Jumpmaster cited in Sergeant Shaina Schmigel’s parachute death
SSG E sends us a link to the Army Times article about the investigation in the death of paratrooper Sergeant Shaina Schmigel during a jump in May over Fort Bragg;
Sgt. Shaina Schmigel died during a nighttime static line jump May 30, 2014, over Fort Bragg, N.C. According to the investigation, Schmigel’s equipment was misrouted so that, when exiting the plane, she became a “towed jumper.” While be being towed, the subsequent jumper exited the plane and Schmigel became entangled in his T-11 parachute. Schmigel reportedly died from fatal lacerations to the throat and a broken neck. The entire incident lasted only 3 to 4 seconds, according to the investigation.
The collision has likely knocked SGT Schmigel loose from being a towed jumper and her parachute deployed normally. No one, including the jumper who had collided with her, realized that anything was wrong until she found on the drop zone and she was unresponsive.
The investigator found that the safety had only given a cursory check of her static line, and that the safety hadn’t accomplished his refresher training in a timely manner. Schmigel’s rucksack was too light by four pounds and the investigator claims that the accident probably wouldn’t have happened if she’d been jumping with a T-10.
We reported Sgt Smigel’s death last month.
Category: Army News
Not a good state of affairs for anyone in this mess. Godspeed to the deceased Veteran.
Playing Army is a dangerous business no matter where you may be plying your trade.
Splain “main curve pin protective flap” please. Trying to understand what this means. Tnx.
From the article: “her static line became wedged beneath her main curve pin protective flap because it was misrouted in such a manner to catch both corners of the main curve pin protective flap”
RIP Trooper.
Not having used a T-11 and the new container, I’m having a hard time visualizing this. Is this a rigging error, or an error in not following back the static line fully during JMPI.
The issue started with the rigger who packed the chute, then the failure to catch it at JMPI. I wouldn’t jump out of a Deuce and a half with that unit !
The Main Curved Pin is a feature similar to what is used on skydiving parachutes. It took the place of the Pack Closing Tie and was supposed to provide a more reliable opening.
What took place in this instance was the static line was not tightened back up in its retainer bands sitting on the outer and inner Static Line Stow Bars on the parachute, which caused the Universal Static Line, Modified to slip below the Main Curved pin protector flap.
When the jumper exited the aircraft, this misrouted section of the Universal Static Line, Modified wedged under the pack closing flap between it and the pack closing loop, thereby causing the parachute to effective ‘lock’ closed.
What caused her Parachute to deploy was the next jumper out the aircraft allegedly hitting her upon their exit.
I am basing all this information off the article, and not in an official capacity in any way.
I am stunned that the Primary Jumpmaster wasn’t crapping kittens to his Air Officer about the fact he had NO experienced safeties. Add to that the fact that TWO of them hadn’t shown up for the JMB, and I would be FURIOUS.
To paraphrase Captain A. G. Lamplugh, ‘Airborne Operations are not inherently dangerous in and of themselves. But to an even greater degree than the sea, the sky is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect’.
Safe winds and fair landings SGT Schmigel, You’ve done your time in hell.
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Thanks Ray. I get the general picture now.
Tomorrow morning I will go to the temple and have the monks pray and bless a women ready to fight for her country. May Buddha bring her back as a awesome warrior leader.
What is this about the ruck not weighing enough? They stop doing fun jumps or something?
Thanks, that paints a very clear picture for me of how this could have happened.
I remember from my days of jumping parachutes with closing pins (vice the cloth pack clothing tie), that the orientation of the pins and static line was something you wanted to check multiple times.
Agee, on your comments on the air officer/OIC not ensuring that there was relevant experience all around. Though, after 14 years of deployments, it could be that the unit was using all the available JMs that it had (more likely true if this was a multi aircraft jump). As I remember from long ago, a new JM had to safety multiple times before he/she served as a jumping JM in the aircraft, so its probably not uncommon for the safeties to be newly certified JMs.
