Old enough to know better.
The Army is moving forward with the deactivation of its Small-Team Reconnaissance Units. The drawn down of military capabilities that has been going on for the last 8 years is still in motion.
Computer models were used to conclude long-range surveillance companies were not in demand by ground commanders.
Defense analysts have said Army commanders have an aversion to risk and a growing preference to use technology such as satellites and drones for reconnaissance rather than insert small teams of soldiers.
Most of us have been around long enough to know that we have not always had the ability to play reconnaissance with a keyboard and a joystick. Victory on the battlefield often requires that we have redundant capabilities. Using computer models as the primary justification to restructure military assets seems juvenile.
Long-range surveillance soldiers in the model would attack large units and were killed immediately based on their coding, Scales said, delivering war planners the conclusion the units were a risky, low-reward asset.
I am sure their computers do show that kind of result. I can not help but wonder what their computers show happens if the damn things get unplugged. Drawing down a capability to the point where it no longer exists will cause a loss of expertise that can not be duplicated by killers in cubicles.
All LRS soldiers are airborne qualified, and many have graduated from Ranger and Pathfinder schools. Most LRS soldiers end up attending at the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort Benning in Georgia — a schoolhouse that also trains units such as Navy SEALs and Marine Force Recon.
Maybe their coding for battlefield simulations did not include having Secretary Mattis in control of the on/off button. I certainly hope his presence makes a difference in the outcome.
Category: Army News, Big Army, Defense cuts
Who needs LGOPs? Who needs battle ships? Who needs recon choppers.
LRS Soldiers don’t attack large units. They perform “surveillance”.
I was never LRS, but I’m pretty sure they practice the battle drill break contact a hell of a lot more than squad attack.
Exactly, NBC, if they were out to attack ‘large units’, they’d be called Long Range Attack Units, not Long Range Surveillance Units.
‘Long-range surveillance soldiers in the model would attack large units and were killed immediately based on their coding…’.
OK, well that leads me directly to a fundamental question about the computer model that was used to make this determination.
Did the long-range surveillance soldiers in the model use the time-proven/survivable tactics and methodology that Recon units have traditionally used, where they remain unobserved and engage ‘large units’ with indirect fires or air?
Or was this model skewed to justify a specific pre-determined outcome, and therefore had these long-range surveillance soldiers foolishly engage ‘large units’ in frontal attacks, etc., while charging at the enemy with fixed bayonets and rifles carried at the high port arms?
The Marine Corps learned the hard way a few years back that it had to maintain its organic ground reconnaissance capabilities, because other ISR assets may not always be available, or viable. The Army should learn from that in this case.
As I mull over this ill-considered decision, I think that I’m beginning to smell Bean Counter shite.
Hopefully SECDEF Mattis will intervene and crush this.
Not to worry. The same guy that hired Lars is in charge of this.
or the MI bitch officer who informed me that range time was an utter waste since any future wars would be done with missiles and satellites (circa 1983.) Oh, and she retired as a general…
Sounds like someone who knew who to know and blow!
Immediately thought of this…
Something about well conceived plans working perfectly until the first shot is fired comes to mind.
Exactly, nothing ever goes as planned when the shit hits the fan.
I once has a leader explain to me the reason that the US is so successful. He use an oxymoron, saying we are well versed in “organized chaos”.
That was taught eons ago in Mil Science classes. Soldiers in most Armies wait to be told what to do when the plan goes to hell. American Soldiers say F’It and go kill using their training.
I could look it up but the quote goes something like this: “The reason the American Army is so good at war is because war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.”
And, akin to that, we have all these great manuals, but we don’t ever read them.
Supposedly made, in some related form, by a Soviet army officer.
Attributed to an unnamed (that I can find) German general during a post WWII debriefing.
I’ve been on the receiving end of shite isr from drones and the flyboys (flypeople?). One time it was an “ied emplacing” large rodent that went into a canal which could of easily led to a drowned Soldier when we attempted to detain said rat.
