accounted for after the loss of Lima Site 85 on 11 March 1968. These individuals, all USAF, were Lt. Col. Clarence F. Blanton, MSgt. James H. Calfee, TSgt. Melvin A. Holland, SSgt. Herbert A. Kirk, SSgt. Henry G. Gish, SSgt. Willis R. Hall, SSgt. James W. Davis, SSgt. David S. Price, TSgt. Donald K. Springsteadah, SSgt. Don F. Worley, and TSgt. Patrick L. Shannon. Additionally, Capt. Donald L. Westbrook was lost during post-battle air operations to destroy the remnants of Lima Site 85 on 13 March 1968 when his aircraft was downed by enemy fire. His remains were also initially not recovered.
Remains belonging to TSgt. Shannon, Capt. Westbrook, and Lt. Col Blanton were later recovered and were positively identified in 2005, 2007, and 2012, respectively. Remains belonging to the other nine US KIA at Lima Site 85 have not yet been recovered and positively identified.
Aftermath
Twenty days after the loss of Lima Site 85, the POTUS declared a halt to all US bombing operations in North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel. This declaration removed the operational need for Lima Site 85’s TACAN and radar facilities. No attempt was later made to restore them.
The 11 US personnel lost on Lima Site 85 – technically civilian technicians at the time of loss – were reinstated in the USAF. In 1984, they were posthumously awarded the Bronze Star Medal.
US operations in Laos were first acknowledged in 1970. However, the official after-action report regarding the fall of Lima Site 85 was not declassified until 1988, and reportedly contains errors. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao accounts of the battle were not obtained until several years later.
CMSgt. Etchburger was awarded a posthumous Air Force Cross for his valor in combat on 11 March 1968. CMSgt. Etchburger’s widow was presented his posthumously-awarded Air Force Cross in a private ceremony in January, 1969. His actions on 11 March 1968 saved the lives of at least three wounded comrades.
CMSgt. Etchburger was initially recommended to receive the Medal of Honor. However, although the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. John D. Ryan, reportedly agreed that Etchburger’s valor merited the Medal of Honor, he opted to downgrade the award to the Air Force Cross for political and security reasons.
That injustice was corrected in 2010, and CMSgt. Etchburger’s surviving sons were presented his posthumous Medal of Honor by the POTUS. Unfortunately, his widow did not live to see that injustice corrected; she passed away in 1994.
The fall of Lima Site 85 was the largest single ground-combat loss of USAF personnel during the Vietnam War. Though many factors contributed to the loss of life, the root cause was an error in judgment regarding when the site should be evacuated and destroyed – an error that cost 11 US personnel their lives.
US Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan perhaps summed up the entire situation best in a single sentence in his 11 March 1968 initial cable regarding the site’s loss: “At first glance, however, it appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in attempting to keep this facility in operation.”
Rest in peace, my elder brothers-in-arms. May the remaining 9 of you be recovered and identified soon.
. . .
Author’s note: This brief article was developed from the following on-line sources, with the latter two being primary. In particular, the last two sources give excellent account of CMSgt Etchburger’s heroism on 10-11 March 1968. The first source provides the quote from Ambassador Sullivan which led to the title of the article. These sources are not always consistent, and I have done my best to synthesize multiple sources into a coherent article here. All sources provide additional detail, including maps, photographs, and other graphics associated with Lima Site 85. Errors in this article are mine.
http://www.limasite85.us/the_destruction_of_lima_site_85.htm
http://combat-skyspot.tripod.com/commandoclub.htm
http://www.virtualwall.org/dw/WestbrookDE01a.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lima_Site_85
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November%202010/1110MOH.aspx
http://www.ccshf.org/EOS%20Supplements/EOS%20-%201968069%20-%20SITE%2085.pdf
Several well-respected books have also been written that cover the fall of Lima Site 85, either as a partial or primary subject. One of these books – “One Day Too Long”, by Timothy Castle – covers the fall of Lima Site 85 as it’s primary subject. A list of these books is contained in the Wikipedia article cited above.
Category: Air Force, Historical
We are outside the wire every day in Afghanistan…just like we were in Iraq..Just like we were in Vietnam. Haters gonna hate. Life goes on.
Don’t understand your comment, Lee. And based on what you wrote above, I think you missed the entire point of the article.
Because of poor judgement at higher HQ and political considerations regarding Lima Site 85 influencing tactical operations, for 11 Americans “life goes on” . . . turned out not to be an option.
On a larger scale, the entire Vietnam War was lost due to “political considerations”. The United States military knows how to engage and overcome the enemy but the DC politicians are running the show. That is no way to win a war.