Thanks RayRay. A better explanation than any google-fu I could muster so far. Could still use a pitcher, as I’m a LEG. You know that last fatal incident not long ago was directly and indirectly caused by a whole slew of failures to adhere to safety and protocol(including skipping of safety briefs). I expect more heads to roll. Complacency kills.
The T-11 pack try incorporates a curved pin, pretty identical to those used in civilian rigs; replacing the 1/4″ cotton webbing loop on the T-10. To be honest, I’m not entirely sure how the static line could be misrouted below the flap as to prevent deployment….but the final jumper check of the Safety is to ensure that the SL is routed properly from the pack tray to the anchor line cable….usually checking to ensure that it’s not been misrouted under a riser or around an arm.
The pages of this JM study guide aren’t numbered, but the pack tray nomenclature is towards the end.
http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/rtb/1-507th/jumpmaster/content/PDF/T-11%20Nomenclature%20packet.pdf
Thanks for the pictures. Does make me wonder how it was potentially missed, and how it could snag and not open. The pins are curves to permit opening when tension in applies in and direction.
Thanks, the last two pages helped tremendously. (Still don’t get the whole sequence of how/why, but better understanding). To reiterate myself, stills sounds like a no-shit buddy-check thing for THIS kind of situation. Not to mention the safety crew. Sounds like this totally could have been avoided. Maybe not 100%, but c’mon.
In all the times I jumped, I never once doubted the abilities of the Jumpmasters/Safeties to ensure that my equipment was safe to jump.
The circumstances surrounding this fatality, are just dumbfounding to me.
God Bless and RIP Sgt. Schmigel. AATW! See you on the DZ.
You had to trust your Jumpmasters. But a few were avoided like the plague during JMPI.
I was a SL and MFFJM, and it is VERY difficult to understand how this happened. Inspections and 2nd looks are the bread and butter of the entire operation. The investigation tells a tale of complacence and negligence, which is very hard to swallow. This death was avoidable, and I feel for her family, friends and unit. RIP, Airborne.
“This death was avoidable” is true in nearly every death not by natural causes. It just depends on whether the thing that could have been avoided was near or remote in the chain of events leading to the death. I don’t understand what happened here, other than a young soldier lost her life. I was sorry for that then and I’m sorry for that now. Maybe her family will appreciate knowing precisely what happened.
In this case, near in the chain of events.
In plain terms, the Army investigation found that a jumpmaster performing a pre-jump inspection missed something obvious that he/she should have caught – a misrouted static line. That misrouted static line was what caused SGT Schmigel to become a towed jumper, leading directly to her death.
The article says the Army’s investigation found negligence, but not criminal wrongdoing. I haven’t seen the evidence or read the ROI, but I have a hard time with that particular combination of findings.
When I was going through JM school they beat it into our heads that we could be held criminally liable for any negligence that resulted in injury or death, so the negligence-but-no-criminal-wrongdoing doesn’t make sense (unless that’s just a way of saying “negligence but no intentional tampering” which would not preclude UCMJ for dereliction of duty.)
I’m also having a bit of a hard time trying to visualize how this might have happened but I’ve been out for 10 years and it’s been more than 13 since I jumped so I don’t know the new equipment.
From the description above it almost sounds as if the SL was flapping around and got caught underneath a part of Schmigel’s pack tray as the jumpers were moving and jostling towards the door of the aircraft, which is something that would have happened long after the jumper was JMPI’d.
Trying to remember, but when the JM gave the command of “CHECK STATIC LINES!” shouldn’t the jumper behind Schmigel have traced her SL from the static line from over her shoulder to where it hits the first retainer band? I seem to remember that when that command is given you’re supposed to check your own SL and also your buddy’s SL (which is why the last jumper in the stick actually turns around – so the guy in front of him can check his SL.)
