Warship Collision-Could’ve Been Avoided 30 Seconds Before Impact

That was the “last opportunity” to avoid impact. Proper training and the right combination of experiences should’ve given them other opportunities before the collision.

The National Safety Transportation Board issued a report on the USS McCain collision.

In addition to going through restricted maneuvering, they had shifted steering control to aft steering. Something like this requires the ship to show navigation lights declaring restricted in its ability to maneuver. This apparently wasn’t done.

The captain’s night orders called for the ship to reduce to the slowest maneuverable speed in situations like this. However, there was confusion as to what this speed was. Slowest maneuvering speed was rating knowledge or used to be. It was also a question asked on the surface warfare board.

The report itself provided some details regarding watch standing experience and service longevity. Some were transferred over from another ship to the USS McCain. Many qualified not long before the deployment. Thus, they had an experience level that one would expect during the certification phase shortly after a shipyard stay… Long before the training phase for deployment preparation.

Also, there was newer personnel on station. Normally, during restricted maneuvering like this, very experienced personnel were on station.

The US Naval Institute listed the following from the report:

* The decision to transfer the location of thrust control on board the John S McCain while the vessel was in a congested waterway
* The lack of very high frequency radio communications between the vessels
* The automatic identification system data transmission policy for Navy vessels
* The procedures for the transfers of steering and thrust control on board the John S McCain
* The training of Navy bridge watchstanders
* The design of the destroyer’s Integrated Bridge and Navigation System
* Navy watchstanders’ fatigue
* Navy oversight of the John S McCain

The quoted information includes some of the issues normally discovered during a post shipyard “shakedown” underway period. During this underway period, the ship crew finds out what kind of bugs need to be worked out from shipyard work. They also discover the training and operational weaknesses that need to be worked on.

The experiences gained during this “shakedown” cruise influenced the training plan for the following underway periods. These issues were worked on from shakedown until certification. By the time the pre-deployment workup phase arrives, the crew is pretty much working together, and getting results, as if it were second nature.

This may not have been the case here. Those with CIC/bridge/engine-room watch standing experiences might “cringe” at some of the things that the report says. The US Naval Institute has the report imbedded in its article.

The Washington Examiner and the US Naval Institute provide more details.

Category: Navy