Background checks didn’t kill 13 at the Navy Yard
Ex-PH2 sent us a link to an NBC article about The Experts, the company that employed Aaron Alexis, the Navy Yard shooter, which was seeking more government contracts in the days following the shooting.
A little more than 24 hours after an IT contractor gunned down a dozen workers at the Washington Navy Yard, the CEO of the company he worked for sent an email to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus saying he has the experience to help the military improve its security.
The email from The Experts chief Thomas Hoshko, which included descriptions of his background and expertise, stunned some Navy leaders still reeling from the shooting rampage Monday that left 13 people dead, including the gunman, former Navy reservist Aaron Alexis.
I guess everyone just figures they should shut their doors. Why wouldn’t they seek more business? It’s a company’s job to do that, isn’t it?
Revelation of the email comes as the Navy and the Defense Department launch a series of short- and long-term reviews into Alexis’ Navy service history, the Pentagon’s security clearance procedures, overall safety at defense installations around the world and the responsibilities that contractors have in reviewing their workers and notifying the military about potential problems.
Yeah, well, what was there to find in Alexis’ history that was supposed to twig the investigators to his mental health problems? In another article, folks are upset that USIS, the contractor that conducted the actual investigation of Alexis also did Eddie Snowden’s investigation.
“From Edward Snowden to Aaron Alexis, what’s emerging is a pattern of failure on the part of this company, and a failure of this entire system, that risks nothing less than our national security and the lives of Americans,” [Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo.] said. “What’s most frightening is that USIS performs a majority of background checks for our government. We clearly need a top-to-bottom overhaul of how we vet those who have access to our country’s secrets and to our secure facilities. I plan to pursue such an overhaul, and won’t rest until it’s achieved.”
Yeah, well, as I said, everyone did their best in the case of Alexis to hide his condition. Unless they can find something from the personnel interview that would have tipped off the investigator, they’ve really got nothing. As I’ve said before, everyone from local police to the Navy did their best to make sure that Alexis wouldn’t have a record of being measurably nutty. Alexis only had a Secret clearance, and last I knew, all they do for level is a national activity check – look for police records and at military records. If no one is willing to arrest him or make a record of his nutty behavior, I guess nothing would have pinged their radar.
If they want to fix the real problem, they should reduce the number of jobs that require a security check. I speak from experience when I say that there are entirely too many people walking around with security clearances that they don’t need and then we need contract investigators to keep up with the demand – and then people like Snowden, Alexis, Wickre and Monkress slip through.
Category: "Your Tax Dollars At Work"
“If they want to fix the real problem, they should reduce the number of jobs that require a security check.”
Almost 850,000 people have a Top Secret security clearance. Probably twice that number have Secret.
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
They don’t even interview you in person for a SECRET clearance. If it isn’t in writing and viewable from their computer, they won’t see it.
Wait a minute, you brought up Monkeyass and Weaker… Are you trying to say that they are a couple french fries short of a Happy Meal? I don’t see either of them doing ANYTHING remotely dangerous or illegal… aside from communicating terrorist threats through electronic media, stolen valor, and impersonating a human being.
TMB correct. Adjudication for SECRET is a civil, criminal, and financial background check peppered by other databases.
Adjudication for TOP SECRET involves Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) that includes 10 years of everything and more depending (including all reqs for SECRET), interviews with all family members (and sometimes checks on them), along with other checks on just about everything. Some agencies with three letters involve life style issues as well and predisclosure of those requirements are discussed prior to job interview or job offer.
Well, when I was up for a secret clearance in the 1960s (ah, that takes me back!), the FBI sent people to my hometown to talk to people who knew me and my family.
But that was before computers and laziness took over that end of the investigative spectrum.
My security clearance was so high, they wouldn’t tell me I had it. If they had, well, let’s just say I’m grateful that they kept it from me.(What time does that one appear on a valor thief’s FB account?)
@5 Back then that was probably the only way to find out anything about you. My Top Secret interview took 2 hours mostly because I had to remember people I might have known from that long ago. Most of them were contacted in person by an investigator. I got a visit a couple months ago because my next door neighbor was having his renewal done. They even send you a survey afterwards asking how the interview went.
Turning off someone’s clearance is pretty easy. A unit-level commander can do it with a couple pieces of paper. Getting a clearance back is like climbing Everest.