Nobody hating but statistically NAVY and USAF guys don’t seem to be bleeding as much.
Total OIF casualties 36,335 (as of April 5th DCAS report)
ARMY/USMC 35,097.
Same true in Vietnam. Total in-theater deaths 58,220.
ARMY/USMC 53,068.
Jumpmaster: at the strategic level, war is always political. Clausewitz stated that IMO best and most succinctly. There’s no avoiding that fact, no matter how much one might want to. A war’s objective is always a political one.
However, politics can indeed get people killed unnecessarily when it unduly intrudes into the tactical realm. IMO, exactly that was partially to blame here. Poor judgment at a higher HQ remote from the actual fight was the other.
Thanks, COB6.
In case anyone was wondering, here’s what COB6’s numbers show:
In Vietnam, the USA/USMC incurred 91.15% of the total KIAs. The USN and USAF split the remaining 8.85%.
In OEF/OIF, the USA/USMC have incurred 96.59% of the total casualties to date. The USN and USAF have split the remaining 3.41%.
When I refer to the USAF as not being as “hardcore”, this is precisely what I mean. One’s chance of ending up KIA or WIA – or even seeing close combat – is substantially less in the USAF than in those services that typically engage in ground combat. Yes, selected elements of the USAF do that, and yes – occasionally a plane is lost or someone gets wounded or killed by enemy action. But engaging in ground combat isn’t exactly an expected task for most personnel in the USAF. It’s the “nature of the beast.”
At Lima Site 85, ground combat wasn’t supposed to be something expected, either. Unfortunately, things didn’t turn out as planned – and 11 Americans paid for that error with their lives.
Nothing kills like stupid.
2/17 Air Cav: dunno if I’d say “stupid” as much as “tragic and ironic”. Each decision made was plausible from the point of view of the individual making it at the time. The facility was in a neutral country; ergo, it had to be clandestine and non-military. The facility was critically important; ergo, it had to be operated to the last minute. The facility was at risk; ergo, it was to be evacuated the day after it’s security could no longer be assumed. And the site itself is not blameless, either – they were simply not ready for an unexpected attack and had no backup plan regarding how to evacuate if under attack.
One day too late indeed appears to be the case here. And there seems to be plenty of blame to go around.
The back story of how the Air Force and government treated the families is a despicable chapter of military history.
Perhaps somewhat redundant, but additional info here: http://leatherneckm31.typepad.com/leatherneckm31/2008/06/lima-site-85—-1968.html
The stupid I was referring to was the failure to recognize that cliffs can be scaled (as history teaches well), that ‘imminent capture’ is not a good decision point, and that adequate defensive arms and support were not available.
Knew the story (minus some names and details), but thanks for filling those in.
Personally, I’ve long enjoyed our (mostly friendly) inter-service rivalries.
Paraphrasing Hondo, above – The Mission defines the risks to life and limb, not the uniform.
Well researched and well written. They are not forgotten.
Thanks, Hondo!
2/17 Air Cav: I initially thought the same. But on reflection, I’m not so sure.
It’s somewhat unclear as to whether or not the previous scaling of the cliffs at Phou Pha Thi was known to the defenders. I believe I’ve read that after the 1959 defeat at Phou Pha Thi the Royal Lao forces in NE Laos retreated completely across Laos to Thailand – close to 200 miles. Under those conditions, it’s possible the details of the previous battle were not known to the 1968 defenders. In particular, they might not have known about the previous scaling of those cliffs in 1959.
From photographs (see the references) the cliffs on the upper mountain appear reasonably sheer for several hundred feet. Not having seen them personally – and not really having enough expertise to evaluate them in any case – I’m reluctant to second guess the defenders on that score.
In hindsight, obviously the decision was not sound. But it may have been reasonable given forces available (approx 1000 friendlies to defend the entire mountain) and the terrain.
Why there wasn’t a reaction force and/or more security at the mountaintop operational site just in case, however, is a fair question IMO. Ditto why the prohibition on “civilian” technicians being trained in the operation of locally-available weapons (e.g., AK-47s and/or M-16s, whichever were used by the Lao and Thai defenders) and armed with same.
And not having a practiced, well-thought-out plan for evacuation under fire turned out to be fatal.
— break —
Gary Alexander: not sure I agree, at least financially. The families of those lost at Lima Site 85 eventually received benefits from both their “contractor” life insurance and full military benefits (though one individual with a foreign spouse had signed an agreement to the contrary, which was later overturned in court).