From the article:
“But during the investigation, her equipment was examined and it was found Schmigel’s static line had been misrouted below her main curve pin protective flap. The soldier serving as her safety did not check the jumpers’ static lines “beyond checking to see that the static lines were routed over the jumpers’ correct shoulder.””
Apparently checking the routing of the sl over the shoulder was not sufficient to find the mis-routing.
This is a drawing of the “curved pin”, cover, etc. from the T11 I think.
The picture linked to is actually of T-11 Reserve ripcord assembly.
My impression from reading this and others’ comments is that the static line, which may well have been fine as of JMPI, got jostled out of one of the rubber-band holds or otherwise loosened up, and the line drooped all the way to below the protective flap. So both the soldier to her rear ought to have seen that, and the safety who went down the line should have seen (and felt) that.
Given that it’s the safety who took the brunt of the blame, I’m guessing that’s what happened…
Does anyone have the link to the full report? Thanks.
I think the story was on military.Com that is where I saw it the first time on FB.
Would ramp vs. paratroop door exit have affected this? If she’d hung up on a ramp exit, would she have been more visible, interrupting the release of the 17th jumper?
I doubt it.
I read this as leadership failure.
It’s sad, makes you angry because we know that it is a simple thing to avoid.
If only, if only….
Some one already said it but the business of defending the nation means breaking things and people…someimtes even ourselves.
RIP Trooper. We will see you on the high ground.
Multiple leadership failures, actually. Here’s more of what the Army investigation found, per the linked Army Times article. (I’ve omitted one item, with rational for omission listed in italics below.)
Though only the first of those issues may have directly contributed to SGT Schmigel’s death, I’m seeing a pattern. That’s indicative of insufficient command emphasis regarding “doing things right”, pretty much across the board. I’m thinking that a few people are very likely now working diligently on their resumes – deservedly so.
There should have been ONE safety on each door that had at least pulled ONE nighttime operation. I don’t understand how they could have let this JM team be allowed to perform the operation.
Add to that the fact that the ENTIRE right door’s safeties were NOT present at the JMB, it looks pretty negligent to me.
Well being permanently relieved of jumpmaster status is a pretty big deal. That man (or woman) will never be a leader in the Airborne Community again.
Being releived of status is big. But IMO it’s not as “big” as getting someone killed via negligent performance of duty, nor does it seem to me sufficient punishment for doing so.
This is what happens when dangerous evolutions become routine and mundane to leaders. The leadership decided to let themselves and the jumpmasters not attend the pre-flight jumpmaster brief, didn’t recertify a jumpmaster, and thought that it would be alright to use 4 jumpmasters who were doing their first safety duty instead of integrating at least one experienced jumpmaster to oversee the three new guys.
As a former SLJM, I can’t speak on the routing of T-11 static line but I do know that getting dragged because of routing is one of many factors that would have affected a T-10 or -1C. Too many loop turns of 80 pound is just one. I hope they also covered with the JM that did the JMPI,Rigger and the JM at the door.
R.I.P. Airborne!
I’m reminded of a story my team chief in Iraq told me from when he was with the 82nd. He used to bitch about all the safety checks the jumpmasters would do before a jump, and how meticulous they were about every little thing. They went to Germany to do a jump and the German jumpmaster looked him up and down, patted his shoulder, give him two big thumbs up and walked away. For half a second he thought “Right on, that’s how it should be done” and then went and found a US jumpmaster and asked him to double check because “Holy fuck, it was my life on the line and it was critical that someone who knew what they were doing check him out”. He had nothing but respect for the jumpmasters after that.
It was always nice to get a blast of beer breath from the German Jumpmasters.
He didn’t mention that, but he did mention that the beer they had at the drop zone was pretty good.
In Zimbabwe we did a joint exercise with their military and they don’t even have “JM’s” in the same way we do. They have ‘dispatchers’ who in most cases don’t even jump. Their “JMPI” (Jumpmaster Pre Inspection) consisted of looking at the soldier with his gear on, tightening the waist band, shaking the reserve back and forth and saying “OK!” and giving a thumbs up, altogether about a 6 second process.
