Army shutting down successful unit that developed solutions to current and emerging threats
Jeff LPH 3 sent along this story that the Army is shuttering the Asymmetric Warfare Group.
For nearly 15 years a little known but highly influential Army group has been in the middle of how the Army learns immediate lessons from combat, adapts to the evolving battlefield and saves soldiers’ lives.
It’s called Asymmetric Warfare Group, and the Army is shutting it down next year.
The Army made its official announcement today that by mid-2021, AWG will be discontinued.
So what is it that the AWG did?
By their own accounting, AWG provided 24 material solutions, 92 non-material solutions and at least 35 solutions that combined both material and non-material efforts. Those spanned everything from the Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile, or Switchblade, to reducing electromagnetic signature reduction.
Along the way, AWG published 72 key guides, from training aides to handy pocket reference guides and full handbooks.
Those publications covered Russian New Generation Warfare, Chinese land warfare strategies and the aftermath of bloody fighting in Mosul and Raqqah, and many other subjects. From these documents a larger Army and joint strategy has emerged in how to fight wars now and in the future.
Some of those papers are the foundational documents for the Army’s practical approach to great power competition, many predating the actual shift in the National Defense Strategy.
Oh, there’s also an expensive training facility they built.
And it’s not yet clear what is going to be done with the $94 million urban training facility, considered state of the art by some urban warfare experts, complete with a tunnel system and areas for complex training.
“The Army is currently determining the final disposition of the facility,” a spokesman told Army Times.
While no reasons are given for the planned closure, it’s thought that this is part of the larger push within DoD to shift from counterinsurgency operations and back into doctrine of large-scale conflict against a near-peer adversary.
I think maintaining the capability to unleash strategic and tactical hell on any enemy that might try us is a good thing, but for the last several decades we’ve been conducting more low intensity, COIN-type operations. Sounds like we might be losing a lot of knowledge with this shutdown. Knowledge that was earned with blood. They say all the work of the AWG will be retained at TRADOC facilities. We all know that it will remain there until such time as a lot of American blood is being spilled again, to unearth what we’ve forgotten.
More at the source; Army Times
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Seems penny wise and pound foolish.
It may be a good idea to keep some unit to filling those little spaces between; SOCOM, Acquisition Command, Infantry/MP/Engineer TRADOCs.
But what do I know?
I’m not an advocate of shutting them down; they are a valuable capability. That said, Of four times I interacted with them two were deliberately negative on their part, one they were okay and one they were exceptional. The two negative experiences were big-forum briefings where they gave the same briefing which was essentially scripted to tell everybody that how we trained and did things was all wrong so they could “shake us up” into changing our mindset. One of those was to about a thousand majors at CGSC. Despite a valuable message, it was instant loss of the audience through alienation. On the other hand, once I had to sneak them into al Anbar province past the Marine RCT I was attached to, and they were excellent while deployed. The okay experience occurred after I coordinated for them to come visit us in CONUS and told them not to give “the briefing.” (Yes, they knew what I meant….)
So, all the Majors in the Command and General Staff Course didn’t like to be told they were a bunch of retards?
I bet a good percentage of them were.
Some were. A lot weren’t.
By the way, it’s command and general staff college, not course.
The “Smart Idea Fairy” strikes again…
What’s a paltry 92 million spent on a state of the art facility. When sold at a “surplus to the needs of the government” auction, the taxpayer may even get a few millions for it. Maybe as much as 6-9 millions…from the right developer. Who will turn around and use it as a contract training area for other agencies. Think FLETC in Brunswick. And there’s another place down outside Perry GA.
Or, here’s a novel idea. It’ll be used as a secure place for essential grubmint “leaders” in case of an attack. I mean, after all, no need to let it go to waste. And no need to try and teach up and coming future warriors the hard learned lessons, paid for in the blood of other warriors. “Near peer opponent?” Urban warfare capable? Guess we never saw any house to house fighting in WWII. Anybody remember a little fracas in the city of Hue?
Who was it, back yonder, McNamara(?) that stuffed the DoD with “Bright young Men”, fresh from business school, that was going to teach the military to run a war like a business? I look at it this way. Unless you have worn the uniform, smelled the smoke, and know what works and don’t work, you got NO phuqueing business making ANY decisions of what the Warrior needs…or doesn’t need. Now sit down, shut up, and quit ruining my ability to wage war…bringing every weapon we have to bear.
I’m betting the Army thinks that this can be folded into Army Futures Command.
the concept that a 4 star command can ever be as focused as a smaller organization is negated by actual experience in the real world where orgs like TRADOC and FORSCOM are mired in the past and obsolescence while units solve their problems at the Brigade and Division level.
I don’t know who else experienced this, but I saw the Army work quite efficiently and effectively in the Viet of the Nam when compared with stateside and Germany. It was like people were ignoring stupid rules that didn’t work in a combat zone. Sorta like someone told the “good idea fairies” to shut up.
^THIS^
rgr769, heard that from many a Cadre in Basic/AIT (All VN Vets) in ’71. Same from many of the troops I served with in FRG. Saw it FIRST (ht to R-D) Hand upon DEROS from FRG to Bragg.
I personally think a lot of folks ETSd because of the abundance of Mickey Mouse BS they saw in CONUS. It weighed in on my decision to get out.
” It weighed in on my decision to get out.”
