Operacja Samum*

During mid-1990, a group of US personnel were conducting intelligence gathering overseas. They were observing troop movements of interest to the US. They were also operating without official cover.

I won’t speculate on how common that was, and I don’t know. But obviously such things happened from time to time during the Cold War and its aftermath.

Reports differ as to the agencies involved. Details are unclear; many have not yet been made public. However, the best information indicates that six US personnel were involved; they were from the CIA and DIA.

Unfortunately, the events in real world soon intervened. You see, it seems that these individuals were in Kuwait, clandestinely observing troop movements along the Kuwaiti border.

On 2 August 1990.

Yeah. “Oh, sh!t,” is right.

The US operatives went into hiding. For some time they lay low. I’m sure their APF was extreme the whole time.

In case anyone’s forgotten: this was during the time when Saddam Hussein (may he enjoy the “up close and personal” attention of Shaytan for all of eternity) was taking Western citizens hostage, then using them for propaganda purposes and as human shields. There was a realistic threat of that happening to these individuals if they were caught.

And has Hussein’s intelligence services discovered their true reason for being in Kuwait, well . . . .

As you might expect, the US Intel Community was rather chagrined by this turn of events. They began seeking assistance in extracting these personnel from Iraq.

Unfortunately, every nation they approached was either unwilling or unable to help. Save one.

In late August, the CIA contacted the Polish intelligence services. Poland agreed to help.

At the time, Poland had a large commercial presence in Iraq. Specifically, Polish engineering firms were then doing much construction work throughout Iraq – as contractors to the Iraqi government. For a number of reasons, the government of Poland determined it was in their national interest to assist the US in this matter.

The fact that the US was apparently willing to support a renegotiation of Poland’s foreign debt – reputedly by 50%, or over $16 billion – probably was among those reasons. (smile) And for what it’s worth: such a reduction was in fact negotiated in April, 1991.

The Poles reportedly insisted that their intel officers run the operations in-country. After some wrangling, the US agreed. The operation was then placed under the command of Gromoslaw Czempinski – who, ironically, previously been involved in or led numerous intelligence operations against US and other western nations.

Polish operatives arranged a linkup with the US operatives in hiding in Baghdad and/or Kuwait. They moved to a Polish construction camp near Baghdad. They stayed there for a number of weeks.

In the interim, Hussein had imposed travel restrictions on most foreigners. Military checkpoints were also established on major highways. However, because of their government contracts, “employees” of Polish firms working in Iraq generally could travel – and could leave the country.

This provided the necessary opportunity.

False passports and exit visas were obtained. Transportation to the Iraq-Turkish border was arranged.

The US operatives were each given passports from a Slavic nation; it’s unclear which. However, there was a problem: none of the US operatives spoke a Slavic language. Though the Polish technician in charge of the exfiltration tried, he could not teach them how to properly pronounce their own cover names.

This was a real concern. During the 1980s, many Iraqis had been educated in Poland. There was a reasonable chance that they might run into one during their exfiltration – one who spoke Polish well enough to detect the ruse.

The work-around was that the US operatives would use a common stereotype:  that of the “drunken Slav”. The US personnel being exfiltrated would not speak to any Iraqi. The Poles with them would blame their poor pronunciation (if any was overheard) on their being drunk.

The exfiltration was planned to be via auto convoy. It was to be led by the technician who’d tried and failed to teach the US operatives to pronounce their Slavic cover names.

After some hesitation, the go was finally given for exfiltration. The CIA reputedly nearly caused a last-minute abort – they didn’t want the Polish intel officer in charge to accompany the exfiltration, and sent a cable to that effect.

This was a showstopper, as the Polish civilians involved (not all Poles involved were Polish intel operatives) balked at going if he was not to be on the convoy. So Czempinski ignored US objections and in fact accompanied the group.

One of the Polish intel officers had obtained 4 bottles of Scotch, which he brought with him. In northern Iraq, he brought them out and had the US operatives drink the stuff. That way they’d actually be drunk if and when they reached any checkpoints with a Polish-speaking Iraqi. (Reputedly the US agents were so wired at that point that the liquor had little discernible effect, other than to make them smell like drunks.)

North of Mosul, what was feared might happen . . . in fact happened.  An Iraqi officer approached one of the cars in the convoy.  He glanced at a few of the passports, then said – in flawless Polish – “How lucky I am to see my best friends.”

Whether by inspiration or design, the Polish technician leading the convoy had the perfect response.  He immediately approached the Iraqi officer, gave him three kisses on the cheeks and a hearty bear hug – an in the process, moving him away from the car. They spoke for a bit; he complimented the Iraqi officer on his excellent Polish.

He then offered the Iraqi the remaining passports, telling him: “Ah, you must check these.”

I’m certain about then six anuses clenched so tightly shut that it would have taken a sledgehammer to force a needle into them.

The Iraqi’s reply? “No problem. You are friends; you can go.”

The 6 US operatives were taken to the border with Turkey, where they departed Iraq.  It’s unclear precisely where they crossed the border.

They also were not the only westerners that Poland helped escape.  Poland reportedly afterwards assisted an additional 15 non-US Western citizens in leaving Iraq prior to the outbreak of hostilities in January 1991.

I do hope that full details of this operation are made public while I’m still on this side of the dirt. I’d love to hear them.

Oh, and one more thing: Wielkie dzieki, przyjaciele. Wielkie dzieki.

 

* Author’s Note: “Operacja Samum” is the name given to a  Polish 1999 film made concerning the operation described here.  I’ve not seen the film.  It’s available on YouTube here, but it’s in Polish and unfortunately does not appear to have subtitles.  It also reputedly takes some artistic liberties regarding what actually occurred.

“Samum” is Polish for simoom – a type of dangerous windstorm prevalent in the Middle East.  As one might guess, “Operacja” translates as “Operation”.

Though the name “Operacja Samum” was used in the film for the operation, the actual name used for the operation itself has not been made public.

 

Sources:

http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19950117&slug=2099750

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Simoom

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/drinking-a-way-out-of-hostile-iraq/343947.html

Unfortunately, John Pomfret’s original Washington Post article concerning the operation (which revealed its existence to the public) is behind a paywall. While I believe the first article linked above to be a substantially complete reprint, I am not certain of that fact, and I haven’t yet had the opportunity to read the original.

I have never seen any official files concerning the operation.  (I damn well wouldn’t be writing this article if I had.)  Until a few days ago, I had never heard of the events noted above.

Category: Historical, Who knows