Must have missed this the 1st time. RIP Sergeant Shaina Schmigel.
It’s sux that it looks like it could have prevented. Even in an ideal scenario guess Jump masters can’t have a bad day. Damn damn shame anyway u cut it.
Thanks for serving, Sergeant. RIP.
Never jumped a T-11, But I’m having a hard time picturing how this wasn’t caught during JMPI. Also at the jump command “Check Static Lines” you check your static line from the anchor line cable and the static line of the jumper in front of you as its routed to the pack tray in addition to the safety checking each individual jumper. Rest in peace trooper.
There is no excuse for negligence in something like this.
RIP, Sgt. Schmigel.
Two a fellow NCO. Rest Well….
RIP…
I lack sufficient familiarity with the T-11, but find mention of “Schmigel’s rucksack weighed 31 pounds after the incident, rather than the minimum 35” a bit peculiar when the cause is attributed to a misrouted static line.
It’s peculiar as there is specific investigation recommendation a study of the opening irregularities of T-11s. Further, previous T-11 incidents resulted in Basic Airborne Course policy implementation of body weight requirement of students must weigh 110 pound.
Also peculiar is suggestion of use of T-10 would have made the death unlikely because the “rope” holding the parachute “together” that is broken when it deploys is irrelevant when cause of the accident is primarily attributed to incompetent and negligent performing of jumper and equipment inspections by jumpmasters and safeties. The accidental death is attributed to failure of jumpmasters to do the proper by-the-numbers hand on inspection (look & touch) on the jumpers before they boarded the aircraft or prior to jump exit of the aircraft.
BTW, correct description is not ‘rope’ holding the T-10 parachute together. It is 80 pound test cord or tape (it’s flat rather than round) holding the container closed. Inexcusable sloppy and lazy writing IMO.
My experience disclosure: On military jump status for 23 years. Static line jumpmaster for 20 years, MFF Jumpmaster 12 years.
I have spent 8 years as an 11bravo but never have been in an airborne unit, so I have no idea about anything to do with jumping. But, taking your experience would weight of a ruck effect a flat “rope”? And, if so, is it true parachute riggers have to sign something inside of the parachute when they do their checks incase something like this happens? And do you sign some kind of waiver in the event you are injured? (I have heard that airborne school has a high rate of injury) Again, these are all questions from someone who has never had anything to do with airborne because I am curious to the point of this seems totally fucking wrong if someone was to lose their life because of someone being a lazy piece of shit, but I cannot reach that conclusion because I do not have that experience.
Also, by someone being a lazy piece of shit I mean the person doing the checks on whoever sets up the parachutes just to be clear
The riggers sign the parachute log book (maintenance record kept with the parachute) for each 30 day inspection and each 120-day complete inspection and repack.
The parachute supposedly gets a complete inspection each time it gets packed after a jump.
There is no signing of a waiver incase you are injured. What would be the objective of such waiver for a military parachutist performing jumps as a required duty requirement?
Bingo. While on jump status, making a jump when directed to do so isn’t optional; it’s mandatory duty. The alternative is to terminate jump status by refusing to jump. Unless the individual has the requisite amount of time on jump status already (36 mo, as I recall), I’m pretty sure that also is grounds for permanently revoking their jump wings.
We had a guy in one of my units do that (refuse to jump/terminate jump status). He was transferred to another unit very shortly afterwards.
The lazy and incompetent can be anybody in the custody chain of the parachute from the moment it is put into serviceable use to the moment a parachutists does a jump exit from the aircraft (Rigger, jumpmaster, safety, jumper).
jocha: I think the IO was saying that the incident wouldn’t have happened with a T-10 because in his/her opinion the T-10’s different design would have precluded the static line from “hanging” in the same way. I omitted that IO comment above when I quoted from the Army Times article because it clearly seemed to me to be opinion vice an observation of fact.