The other that comes to mind was two squads on line sweeping a large open field, in a sector that was faaaarrrr from friendly, for a weapon that an insurgent dropped (some how he got a lock on the transporter and beamed up to the mothership). 2 hours later we found a plastic pistol toy. For some unknown reason those goatlovers failed to open up on us, maybe because it was about 20 degrees and haji don’t like to use lotion.
Nothing, no amount of expensive toys, highest resolution, weapons packages will EVER replace a well trained Infantry or Cavalry Scout.
Nothing. Ever.
Ever Ever.
Let see ’em get some humint…
Maybe this isn’t a bad plan in asymmetric modeling but what happens against a 1st world enemy who has the ability to jam your toys and force your troops into an old school recon patrol situation and now you have no specialized groups capable of this function?
Or in a 3rd world scenario where for whatever reason your tech isn’t operational at the moment?
Nothing worse than fucking rear echelon simulation wienies trying to “help” the troops that will actually do the dying when the sim wienies are wrong…risk aversion is a good thing, we don’t need leaders who enjoy getting people killed, but the risk of people getting killed is part and parcel of every military operation including the training involved for actual operational level performances. Rule #1 of war, young men die…often horribly and tragically but inevitably.
One of the best ways to keep young men from dying is when other young men are able to tell them where the enemy is and what the enemy is doing at any given moment with or without tech.
Here’s hoping “Mad Dog” fixes this fucking idiocy in hurry.
Jam your toys? What? Oh, that can’t possibly happen… can it?
Sure, it can …
Jam your toys.
I blame this on too many years of air superiority.
What are they going to do when the drones get poked in the ass as soon as they are down range?
Satellites? If they are not in geosynchronous orbit you will only be able to recon when they are overhead.
This is a bad policy that will cost more lives than the risk aversion will save.
Hmmm…. since AI (aerial interpretation) was rolled into PH after World War II, I occasionally put my AI skills to work counting helicopters on the pad at the south side of Isfahan. You may have heard of that place. I think they build them there.
So this morning, I counted the following:
32 troop helos, of which 8 looked like Sikorsky mimics, and 24 were another fuselage type.
33 gunships, looked vaguely like Apaches
4 smaller choppers on another pad, looked a little like the choppers used in ‘MASH’, but are probably for training purposes, or maybe surveillance?
It’s not all that difficult to figure this out, based on the shadows cast by the birds where they sit on the tarmac.
So much for all that expensive IT equipment. Direct observation is better. They know that in World War I, WWII, Korea, Vietnam. Geez, isn’t that the Scout’s job? Observe directly and report?
Old Soldier question: are “Small-Team Reconnaissance Units” the modern day version of “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs)” from my Nam era?
LRRPs were used a lot then and did great stuff.
Essentially yes, but with some differences. They have had a dozen different names down the years since LRRP.
Most recently, they were LRS-D in the BFSBs.
And every one of them requires brass clankers.
Yes, when you go out into bad guy country with five other dudes and no arty support to gather intel, it can get a little hairy if said bad guys discern you are in their AO. If you were captured in RVN the odds you would survive were slim and none. The VC and NVA had a substantial bounty on “the men with painted faces.”
I can’t remember who compiled it, but there are (were) several paperback collections of LRRP stories.
I am nowhere near being man enough to shine their boots.
I went out on missions twice with my LRRP teams; it was quite illuminating for this O-3 C.O. In the first one I was just another snuffy. I learned why I couldn’t bring a poncho to the field–too noisy.
I didn’t serve in the military but my father was an Air Force Pilot in the early 60’s . He used to train Iranian and Egyptian pilots, among others before transitioning to Air Traffic Control before leaving the service to raise my sister and I. I have MASSIVE RESPECT for all military members past,present,and future. I own 450 (and have read 90% of them so far) books on the Vietnman War, most are autobiographies, biographies and battle recountings. There are probably 20-25 that are LRP and LRRP bios and about the same number by Navy Seals. ASTOUNDING COURAGE and SKILL. To even remotely think there is no longer a need for these men is not only extremely shortsighted, it is dangerously FOOLISH.
