Going Rogue: The Marines in Afghanistan

(H/t to F’n Boot for the link)

The Washington Post had an article in its Sunday edition about how the Marines are operating in Afghanistan. Basically, the articles implies that the Marines have essentially “gone rogue” and are choosing not to follow McChrystal’s strategy of focusing on protecting population centers. Instead they have chosen to focus on rural areas in Helmand, Farah, and the Nimroz provinces and have been reluctant to detach units from the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) based in Helmand to support operations in more heavily-populated areas like Kandahar.

I think this excerpt essentially sums up the article:

The Marine approach — creative, aggressive and, at times, unorthodox — has won many admirers within the military. The Marine emphasis on patrolling by foot and interacting with the population, which has helped to turn former insurgent strongholds along the Helmand River valley into reasonably stable communities with thriving bazaars and functioning schools, is hailed as a model of how U.S. forces should implement counterinsurgency strategy.

But the Marines’ methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as “Marineistan.” They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines.

I do not believe that the Marine strategy is contrary to McChrystal’s overall counterinsurgency strategy. In fact, I think the Marines are quite obviously adopting it wholeheartedly, just as they embraced many of the same COIN tactics in Al Anbar, Iraq. It can’t be ignored that Helmand (which is the center of the Marine’s AO) has been the scene of more coalition KIA/WIAs than any other province, despite the sparse population. Obviously, Helmand has become a very important power center for the Taliban and if any progress is to be made against the Taliban in Kandahar or the rest of the country, the Taliban must not be allowed a sanctuary in Helmand. They also must not be allowed to establish similar bases of power in Nimuroz or Farah province or move freely across the Pakistani border. The senior Marine in Afghanistan, Brig. Gen. Nicholson, has this same mindset:

“You cannot fix Kandahar without fixing Helmand,” Nicholson said. “The insurgency there draws support from the insurgency here.”

The situation was similar with Al Anbar in Iraq, which the Marines were also primarily responsible for. Al Anbar, like Helmand, was sparsely populated. However, it became an important base of support for the Sunni insurgency,  including for Sunni insurgents in faraway cities like Mosul and Kirkuk. Also, just like with Helmand, Al Anbar became an important transit point for foreign fighters entering and exiting Iraq. If we would have not secured Al Anbar and won the support of the people in Al Anbar, we would have not been able to secure the rest of the country.

Also, the article states that the Marines do not want to operate without the support of their own forces (the MAGTF concept). While Marines are trained to be supported primarily by Marines (or the Navy), they have shown an ability to operate succesfully with the support of the Army and Air Forces. When 2nd Battalion 7th Marines was operating essentially by itself in Helmand at the end of 2008, it was primarily supported by Army supply units, Air Force close-air support, and even British helicopter units. During my time in Iraq, our EOD team was from the Navy, the supply-unit supporting our base in Hit was an Army national guard unit, and our medevac support was from the Army. In Marjah, the attack was supported by Army and British infantry units. While the MAGTF is an important part of Marine Corps doctrine, the Marine Corps has shown itself to be flexible in both Iraq and Afghanistan and able to operate with the support of people outside of the Marine Corps and Navy.  If McChrystal needs to pull some units from Helmand to support an operation in Kandahar, the Marines are more than able to operate there.

We Marines are a hard-headed bunch who like to think out of the box and do things our own way, no doubt about it. But in the case of Afghanistan, I don’t think anybody can deny that the Marine Corps has embraced McChrystal’s strategy and are implementing it in Helmand, Farah, and Nimuroz province.

Category: Politics