Have long wondered what impact the bloat of civilian employees has had on security clearance procedures et al. What with union rules, personnel rules and all that silly stuff that is more clearly defined in the military, are civilian clearances easier to acquire and perhaps more difficult to cancel? I dunno. But it is difficult to believe that the same rules apply, even though they certainly should, to access sensitive information.
How exactly are background checks going to find the paperwork that some stupid cop lost nigh on a decade ago? And how does said idiot still have his job, anyway?
The only way USIS can be at fault is if they find the investigation was flawed. If the rules were followed, and nothing was found because he was never convicted of anything, and his reserve squadron didn’t document his military infractions in his JPAS record, then there is nothing USIS can be blamed for. I did the personnel security gig for a living while active duty and I documented the infractions in the individuals records precisely so that later adjudicators would have full knowledge when making their determinations.
How does a navy reservist with four years get a contracting gig anyway for the navy? He graduated tech school and that’s it. There’s actually no real work experience during his time in the reserves.
Is the problem with the investigative process, or the adjudicative process? (I ask because that’s not my area of expertise)
Loaded question. I know.
USIS has quite a few suspicious characters working for them. I have had security clearance checks by them and also was going to be hired by USIS in 2011.
Starting with the recruiter from USIS I spoke to. I wanted to do a background check on him because he seems a little suspect. He had 2 currently active lawsuits against him for vehicle accidents and a DUI arrest. Surprised that he would even have that much power as a recruiter and getting his own team to go to Iraq.
Second incident with USIS. This year, I was Background Investigated for TS/SCI clearance by a guy from USIS. Seemed a bit shaky and did not even ask for details into my background. He did such a poor job, that OPM came to re ask questions and get the job done right. I had to ask why happened to the USIS guy who was investigating me, they said he was probably fired.
Not to blame the shooting on background checks. I can understand just how bad some of these companies are. Even a company (CAV) I worked for Kuwait was hiring Convicts who had rape charges, Dishonorable discharge for drugs, deadbeat dads were even hired.
@12 – the problem has no single “cause”. It’s a compilation of several issues.
1) none of the issues with Alexis’ gun infractions and mental instability were a matter of record, so without active discussions with LE or medical personnel, they don’t show up in available online databases;
2) his reserve command failed to document his “pattern of misconduct” issues in the proper JPASJCAVS database that would have flagged him as being unsuitable for when the DoD Central Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF) adjudicated his currently existing clearance;
3) without evidence to the contrary, the USIS investigation appears to have been aboveboard and in accordance with prescribed procedures.
USIS is the government contract investigator. It’s reasonable to assume they did Alexis, Snowden and 100’s of thousands of other’s investigations. By virtue of sheer numbers alone, they’re likely to have done investigations on anyone who later uses that clearance access to do something wrong. Again, unless there is a documented faulty investigation, they did their job.
Something to also understand…even if USIS or OPM investigations uncover something in a candidate’s past, the adjudicators at DoD CAF can still grant someone a clearance if they feel that the item wasn’t of sufficient seriousness to warrant exclusion. I’ve done incident reports on people and had my CO request permanent revocation of someone’s clearance, only to have DoD CAF come back with a favorable re-adjudication “because the command took appropriate action” to ensure the incident (viewing porn on government computers and lying about it) wouldn’t happen again (which it did anyway, because as a system admin, he just used the SA account to do it again). Combine that with the previous Security Manager’s failure to report similar incidents kept them in the dark as to his porn addiction.
LE and command Security Managers have an obligation to ensure events are properly reported so that they can be used to make appropriate determinations about a subjects suitability, reliability and trustworthyness in granting a clearance. Lack of data to the contrary means the CAF will positively grant a clearance to someone who shouldn’t have one. /rant
Everyone working for the government has a secret clearance. It’s required. So reducing the number required would be reducing mission so you could reduce the employees required. Hell, my cousin, working for TRICARE, had a secret clearance.
USIS did my past clearances, but OPM actually did my last one. Let’s just say, I saw a difference. Instead of a 30-45 min interview, it was 4 hours. I felt like I had an anal probe after I came out of it, and this was a few months before Snowden. Not complaining, mind you. I think anyone going for the clearance I have SHOULD feel that way. Our nation’s security is at stake. I was just surprised at the difference. They also actually came to my neighborhood and interviewed my neighbors. The others, except for my first one 18 years ago, didn’t do that. Took longer to adjudicate. Last few times it was adjudicated a few weeks after my interview. This time it took 7 months after my interview. THAT was post Snowden. I was originally told it was done in May, but then it wasn’t done until July.