How many paratroopers drowned in the wee hours of 6/6/1944 because aerial reconnaissance of Normandy couldn’t see that all of those nice open fields had been flooded?
How many kids on B-24s died in flames because Ploesti only got high-altitude overflights that couldn’t see all the flak guns concealed under fake roofs that were perfectly visible from the ground?
How many boys from the 1st Marine Division and Task Force Faith died in the North Korean snow because the aerial recon photos didn’t see 200,000 Red Chinese crossing the Yalu?
Hell, in the last case, intel on the ground was practically screaming the truth from the rooftops, but MacArthur & co. didn’t buy it because their overhead images didn’t show it. I’m sure someone will try to tell me that it’s an apples/oranges comparison based on how much capabilities have improved since then. Interestingly enough, they were saying the same thing right before each of the above examples, and many others.
And computer models? Seriously? Did they learn nothing from McNamara’s fuckups in Vietnam? “Computer models show they would attack a larger force and be destroyed…” Oh, hell, do you suppose the computer accounted for the recon team leader having a functional brain between his ears and not pulling a Leeroy Jenkins just because he sees bad guys? That maybe he’s smart enough to, I dunno, observe and scout that large enemy force without letting them know his team is there, and reporting his observations back to his own command, so they can decide how best to kill that large enemy force? In other words, that the recon team would do its job?
I’m a layman without the benefit of the professional experience many of you have. If it’s obvious to me that this is bullshit, I think that’s saying something.
You could also say that those CIA experts with all their SIGINT and ELINT missed over 40,000 Soviet personnel building up to walk into Afghanistan.
We didn’t have anyone on the ground there, but the Soviets were able to hide an invasion force and stroll without all our intelligence capabilities knowing about it.
Actually, they didn’t – the US Intel Community (IC) detected the Soviet prepositioning of forces that participated in the initial aerial occupation of Kabul and other major cities/transportation centers. See the intro of
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record.html
The US IC did, however, fail to correctly assess the Soviet’s intent. As a result, they also failed to warn the POTUS of the possibility that the Soviet prepositioning of forces could be the prelude to an invasion.
Damn, Hondo. I miss that.
Aye, there’s the rub. Relatively easy to count tanks, etc. to determine capabilities. Determining intent is a wee bit tougher.
Interesting. So, in other words, we had all this intelligence, but we didn’t know what was going on “on the ground”?
It still works, thanks for the link you freak of knowledge.
Hondo has long established himself as our Sheldon Cooper. (But in a good way.)
Eyes and ears
HOLY CRAP!!! Nothing replaces the value of trained and intelligent scouts going and actually identifying and verifying the who, what, and where of the situation. Does the Army still use the SALUTE report format? Im sure they do in some form or another.
To self mitigate what could be a lengthy rant; in my time in the National Guard, Army Reserve and a very brief time on active duty I was a 19E and an armor officer assigned as a tanker to armored cavalry regiments or a J-series cavalry squadron. Hence the value of actually having gone and snooped around to see what you could be charging into has been HAMMERED INTO MY VERY THICK NOGGIN. A model cannot replace the ability of a soldier to see, analyze and report back what the hell is actually being looked at.
My professional day to day life involves working with some pretty smart PhD types who believe that the modeling tells it all. I am continually reminding them that we need to go look. The model is a guess based on a defined set of parameters. When the team I lead exists to monitor, seek out and analyze radiation in the environment, the best thing a model can do is point in a general direction. Mother Nature works in her own way and many times science only gets it half right.
Ahhhh dammit typed too much.
Bottom Line: Keep the scouts!
And often those pretty smart PhD types don’t ever do the “field” work, but will disagree with someone who’s been there and smelled the air and felt the aura of the location.