I believe the IO included the rucksack weight shortage for completeness, and as a possible indicator of a broad pattern of poor supervision/attention to detail. I personally very seriously doubt it had anything whatsoever to do with the young SGT’s death, but together with the other IO observations it does tend to show that the unit wasn’t checking a number of things very closely.
Hard to decipher what happened from the Army Times article. I also looked at T-11 container on-line and concluded I will have to actually hands-on look at an actual T-11 to figure out what incorrectly routed where could and would cause the static line became wedged beneath her main curve pin protective flap.
This previously posted link, http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/rtb/1-507th/jumpmaster/content/PDF/T-11%20Nomenclature%20packet.pdf , on pages 19-20 has details of the static line and pages 38-41 shows the static line attached to the closed container. I have difficulty picturing how the static line could get misrouted in such a manner to catch both corners of the main curve pin protective flap. To catch during exit and opening sequence is the difficulty because IMO to do so would require the static line to be looped around the open protective flap before exit. I suppose I could make a visit to JBER and put hand on a T-11 and ask a few jumpmasters experienced with the T-11 a question or two.
I had an attentive jump master save my life just before exiting an aircraft.
It is a high stakes responsibility that is regarded as pretty routine.
The lazy and incompetent can be anybody in the custody chain of the parachute from the moment it is put into serviceable use to the moment a parachutists does a jump exit from the aircraft (Rigger, jumpmaster, safety, jumper).
Yes, there was three points where it could have been caught, I failed, the jumper behind me did not catch it, but the jump master caught it. It was a misrouted static line. We had been ordered to disconnect and hook-up on the other side of the aircraft. In the dim light at the time and in the jumble of stumbling people trying to switch sides of the aircraft with chutes and rucks attached to us I did not notice I had misrouted the static line when I switched sides. What looks right on one side of the aircraft is potentially deadly wrong on the other. Both me and the jumper behind me missed it when we checked static line. The jump master caught it just as I was stepping toward the door. I was third or fourth in the stick and we were moving out the door as quick as possible, The jump master had a split second to assess me as I turned to exit the door and he caught it. So the primary incompetence in that one was me. It was my 11th or 12th jump so I really did not know what to look for when switching sides like that. I should have caught it though. It was idiotic and nearly killed me. I had a mishap in airborne school that I heard later was due to someone screwing up when packing the chute. My chute was torn. Since it was in airborne school and they took it very seriously and there was an immediate investigation. It was my first jump and I had to pull my reserve. The black hat saw that I was falling faster than other jumpers and was yelling that I had a torn chute while I was still trying to orient myself, check my chute, and assess if I was falling too fast. There is a lot to process on your first time under a canopy (towers had been canceled for my class). And you are not sure who the black hats are yelling at. I pulled when I saw the… Read more »
Wow. On your first jump? Coming back from that took some serious nads…I found myself getting more nervous with each successive jump – as I got more familiar with the process, I became more aware of the potential points of danger. I cannot imagine having that experience on Jump #1, though – you definitely had to sack up quick!
The ATAPS: T11 Main weighs in at 36.8 lbs and the T11R plus another 14.8 lbs. Not to include the additional weight of the Ruck and the jumpers weight. Its a damn heavy mushroom on your back. Its packed in a sock, packed in a d-bag put in the pack tray. not a fun chute to jump or pack.
Compared to a T-10D with SLCP is 31 lbs plus 12 lbs its a whole lot more forgiving.
It sucks due to a longer opening and deployment of the Main. Most dudes get the pucker factor on it.
The main curve pin protector flap is exactly like a civilian free fall rig.
Weight plays a factor in deployment/extraction phase- but she was DRT a few seconds after exit. Its harsh, but she didn’t see it coming. (small comfort)
It sucks she’s gone: but she died with her boots on, I can ask for no better death. I raise my tankard and Hope the feast in the Hall of Heroes is to her liking.