The war? That old thing.
The Stars & Stripes reports that, even though Americans have stopped paying attention, there’s still a war going on.
More than a decade since the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom on Oct. 7, 2001, there are still 54,000 American troops in Afghanistan. That is more, by far, than at any time during the first seven years of the war, yet these days, they garner scant news coverage. Most recently, Syria’s civil war and the use of chemical weapons as well as the federal government shutdown have buried Afghanistan news, even as Americans continue to die — four were killed within a week in so-called insider attacks just at the end of September.
“There is a bloody war happening, and no one is talking about it,” said Ahmad Majidyar, an Afghanistan expert at the American Enterprise Institute and a frequent adviser to the U.S. Army.
The U.S. role is diminishing and casualties among members of the U.S.-led international coalition are down as the Afghan security forces take over more of the fighting. But Americans are still fighting — and dying.
Yeah, well, who can expect us to know all of that without Code Pink stomping their angry little feet in front of the White House daily? Code pink is more concerned with helping Iran build their nuclear program and wiping out Israel than any war their President is fighting. IVAW, the anti-war group who complained daily about the war in Iraq and then shifted focus to Afghanistan when they started being irrelevant when Iraq left the front page are now more worried about Syria and poor little traitor Chelsea Manning than the 102 soldiers who lost their lives in Afghanistan this year.
Public ambivalence about Afghanistan stems in part from the failures of the past few years, which, despite the surge of foreign troops, saw a sharp rise in casualties; violence remained above the pre-surge levels after the additional forces left, Smith said.
“The short attention span of the West is such that if the problem hasn’t been solved by now, maybe they figure it’s unsolvable, which is too bad because I think what Afghanistan needs right now is continued engagement,” [Graeme Smith] said. “In a lot of ways, a lot of Afghanistan’s future depends on whether Western nations feel guilty enough about the mess they made to stay involved.”
Yeah, well, “the failures of the last few years” happened because before the surge in Afghanistan even began, this administration was making plans to withdraw. The President wouldn’t give the generals the number of troops they asked for, despite CIA and DoD predictions that what is happening would happen, and now because the president’s compromise staffing has failed the country, failed the troops who served in Afghanistan, he doesn’t want to talk about, the pliant media follows suit, and it all falls off the national radar.
“The mess they made” can be laid at the feet of this Administration and it’s failure to make any commitment to destroying our enemies. A scant few months ago, we were told that al Qaeda has been “decimated”, yet we see evidence of the fact 13 years hasn’t even put a dent in their activities. We were told that the drone program has limited them, but the last few weekends have been full of news of al Qaeda.
It’s war as a campaign platform, with a real cost in lives and national security that doesn’t seem to matter to anyone. It’s a serious lack of leadership.
Category: Barack Obama/Joe Biden, Code Pink, Iraq Veterans Against the War
Well to be fair, decimated means one in ten. Its possible (likely even) that we have killed one in ten of al Qaeda’s original membership.
(Do I really need a sacrasm tag here?)
The background on this one is soo easy.
1. Afghanistan = Bush’s war
2. Obama = Nobel Peace Prize winning president
3. MSM makes Afghanistan go away.
IMO, this is just an indication of something predicted long ago – the WH, like much of the American people, just don’t have the resolve nor commitment to see through something that is difficult and destroy the enemy. Heaven knows those in uniform have tried, and to them goes all the credit. Every fuggin’ bit of it.
Yeah, the mainstream muddlebrains like to think they can make it go away. Is that why they’re so surprised when there’s another attack?
Graeme Smith is right – severe case in this culture of short attention span and attention deficit disorder. Must be addressed. The people who get the news are far too easily and too quickly bored. They need excitement. Without that adrenaline shot, which they need becaue their lives are far too placid for their own good, they simply cannot stay focused on one thing for an extended time – say, more than 2 minutes, max.
To be even more fair, how the current administration handled Afghanistan may be poor, but the Bush Administration let it languish for five years. Cleaning up a combat theater that you’ve let go to pot for half a decade is not an easy endevour. There is more than enough blame to share here. I was in Afghanistan in 2006-07, 2008, and 2009. The writing was on the wall that we were falling behind, but when the leadership in Afghanistan started popping the red star clusters, the Bush Administration essentially said “Hey, yeah, sorry about that…and…you see, Iraq is tearing itself apart right now and we’re a little busy. Hold what you got, Airborne.”