I’ve had more than one professor try to tell me how things really are in Afghanistan or Iraq, then I ask, “So when were you there?” “Uhhhh, I haven’t been, but I KNOW how things are there!” “Yeah, I’ve been there and seen for myself and talked to the people.” “But this book says….”
OH, GO-O-OD! Please don’t start mimicking the commissar. Eeewwww! Ickkkk!
The been there-saw it firsthand stuff doesn’t work for desk jockeys.
Just because I can count helos on a tarmac, it doesn’t mean they’re anything but decoys and dummies made to look like the real thing, does it?
I would caveat that of the troops who went to Iraq, there were fobbits and others who had no interaction with the local populace other than maybe “Haji, how much for 10 movie dvds?” (The Intel weenies on my FOB literally never left the wire. But, always had an opinion on everything as if they knew more than dick.)
Same goes for Korea. There are the barracks rats who never leave post, but say 100 times a day “Korea sucks!” I’ve been there 10 times and had good times on most every trip by getting off post.
And though I do as much paperwork as a cop who just arrested someone, I still fancy myself as an outside the wire type who spent much more time doing my job away from a desk than at it. (Thank Buddha!)
That book starts with “Once upon a time” and ends with “They all lived happily ever after”. Unfortunately, there’s one big badass wolf in the middle chapters that they just skim over.
I’ve worked in the Warfare Analysis community for a while- Modeling and Simulation is their bread and butter. The 50 pound heads (PhDs) would even joke that while all models lie, some are useful.
I disagreed, and found employment elsewhere.
Those same “computer models” can’t properly employ Civil Affairs or PSYOP teams either. Why? Because those computer models treat everything as combat maneuver elements. The contractors who run it don’t care because they get paid either way. It would be too complicated and/or too expensive to program all those units in the system to be true “Combat multipliers” as part of the scenario.
And I lost count of the amount of times I went out with a Cav Platoon in Afghanistan or as a CA team with security in Iraq to go find out what’s going on in a location because the drones and/or cameras weren’t showing anything worthwhile but a picture. They haven’t programmed those drones and cameras to have conversations with people, yet.
This is also the same reason why an F-16 can be a great show of force and excellent ground attack element, but won’t be able to hold ground or accept surrender. We need people on the ground because Mark-1 Eyeball is best when attached to a human brain on location.
Heh-a couple of years ago at a warfighter the OPFOR attacked us (well III Corps, which my unit was subordinate to) with armored columns across a giant freaking lake! Suddenly the enemy armor just drove across all that water to attack us while-coincidentally-the system put most of our armor down for maintenance. I’m sure that a lot of that is just built into the game to simulate stress and the OC/Ts just kind of shrugged when it was pointed out to them that none of the enemy armor was amphibious. Anyway, the point I was trying to make is that the-very expensive-warfighter system treated that like a real possibility, so who knows what the software used here did. GIGO.
Nothing new. Saw and heard many times that what us Boots on the Ground saw right in front of us, was not what the COC and Intel were reading of the situation.
Our lying eyes.
On a side note. Where does one get a computer with a Hero complex? Recon attacking and getting killed by larger force. Really, Best of the Best acting like Hollywood idiots.
Hmm
“If we use recon people, we may have casualties that will make me look bad.”
“If we use these toys, intel says what we want it to say, and any blame falls on toy failure, including casualties”
“Congresscritters are happy when we buy and expend toys in place of hiring skilled people.”
Nah. No one would be dumb enough to think like that.
After watching an unnamed partner country destroy a few drones trying to land them and watching an aerostat break its tether and go sailing away, my faith in technology hasn’t been shaken too much. Besides, Dave, you don’t need to pay a drone a pension and bennies, and the local defense contractors (both manufacturers and operators) will be ever so grateful for the added business.
“Long-range surveillance soldiers in the model would attack large units”.
There’s the first fuckup right there.
Roger that Sergeant First Class.
One against many? That only works in manga comics. Where do they get this stuff?
