Chavez’ arms race

Photo from Associated Press

Hugo Chavez took credit, once again, for negotiating the release of four more Colombian hostages from the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Front (FARC) yesterday – four out of at least 800 (since FARC and the Colobian people can’t seem to settle on a number between 50 and thousands – not to mention the Venezuelans that Chavez won’t admit have been kidnapped).

Daniel at Venezuela News and Views recounts the entire event from in front of his television in Caracas and observes;

…the hostage release was the most important item in Chavez agenda now that success is so scarce for him.

Colombian president Uribe wasn’t quite so unforgiving of FARC (Reuters link);

“The FARC should understand the Colombian people expect them to release all the hostages in their power,” Uribe said in a television address in which he thanked Chavez.

Uribe, whose father was killed in a botched FARC kidnapping, is popular at home for a U.S.-backed military offensive that has forced the rebels from swathes of Colombia.

Meanwhile, the Miami Herald tells the story of Chavez arms purchases from Vlad Putin;

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is purchasing ”three or four times” more weapons than he needs, a top U.S. intelligence chief said Wednesday, but there is no evidence so far he is providing arms to Colombian guerrillas.

[…]

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Florida Republican Sen. Mel Martinez, asked if Chávez’s recent weapons purchases, especially the assault rifles, exceeded Venezuela’s defense needs.

”Yes, sir,” McConnell responded, “probably three or four times more than what he would need.”

When asked if Chávez could use the surplus to ”destabilize neighboring governments, particularly Colombia” and assist Colombia’s left-wing FARC guerrillas, McConnell said: “Could very well be.”

[…]

From Russia, Chávez has purchased the assault rifles, a munitions factory, 53 helicopters — including a dozen Mi-17 military helicopters — and 14 SU-30MK fighters.

McConnell added that on the purchase of the assault rifles, ”one of the thoughts is [Chávez] forming an internal militia to enforce his authoritarian rule.” But when pressed if Chávez meant to arm his supporters to stifle domestic opposition, Maples said that he hasn’t seen any evidence of it.

But, that’s what Noriega did in Panama when he began to lose control of the Panamanian people – he formed the Dignity Battalions, armed them with old weapons from the Guardia Nacional and gave them free rein to wander the streets and literally beat the opposition bloody.

Francisco Rodriguez, formerly Chavez’ chief economist, warns of “An Empty Revolution” in Foreign Affairs magazine;

Chávez’s political success does not stem from the achievements of his social programs or from his effectiveness at redistributing wealth. Rather, through a combination of luck and manipulation of the political system, Chávez has faced elections at times of strong economic growth, currently driven by an oil boom bigger than any since the 1970s.

Like voters everywhere, Venezuelans tend to vote their pocketbooks, and until recently, this has meant voting for Chávez. But now, his mismanagement of the economy and failure to live up to his pro-poor rhetoric have finally started to catch up with him. With inflation accelerating, basic foodstuffs increasingly scarce, and pervasive chronic failures in the provision of basic public services, Venezuelans are starting to glimpse the consequences of Chávez’s economic policies — and they do not like what they see.

So while Chavez scores huge political points with foreign interests (like FARC, China and Iran) he slowly losing his grip on Venezuela’s internal electoral process – and buying weapons. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to do the math on this one.

Category: Foreign Policy, Hugo Chavez, Politics