Maybe if we did not decide to start building schools in 2003 instead of just going after AQ and the Senior Taliban Leadership…. I don’t know. I need a drink.
The neked emperor seems preoccupied w/ Washington Redskins “offensive” nickname…guess routine day as POTUS is so devoid of activity.
Yeah, Devtun, he’s up there above it all, while we’re down here rolling around in the mud.
I addressed the Afghan War for years, to all that would listen, and many more that wouldn’t. As far back as 2008, people told me they were “bored with the war.”
The biggest problem is that this Administration has NEVER had an interest in winning in Afghanistan, which WAS a winnable war. The next biggest problem is that the enemy was correct in their assessment that our citizenry did not have the stomach (or attention span) to outlast them.
As a result, even those that once understood the need to win in Afghanistan, and the costs to do so, have lost the will to support a continued fight. A half-assed effort of merely keeping boots on the ground, while tying their hands behind their backs, is a waste of blood and treasure. The Administration has never listened to the Generals, nor Veterans, and will not change course in its lame duck session. The electorate failed to change the decision makers who are making the errors of gross recklessness in 2012.
And finally, with the accelerated decline of America, and all she was built on, at home, with no relief or end in sight, energy expended to persuade the people to change course in the world becomes pointless. The electorate is too willing to accept, and believe, the lies and propaganda of politicians spewing a party line, rather than to examine the illogic and dishonesty of diametrically opposed statements, even within a single speech.
Yes, I have a pessimistic view for the future of America, and that includes both the threat of terrorists, as well as the decline of the rights of citizens. The War in Afghanistan is symptomatic of why my outlook has soured. The speed at which Americans forget the outrages at home are the weight of the basis.
Everyone forgets what happened in 2005-2006, that’s when we gave that war to NATO (aka ISAF) and gave control to 3 sectors (4 if you count the capital) to our NATO allies. That’s about the time it started to go to crap.
@TC,
We gave it to ISAF/NATO because we could no longer sustain the amount of forces we needed to in AFG and in Iraq at the same time. In 2005 through mid-2007, we were down to 1x Brigade Combat Team, a Division headquarters, and half of an SF Group w/HQ to run the whole combat theater. We had a CAB for support and the National Guard Brigade for training, plus the assorted self-licking ice-cream-cones, I mean, Headquarters elements.
On the Coalition and US Troop levels in Afghanistan:
At NO time from 2001 to 2009 did the US reduce Troop levels in Afghanistan. Some may argue that at no point in that were Troop levels high enough, but it is flat out false to say they decreased.
From the very beginning, it was a stated goal to get allied skin in the game, to include Coalition responsibility for sectors. Kabul was the first area given to non-US responsibility. That began as early as 2003.
The next AOR’s to be handed off were the “safer” areas to the North and West to the more pacifist of allies, while primarily the English speaking Nations (US, UK, NZ, Canada, along with Romanians) operated in and ran operations in the South and the East (where the resistance was strongest).
While it can be noted that resistance grew from 2003 to 2008, it wasn’t until mid 2009 that it spiked, and it remains higher than at pre-2009 levels. There is also a correlation between decreasing violence following the Petraeus Plan in Iraq and increasing violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2007-08.
In 2003, there were approx. 10,000 Troops in Afghanistan. There were few real battles (SAF v. SAF) though rocket attacks were fairly regular in *some* places. There was also a basically non-existent Afghan (govt) force.
Some of the biggest errors made in Afghanistan have been policies that threw money around, without accountability, realistic pricing (i.e. negotiating price) or a true goal, failing to comprehend the culture/thought process of the locals (incl principles of “Pashtunwali,” loyalty, and honor), and most importantly: constantly demonstrating a lack of resolve and a cohesive policy amongst allies or even leaders of the same Nation. (I.e. the State Dept and the Military Commander or US and UN placing opposing demands on Karzai.)
But this falsehood of Troop reductions in Afghanistan to field the War in Iraq must end. It’s a partisan lie with no basis in fact.