This did not happen intentionally or often in Vietnam. LRRP teams were instructed to avoid enemy contact. They were there to observe and report. This was because the six men commonly utilized in both Army and USMC LRRP teams only carried enough ammo to sustain about 20-30 minutes in a firefight. If a team made contact, they were trained to break contact and move to their closest extraction point. Their mission was to sneak and peak, not get in a shoot out. Hiding in the bush was the tactic; and, if necessary, throwing grenades and calling in an airstrike or arty (if available) were the first weapons of choice, if compromised.
rgr769 –
Precisely. During my time, each 1st Recon team member carried 20 magazines (x 19 rounds)and 4 grenades. We had two claymores and smoke grenades distributed in the team. One would have to be pretty damn dumb to attack a large force with that little fire power. Not once did we choose to pick a fight and as you correctly pointed out, we were instructed to avoid contact and to just observe/report. Per my experience of the engagements we couldn’t avoid, the shortest response time we got from air/artillery support was 12 min, with the longest time being 40 minutes. We had enough fire power to hold out for short times, but I was damn happy things did not heat up for that longest response time. We fought well when we had to do so, but we sure as hell didn’t seek it out.
This computer modeling crap reminds me of the climate change computer modeling: GIGO.
It is really bullshite, and much of it will fail when the rubber hits the road. You may be interested to know that my Ranger company replaced the 1st Marine Recon Bn when it stood down in 1971. We took over their battalion area and buildings at the 1st MarDiv base camp in Da Nang.
That is correct PEEPS. If the team is detected. Head for the extact point. Your helos are on the way. If as ahelo crew you insert a team you return to Base and await their call for extact. Joe
I talk to people nearly daily, who have been put in a bad position because of faulty E-INTEL. Nothing beats boots, eyes and ears, on the scene.
So we might be going back to hands-on, real-time, real-world stuff again, instead of some imaginary Kingdom of Warfare in which the Bad Guys go POOF!! when they’re hit?
Gee, that’d be nice.
Let’s just do remember that the Brits fooled the Germans with decoys while they were preparing to invade Europe. Inflatable tanks and halftracks with speakers were part of the ploy to fool Hitler’s aerial recon planes.
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/ghost-army-the-inflatable-tanks-that-fooled-hitler/276137/
Okay, before we get too worked up over this, who actually read the article?
What is being deactivated are 3 100-man Corps-level LRS companies. And they are being deactivated because commanders in the field weren’t using them for their LRS capabilities.
These LRS Companies have only been around since the late 1980’s – I know that because I was on active duty when they were organized and created. We had one in our MI battalion at 1st Armored Division in Germany and one at VII Corps (the LRS Company was at Corps level, at the division level it was a LRS Detachment, basically a platoon – I believe the Army did away with those many years ago for the same reason, that the commander’s weren’t really using them for their intended missions.)
It’s not like the Army is just giving up on reconnaissance. AFAIK there are still recon platoons in infantry and armor battalions/brigades, and there may be others as well (I retired in ’05 so I’m not up on the current MTOE of the BCT system.)
To my knowledge, there are still Cavalry squadrons and regiments as well that are well versed in reconnaissance and surveillance.
For that matter, we still have a Ranger regiment with 3 battalions and 5 active duty and 2 National Guard Special Forces groups, all of which are trained in long range surveillance and reconnaissance.
Outside of these elite units, we continue to train soldiers in these skills at Ranger school who then go on to become leaders at the small unit level in combat arms units world wide.
So I’m not sure the deactivation of 3 company sized elements – that weren’t being used anyway – is necessarily going to impact our capabilities.
“commanders in the field weren’t using them for their LRS capabilities”.
There’s fuckup number two right there.
Boom.
We’ve had the same problem in Civil Affairs for too often, though in many cases it was at least half our fault because of weak Team Leaders or Company Commanders who couldn’t brief like they had balls or confidence about what the mission is for CA teams.
And if we get into another conventional war, those will be pulled from somewhere because of the requirement on a battlefield with lines.