It weighed in a lot of decisions. That’s why they started offering reenlistment bonuses and still had trouble retaining good people.
Not restricted to the Army and not something that was solved decades later.
I ETSd ’08. We’d been sending people from my wing to run convoy duties for the Army. Had a couple come back with PHs. My last two years were a run up and then performance in a readiness inspection. We prepared and demonstrated that we could deal with a large scale chemical war. Never once did we train on what we were actually deploying people into the sandbox to do. It’s all just-in-time training as people are sent on the rotator. We were still in the 1980s Cold War mindset, totally disconnected from the two actual wars we were involved in.
” but I saw the Army work quite efficiently and effectively in the Viet of the Nam”
Not me.
That UTF is located at APHVA. We were able to secure it through RFMSS the other month and were told two weeks before the training it was not available. The UTF structures are “owned” by AWG and the land is “owned” by A.P. Hill. Consequently, they refused to accept our money to use the facility for a week.
Asymmetric Warfare Group shut down… Army Futures Command sounds like it has the same purpose.
Just this morning saw an article in Stars and Stripes about the Army Futures Command in 2018 spending 8.5 million dollars to buy 4 properties in Austin, TX. The purpose was to house the 4 star Commander, his 3 star deputy and the Command Sergeant Major.
“The largest largest of the homes, which is designated for Gen. John M. Murray, the four-star general at the helm of Futures Command, is 5,700 square feet and features a private pool, a three-car garage, a wine grotto and a media room, according to the real estate website Zillow. Its sale price was $3.4 million.”
“The two smaller homes are about 3,300 and 4,200 square feet. They sold for $1.8 million and $2 million, respectively, according to information from the previous owners and sale documents.”
“The fourth property purchased was a multifamily home next door to the commander’s home that sold for $1.29 million, according to the previous owner Steve Kubenka. It was torn down for security reasons and converted into a parking lot”
Would the government ever be so wasteful with taxpayer moneys?
Yup, story checks out. Definitely the government I worked for.
Linky to the article. Now I got to find out about Army Futures Command, and why they need a 4 star, 3 star and CSM in downtown Austin…In an office. Am I missing something? And I guess the whole concept of on post/Housing.
https://www.stripes.com/army-says-8-5-million-purchase-of-austin-real-estate-for-top-leaders-housing-was-the-right-decision-1.647219
OK, I got lost in that rabbit hole, best I can figure out is they got 30 some odd BILLION dollars a year to scratch their watch and wind their ass on how we gonna think about fielding a War Fighter in the future. And the 4 star will be in immediate command of roughly 400 troops. Sound like good duty if you can get it.
No wonder we can’t have nice things. 2 years later, it is still not up and running. YMMV
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Futures_Command
Getting ready for a mission shift from jade helm to yù shāo down there in fee ma region VI?
Follow up questions, are they staring at goats and/or dispersing clouds with their minds?
Nothing ever got solved by a 4-star, just complicated into impossibilities.
Considering the overall defense budget, I do not understand why they cannot keep the AWG and also lean on big Army unit tactics as well.
It sounds like some of the #shiningmyfourstars group in the Pentagon don’t think they are getting enough attention because they are big unit guys and never were part of AWG. It’s the “we ain’t gonna be left out mentality”, and if we are, we’ll just disassemble what we don’t like.
They can put all their lessons and Power Point presentations on the shelf next to all the “Lessons Learned” compiled by generations of soldiers before them. They will be studied and put into practice by succeeding generations of “Top Men”.
I left there Friday (moving to another job in a week) as an armed Operational Advisor after 3 great years, a handful of deployments, and quite a few instructional teaches to the BCTs on relevant topics. I was forward in Afghanistan and some other places and did quite a bit of seeing the AO from a boots on the ground, agnostic perspective and hoped I gave good advice to those I was charged to report to.
I worked with some of the most experienced, knowledgeable and accredited Army SOF operators Whose experience dating from Desert 1 through today. AWG is leaving a great legacy, sure like every organization, there were individuals that did not understand their audience, and hurt the cause, but ultimately AWG punched way above its weight. The Army will feel the loss in 6-8 months when they realize the gaps that are missing and don’t have the pool of knowledge that they let go.
Teaching at the BCTs; that’s the benefit to the mission. Was great to have them with our platoons in Anbar.
As a retired, and still recovering Infantryman I’d like to thank you for all your hard work and dedication is saving lives through knowledge.
Big Army often fights itself harder than it trains for the next war…
So shall it be.
AWG is, and will forever be remembered.
Thanks for the positive feedback Gentlemen! I worked hard because I truly admire the infantry guys! They worked Long hours, Had sorry pay a lot of risk and little support, willing to give it all, and they got little reward, and they still gave heart and soul. It was an eye opening experience coming from the NSW side of the house.
Didn’t all those “experienced, knowledgeable and accredited ” folks write up that knowledge in after action reports and lessons learned for future generations to benefit from? Surely some of them went on to become instructors and update and improve curriculum and FMs. Is there no record of all this valuable information that can be consulted as needed?
Perhaps instead of expending time and money sending officers to graduate schools so they can teach English at West Point we could have them study all the “lessons learned”and AWG product so they can use and pass on all that information.
Reading between the lines, it sounds like TRADOC pulled this off to get control over the program. The flexibility of the program, and willingness to go out and learn firsthand, is what made it a success. Neither one are attributes that TRADOC embraces.