One officer’s perspective on Afghanistan
The following comes from an email we received from a young officer currently serving in Afghanistan. Given the vocal propensity of the crowd at This Ain’t Hell, he’s interested in your feelings and perspectives about what he reports to us from the front;
Writing tonight out of a strange combination of frustration and hopefulness. Before I begin my question/rant, I’d like to caveat by saying that in no way do I not support the war effort. I’d think that would be obvious since I’m over here playing an active role in the prosecution of this conflict. (11 series is my MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) for those of you who are curious) However, I still wanted it make that clear before I began.
The progress in this war is very different depending on the viewpoints you solicit. At the higher [command] levels, we (DOD) are crowing about the massive advances the Afghan forces are making without US/ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) support.
We talk about the provinces that have been handed over to the Afghan government for security and stability (none of these are “high-threat” areas). We speak about them being able to “stand alone” against an ever weakening enemy. Unfortunately it seems as if this war has become a house of cards waiting to tumble down. The arbitrary timetable of withdrawal has led to a rushed mentality where we choose not to fully reveal the true nature of things on the ground here, including ourselves (US Military).
Briefings sent higher [up the chain of command], created for the purpose of highlighting the actual status of our Afghan partners are “modified” to reflect a more rosy perspective. When partnership percentages are too close to the chilling reality (11 ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) contribute to a company “Joint” mission) we massage the numbers, removing our enablers and counting support ANSF soldiers who will not actively support the mission to more aptly reflect the illusion that we are making progress in this handover.
ANSF are isolated and distrusted, with good reason. Theft, desertion, outright attacks (Green on Blue events), and intelligence leaks that are so pervasive we may as well just air-drop our CONOPs (Concept Of Operation) over Taliban villages infect every level of their military organization.
The reality is these people (Afghans) are no closer to ensuring their own sovereignty than they were when our first SF teams began to descend on this wonderful country over 11 years ago. Corruption cannot be understated, and as a way of life is completely incompatible with our goals for this war effort.
Alright, that’s just one officer’s two cents. Rant is now over. What I’d really like to hear is the perspectives of you “old-timers”, no offense meant, who were there in the closing days of ‘Nam. What was the perspective of the troops on the ground when they were asked to fight and die for a nation populated by people who had no desire to improve their lot in life through hardship or shared danger? Is this way off-base? Maybe the final days of Vietnam were so dissimilar as to be incomparable, but I’d still welcome the feedback.
The perspective here is that we could win this war if we could actually fight it. Endless restrictions and “risk-averse” policies that filter down from higher [headquarters] in an endless deluge only stunt our actual progress on the ground. In an effort to stay positive I’d like to know if any of you share similar views, or if not, could offer some perspective to an officer leading men who, when asked why they’re still fighting reply: it’s for the paycheck.
I’ve edited some of this email for spelling and defined some of the terms that might not be familiar to the whole crowd. Other than those few edits, the rest of this are the words of that young officer.
Category: Military issues, Terror War
His e-mail doesn’t really contradict what I’ve been hearing from our embedded contractors downrange, or the NCO’s I have contact with.
I’m not nearly old enough to speak authoritatively on the final days of Vietnam, but I believe I see similarities in the defense of ‘staying the course’ and the true threats [or lack thereof] to our national security.
Same shit my compadres and I faced in 2003-4. We didn’t trust the ANA, and we didn’t obey the orders to permit them to murder us, like not keeping a round chambered.
Afghanistan is rather changeless. The Soviets and their Afghan communist puppet army had the same BS: lots of glowing reports supporting the wisdom of the Politburo in ordering the invasion, and those Afghan communist puppets killing caucasian Soviets for sport.
And I say caucasian because the enlisted and NCO ranks came from the Tajikistan SSR, and had arrangements with Mahsoud to kill off their officers. Cousins calling cousins across the border. Similar to our situation along the Afpak border.
Best course of action: plan a fighting withdrawal south, and into Pakistan to the coast, where our Navy-Marine Corps team can provide support. Our Air Force is too unreliable, and the Russian-made SAM and American-made Stingers will really cramp any air avenues of departure.
I realize that this is anecdotal,but my son deployed in 2010 and is scheduled to deployed again this year. His stories regarding the poor performance of the ANA was simply “Scary”, the one phrase I remember from him is he never wanted to be in front of them, as he didn’t trust them not to shoot him, instead of the enemy!!
Being a Sp/4 11B in 1971-’72 and during the Easter Offensive in VN was a trying experience to say the least. I was RA but there were many US (draftees) still incountry. Nixon had publicly stated that ground combat troops were only performing defensive operations. That caused quite a stir among us grunts still in the bush after we heard that on AFVN over our tiny earpiece transistor radio. However, we continued our missions in the bush for months to come. And believe it or not most of us cheered when Nixon bombed the shit out of North Vietnam. We’d been waiting on that for a very long time. As far as I’m concerned Nixon at least had the balls to do what was needed.
As to a correlation with Afghanistan, of course there are many similarities, but many differences too. I truly feel for our troops there now having to serve with all the restrictions and total BS policies. We had restrictions but maybe not so much as current day. I’ve thought a lot about whether I could serve under this current CIC in combat and have concluded that I would not want to, but would complete any remaining service on honorable terms and get the heck out upon my ETS. I very much support the troops and the mission but with their hands tied practically behind their backs, threats of courts martials, feeding the enemy intel, and all sorts of other BS, it’s time for them to come on home. We’ve got to take our own country back.
There’s a lot more to be said but I get too mad to continue.
Fork the towel heads, they aren’t concerned about their own country, then neither am I. Bring my nephews home.
that was my assessment in 10-11, sad to see nothing is changing. I am waiting for Afghanistan’s version of Operation Lam Son 719….
Very true. “joint operations” are very limited with very small numbers of ANP/ANA, most of em are to scared or just dont do anything any way. “Afghan led” are probably like that also, with the majority of American troops(all branches) doing the brunt of the work.
There are some real shitty ANA/ANP, most of them dont even care they are doing it just for the measly paycheck and to ‘live’ on American bases(if that is the case).
Every single person I met could barely speak their own language,much less read/write(pro tip: very uneducated).
We should just pull all of our troops out and just let Afghans do what Afghans do best, suck at life.
It does seem that most commo from A-stan sounds like this. So, where TSO was embedded is the exception and not the rule?
Some interesting reading here that might be relevant:
‘Little America’: Infighting on Obama team squandered chance for peace in Afghanistan
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/little-america-infighting-on-obama-team-squandered-chance-for-peace-in-afghanistan/2012/06/24/gJQAbQMB0V_story.html
‘Little America’ excerpt: Obama’s troop increase for Afghan war was misdirected
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/little-america-excerpt-obamas-troop-increase-for-afghan-war-was-misdirected/2012/06/22/gJQAYHrAvV_story.html?hpid=z4
My nephew 2-505th (unit enroute to Afghan) … An old saying- “Don’t be the last man killed in Vietnam.” Change that to Afghanistan.
I was a 2-505 Panther in Nam in 68-69 and at least in I corp we were taking it to Charlie.