The BFSBs where the majority of the LRSD units were housed, were shuttered a couple of years ago.
We do still have Recon units in the form of Battalion Recon Platoons in Armor/Infantry Battalions, Cavalry Squadrons at the Brigade Level, and two Cavalry Regiments at the Corps Level (on AD, not counting NG elements).
They have been screwing up our MTOE lately, however. Including taking the Sniper section out of Armored Cav units, because clearly there is never an instance where that might be useful /sarc.
The LRS units are going away because they were not useful for counter-insurgency warfare. For that matter, no traditional Recon unit is good at that, because we only are used correctly in conventional and assymetric warfare. It is a case of always planning to fight the last war, not the next one.
Oh and those computer models were clearly written by someone who never read the 7 Fundamentals of Reconnaissance.
Retain freedom of maneuver
Report nformation rapidly and effectively
Ensure continuous reconnaissance
Develop the situation rapidly
DON’T LEAVE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS IN RESERVE
Orient on the reconnaissance objective
Gain and maintain enemy contact
“RREDDOG”
There is no 8th fundamental of “When your six man SKT identifies an enemy armor division, immediately use battledrill 1A”
I’m going to assume (I know, I know, assumption is the mother of all fuckups.) that battledrill 1A is the immediate unassing of the AO?
Negative. Battledrill 1A is Squad Attack. I was referencing the article saying these small teams were always getting killed by superior forces in their simulations. I was saying that was NOT something they are supposed to do.
That would be battle drill 3.
You’re saying that as if someone in the Pentagon who read a manual on reconnaissance is deciding your MTOEs, rather than those who know how to employ recon elements effectively….
That’s just crazy talk MSG.
Yeah I know, its such a good thing we never have to worry about that in the US Military…..
Also let me just elaborate a bit on the original purpose of those corps-level LRS companies (now keep in mind I’m recalling this from memories that are 25+ years old so I may be a bit rusty in some respects or using out-of-date terminology): The idea behind these companies was that, just as many of you have said, “eyes on the ground” are a commander’s best tool for knowing what is happening in his battle space. It was discovered that there was a gap in surveillance assets: “Strategic” HUMINT (Human Intelligence) assets like Special Forces belonged to the THEATER commander, while the DIVISION commanders had R&S assets in both their cavalry squadron and in their infantry and armor battalions and brigades. However, those assets were limited by the means the commanders had to deliver them – the scouts had to go out by ground vehicle or by helicopter, which limited how “deep” the commander could “see” into the enemy’s territory. In practical terms, these assets couldn’t go deeper than 10 – 20 KM behind the EFLT (Enemy Front Line Trace, also called the FEBA, or Forward Edge of the Battle Area or FLOT, Front Line of Own Troops – the terms EFLT, FEBA and FLOT are often used interchangeably.) So the Army decided to create a Long Range Surveillance Company (LRSC) that would (a) belong to the CORPS commander (rather than the THEATER commander) and (b) would be airborne qualified so that they could be inserted much deeper into the enemy’s territory than the “leg” scouts the division commander had. IIRC the plan was that these assets could be inserted as deep as 50km – 100km (30 – 60 miles) behind the EFLT. The fact that these belonged to the Corps commander rather than the theater commander was significant because too often, if a corps commander requested reconnaissance assets from the theater commander, the theater commander would not have those assets to provide (because they were tasked for other missions.) That left the corps commander ‘blind’ in some respects. In Europe, where we were prepared to fight the Godless Commie… Read more »
Another problem along that vein is we have gone to a much more decentralized combat focus.
In places like Afghanistan, the commander for an AOR was often a Company Commander or Platoon Leader who operated and ran missions with very little directed guidance from higher echelons. In days past, those same AORs would have been directly under the control of a Battalion, Regiment, Brigade or Division Commander. It is kind of hard to ask for or employ a Corps asset to a commander at such a low level of authority.