@TN,
What I am hearing you say is that from 2001-2008 we ran the entire country the size of Texas with essentially an under strength division. I don’t know what the troop count was at that time. I do agree with how you laid out the turnover of the RCs to coalition. The point I am trying to make is that more troops were asked for in 2005-2008, but unavailable. Combat power wise, there was a reduction around 2004 or 2005. I say that because I remember when the 173rd ABCT came in July 2007, I had a conversation with my boss, the J2 for Afghanistan, the discussion was that this was the first time since 2005 there had been more than one BCT in theater, since we gave up the south. I am assuming that BCT in RC South was at full strength when it pulled out, but I don’t know.
@TN
The spike came before 2009.
http://icasualties.org/oef/
Notice the spike in 2005? And again in 2007? Now, I will grant that this is based on casualties and not attacks, but then we get into the age old intelligence argument: Are they attacking us because there are more of them? Or because they were there all the time but we haven’t been to that village in four years?
So I did some digging and it turns out I was both somewhat right and somewhat wrong regarding troop strength. There was an increase in US troop strength EVERY SINGLE YEAR from 2002-2010. Not a decrease like I believed. Combat strength did vary from the beginning to 2007 then increased dramatically.
Please note page 9.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf
By the way, page 17 details the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan. I am going to go throw up now.
DoD Funding for War in Afghanistan and (approx.)Troop Levels:
Oct 2001- 2002 $20.8B, 1,000 to 10,000
2003: $14.7B, 14,000
2004: $14.6B, 18,000
2005: $20 B, 20,000
2006: $19B, 26,000
2007: $39.1B, 28,000
2008: $43.3B, 35,000
2009: $59.2B, 72,000
Source: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20130827.pdf
This does not incl the DoS budget there.
@TN,
You’re such a cheery soul. The ANSF numbers are especially depressing.
#10 Frosty…roger everything you said, I was at the large joint self-licking ice-cream-cone in Norfolk at that time and saw the sourcing slideshows. However, it was believed our partners could and would handle the load, but for whatever reason did not. The country by country restrictions chart was amazing to see, we some great partners and some not-so great partners. I went to KAF very early 09 and traveled enough to see why we had to go back. Again, we had some really great partners, but not all of them thought the same way. Some had no problem taking the fight to the bad guys, others…didn’t like to leave the base.
Hate typing at work…start a reply and by the time I finish it 2 hours later missed the best part of the discussion…
#16 TC, All the ice-cream cones I saw were in AFG. I was at Combined Forced Command-Afghanistan on my first tour. The CJTF two-star HQ at Bagram was not subordinate to the three-star headquarters in Kabul and had no coordination authority with the OTHER two-star HQ in charge of training and reconstruction, which also did not work for the three-star. And that was just the US chain of command. It got worse when you went down the block to ISAF HQ.
Weekly Enemy Initiated Attacks: (approx., from Figure 1.12, ref above and Figure 1.7: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20101019.PDF )
April 2004: 40
April 2005: 40
April 2006: 85
April 2007: 190
April 2008: 200
April 2009: 280
April 2010: 400
April 2011: 580
April 2012: 600
As I said, the violence increased steady, with a correlation between the success of the Petraeus Plan in Iraq (running AQ out) in 2007-08, and spiking post 2009.
#18…yup, you’re bringing back bad memories…they preached unity of command, but never practiced it. Always loved the chain of command charts full of dotted lines…no one ever fully worked for anyone…no one “Supreme Allied Commander”.
TN…great info
The Brookings Institute has long been the best source for objective data and statistics on Iraq and Afghanistan.
Interestingly, when the Iraq Index started, O’Hanlon thought those figures would prove the case against the War, but he maintained his integrity, even when the figures proved that the Petraeus Plan was providing Sustained Success.
As to War by Commission, it doesn’t work, and Afghanistan is also proof of that. NATO (ISAF) took over responsibility in 2003, though few US forces fell under it at the time. (Hence the 2 star/3 star discussion above.)
Many of the elements in the coalition had long ago re-aligned their militaries to “peace-keeping” forces. Those are the ones you talked about (primarily) that wanted to stay in the wire. That is the typical way UN peacekeepers operate. It doesn’t work in Lebanon, in Africa, or in Afghanistan. Then again, that’s why they were given the pacified areas.
I also have eye witness accounts of various diplomats and elements demanding opposite actions of Afghan govt. Not only was their no unified chain of command, ROE, or goals, the allies weren’t even really talking about their individual goals. And Our European Allies? Yeah, their policies were (as normal in their peace-keeping operations) more about establishing their economic and political goals, than in establishing the peace.