As far as being told only limited information at the time and/or having delayed formal recognition of their sacrifice – best I can tell, that unfortunately often is part of the deal in the event of any clandestine operation gone bad.
good story. You’d have hoped that recent history indicating the cliffs could be scaled would’ve been made known in planning their defenses…
@13. From what I’ve read about this elsewhere, after you posted this story, it was a first class, Grade-A clusterf–k. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for the men who volunteered for that duty–but the military planning and leadership above them is an different matter entirely.
I had an uncle lost there…Msgt. James H. Calfee. Recently
his BS with “V” device elevated to SS for Gallantry. Yes, this
entire mission was a Giant C…F… There was no back up plan or evac plan. Finding out more and more about the mission as I uncover docs in many places. The families were treated as third world citizens. I thought we might learn… but then there is Benghazi. Politicians just can’t keep their “secret strategies” to themselves and let those trained for action take
care of business.
Hondo, the sentence, “This was to prove problematic; Sullivan reputedly vigorously exercised his authority over US activities in Laos, and his relationship with the US military was often antagonistic” doesn’t quite capture the regard with which Air America and their primary customer held Ambassador Sullivan. Politics are one thing, Sullivan was something else.
SOG also operated in Laos. Plaster and others report that every US mission into Laos was approved by Sullivan and the White House.
Seems to me if LS85 was as important as the Air Force said then Sullivan should have allowed an effective defense.
The Trail, North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, Vang Pao, and the CIA were all in Laos. Everyone knew that both sides were fighting in Laos and nothing was gained by pretending that we weren’t there. The pretense that we weren’t there suppressed effective operations against the Trail – the same sort of rest and resupply area as NWTA is for the Taliban. “Political decisions” like that and friction in the approval system got a lot of good people killed for no good reason. Allowing our enemy a sanctuary is always bad for us.
About 6 years ago in a museum in Vientiane I asked the tour lady a question about the Trail. She told me, “The Ho Chi Minh trail did not go through Laos”. She did not smile.
In Tim Castle’s book about Heavy Green, he wrote about the attack by the four Colt’s on LS85. Glenn Woods was an Air America flight mechanic, later killed in a crash at 20A. Air America crews did not fly with arms. So how did the crew explain how Woods had an AK to fire at the Colts? The Air America guys tell me, “It must have been left on the aircraft – forgotten by a passenger”. They smile.
Richard: “Air America” was not a part of military. That was a clandestine CIA paramilitary operation. Their relationship with Ambassador Sullivan is thus irrelevant to the discussion here. Regarding how the families of the lost were treated: also true but irrelevant. See my comment 13 above; that appears to be pretty much SOP in any clandestine operation gone bad. The families generally only much later get the full story of what happened. It’s the “nature of the beast”. I agree that trying to keep US involvement in Laos secret was a poor decision; overt involvement would have been defensible given North Vietnam’s continued overt support for the Pathet Lao. Unfortunately, that was the decision made in turn by the JFK, LBJ, and Nixon administrations for strategic and/or political reasons. US involvement in Laos wasn’t publicly acknowledged until 1970. Even that revelation was likely forced by domestic reaction to US operations in Cambodia. And the full story likely still hasn’t been made public. A potentially successful strategy in Vietnam was proposed by the late COL (Ret) Harry Summers in his 1975 work on the Vietnam war entitled “On Strategy”. Summers’ proposal would have occupied some of southern North Vietnam and Laos, and garrisoned the resulting “front line” with about 5 divisions from coast to the Mekong (and into NE Thailand) – thereby cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We would then have trained and equipped the the South Vietnamese army, then told them that the Viet Cong were their problem and allowed them to take care of the Viet Cong as they saw fit. Diplomatic pressure would have been brought to bear on Cambodia to have them cut off the much smaller flow of arms coming to the Viet Cong through Sihanoukville. This would have avoided direct US involvement in the fighting except for operations along a now-well-established battle front, and would have isolated the insurgency in South Vietnam. Corollary benefits would have been to avoid the US being seen as “just another foreign colonial power” by the South Vietnamese as well as the great dislocation of South Vietnamese society caused… Read more »
Hondo, I don’t know if you’ll read this reply, as I only read this post tonight, and you wrote it over a year ago. I am the youngest son of Major Stanley Sliz, whom you are aware was at LS85. Sadly, we lost my father to a heart attack in March 2013. I wanted to say thank you for telling this story, and continuing to do the work you do. If you would be interested in hearing more of the story, we have a lot of documentation from interviews with my dad. You can contact me at the email attached to this reply.