Yes, I think that overall what is happening is that soldiers with R&S capabilities like this that were created at a high echelon (corps) are not having their jobs eliminated, rather they are being “pushed down” to lower echelons where they’re more useful.
I think the way insure they are used and used properly is to do what we did in RVN. The Army should make LRRP companies organic to combat brigades. Then they will be far enough down the totem pole to get used by the commanders who can utilize the intel they obtain.
I’m surprised they didn’t already with as much significance as was placed on BCTs being self-sustaining and plentiful with every type of unit in the last 15 years.
Wow, I think this is more than I’ve seen you write in 6 months combined Martin. lol.
That’s just crazy talk MSG.
Damn, don’t know how I double posted on this one. Weird.
It has something to do with WordPress, not you.
Not only should we keep them, they should be modernized to surpass Russian technology. The Russians are currently using robots to do surveillance on the battle field.
These troops are the ones who should handle the robots for surveillance since they have the expertise in knowing what to look for. So no, we shouldn’t cut them. We should improve them.
No problem , right ?? WTFO ?? All you have to do when the shit hits the fan again is to find a good commander — then recruit and train troops thoroughly –and then put them in the field . Sounds simple , right? Well , it ain’t . You lose a lot of good men during the learning curve . RVN should have taught our leaders how essential HUMINT is . Doesn’t anyone read history books anymore ? And no , it wasn’t all recon . We usually tried to get some meat on the way out to extraction . And we always had the best slick drivers backing us .
“The wars of the future will not be fought on the battlefield or at sea. They will be fought in space, or possibly on top of a very tall mountain. In either case, most of the actual fighting will be done by small robots. And as you go forth today remember always your duty is clear: To build and maintain those robots.”
The Simpsons, S8E25.
Nah. What does Bart Simpson know? He’s 12.
The wars of the future will be fought on distant planets, planets that are cold enough to freeze you solid or boil you alive without protective clothing, or planets that are as comfortable and familiar as your home world ever was. If you think a desert world like Mars or a frozen, ammonia-covered world like Titan won’t be the scene of an intense firefight some day, you haven’t paid attention to history.
History tells us that any place, any system, any world, any continent can be a theater of war. If war against an aggressive, plundering Enemy who will not communicate or negotiate with us is not necessary for the survival of all hominid species and all life in this Universe, then we will be driven to extinction unless we choose to fight back.
I choose to fight back.
It’s a sad day, but it’s been coming for a long time. If not for 9/11 all the LRS units would have been deactivated in 2002/03.
While no one underestimates the utility of highly trained conventional infantry observers, there is only so much end strength to go around, and deactivating the AD LRS units buys a complete infantry battalion.
Any off the cuff requirements can be met by outsourcing missions to SOCOM components, who are doing the job everyday anyway.
Hopefully, the Army will be able to bring back this type of organization into to the force at a later date (I’ll bet money on it as the requirement didn’t go away). When it does so I would hope that the institution incorporates some of the lessons learned over the last 30 years of LRS units and creates an organization which is functional and value added.
(FWIW, a majority of my early career was spent in LRS from team member to LRSD CDR and at the school house. A lot of great soldiers did amazing an unheralded things in LRS units during operations in peacetime, peacekeeping, and combat, its hard to see the units go as they were perhaps the best soldiers I served with during my career.)
Bet Jonn’s in-box is getting slammed from SLuRrPpdRUnK offering his bullshit tales of bravery.
This hits close to home. I was the Company Commander of a LRS Company for 3 years. Our teams never attacked. We taught them that if they were shooting, they were already dead. The only time they would engage the enemy is if they were compromised, and only to break contact and E&E. I think this is a mistake. The army had no capability that can replace a trained soldier conducting surveillance on the ground, no matter how many electronic gadgets they have.
That has been the basic doctrine of long range recon patrols since before the 1960’s and is also common sense. Six men with small arms are not an effective military combat force with which to engage a larger force, especially in enemy controlled territory. The elimination of specialized on the ground recon teams is a serious mistake.