ABC/Post poll: Republicans say war in Afghanistan “not worth fighting”
The Washington Post writes a half-assed story (as usual) that leans heavily on a poll they did with ABC which says that a majority of Republicans who they polled say that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. In their half-assed way, the Post strikes a glancing blow at Obama and merely touches on the reason that poll might have turned out that way;
The poll findings are likely to present a challenge for Republican front-runner Mitt Romney, who has said that the goal in Afghanistan should be to defeat the Taliban on the battlefield.
President Obama stepped back from that goal during his 2009 strategy review and has set the end of 2014 as the departure date for all U.S. combat forces.
Overall, the Post-ABC News poll reflects a country bone-weary of war after more than a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and, until late last year, an almost nine-year engagement in Iraq.
Romney is correct; the goal should be to defeat the Taliban (and al Qaeda) in Afghanistan, but as I’ve said countless times since the summer of 2009, victory isn’t even in the vocabulary of the Obama Administration. Their goal in Afghanistan begins and ends with “withdrawal” – I’m pretty sure that Republicans don’t support the war in Afghanistan, not because of it’s length or their bone-weariness. But because this administration has continued the presence of troops in Afghanistan just so he could ride on their shoulders into the next election. Witness the Post quoting his latest campaign meme;
“For the first time in nine years, there are no Americans fighting in Iraq,” Obama told an audience in Hollywood, Fla., at a campaign fundraising event Tuesday. “And we’ve begun to transition in Afghanistan to put Afghans in the lead, bring our troops home.”
You can play back an interview on YouTube that I did with Adam Kokesh back in early Spring of 2009 wherein I told Kokesh that I support Obama’s war policy, however, by the Fall, my support of his policy fell off when he ignored his generals’ recommendation for 60,000 troops and made a political decision to compromise between his generals’ recommendation and the anti-war crowd. At that point, I knew any decisions that came out of the White House weren’t going to be in support of our National Defense, or in support of our troops – it was going to be in support of Obama/Biden 2012.
Republicans are disillusioned with the war in Afghanistan because they know what victory should look like, and we’re not going to see it Afghanistan. The only victory that the Obama Administration can see in Afghanistan is the one in November. Who wants to be the last to die in Afghanistan for the Obama/Biden 2012 campaign?
Category: Barack Obama/Joe Biden, Terror War
I don’t speak for Republicans, but I stand by the line of reasoning that could at least partially explain the lack of support: our overwhelming effort has been expended towards the ‘Taliban’, instead of al Qaeda.
Ya think the reason that most people (not just Republicans) think the war isn’t worth fighting anymore could have anything to do with the fact our troops have been completely hamstrung and left to twist in the wind?
Ya think???
I think.
“Republicans are disillusioned with the war in Afghanistan because they know what victory should look like, and we’re not going to see it Afghanistan…Who wants to be the last to die in Afghanistan for the Obama/Biden 2012 campaign?”
This sums up my view. I was a rabid A-stan war supporter right up until the politicians decided we didn’t need to win. Once we weren’t going to win there wasn’t a point anymore.
The Taliban and al Qaeda are a malignant cancer. To successfully remove a malignant cancer a lot of good tissue in and around the cancer gets cut out. Afterwards you hope what remains grows back in healthy while watching for a recurrence of the cancer. Our troops have been instructed to remove the cancer without the loss of a single good tissue cell…
Nice analogy Mr. Chiroux. 🙂
And CI, the Taliban and al Qaeda are interchangeable enemies where our goals should be concerned in Afghanistan. There is no defeating one without also defeating the other.
@6 – I disagree. Defeating the Taliban has no appriciable effect on al Qaeda. They have differing strategic goals and there are not enough AQ operatives in country for their elimination to send ripples throughout the rest of the organization.
I agree with CI. Many of these wanna be terrorists sprouting in foreign countries like Europe and the West seem to be the ‘lone wolf’ types that have nothing to do with the Taliban or Afghanistan, but are home grown ones inspired by their own agendas. We can park troops in Afghanistan until the sun don’t shine but for what?
I agree with others in that this isn’t how real war is waged. It’s a bunch of pussy footing P.C. garbage. We are losing our people over there and for what? It’s pointless now.
All I can say is that withdrawal can’t happen soon enough.
@7 – Which doesn’t answer the problem of leaving organized and extreme AQ sympathizers in the vacuum that we are going to leave when we pull out.
A defeated Taliban and a regime friendly to US interests equals less of an AQ presence and a much more difficult operational or training environment for them.
A strong Taliban equals an environment friendly to AQ for organization and training which in turn equals a return trip to Afghanistan in the next decade or so.
Disagree all you want, so long as there is a protective organization in place that AQ can use to shelter behind while licking their wounds, or what ever, they will use it and be a continuing threat. Defeating one requires the defeat of the other.
And Tman, I don’t believe in ‘parking’ troops in A-stan either, I believe we should be fighting this war to actually win it. Our current operational plan may be pointless but the goal, and/or realization of, complete victory never is.
@9 – Your argument seems predicated on the assumption that al Qaeda needs or wants a stable sanctuary in Afghanistan. Our presence there is currently more valuable to their IO campaign than our withdrawal would be. When combating a transnational terror group that has the ability to evolve and adapt, a singular focus on one nation-state, especially one so backwater such as Afghanistan, is counter-productive. AQAM is beginning to have thriving affiliates in many other places that we cannot interdict them, precisely because we’ve been mired in AFG for a decade+. Your model would seem to require a similar process in each locale, while AQ simply moves to the next theater.
The Karzai regime cannot even begin to fund their own security apparatus without massive infusion of outside financial aid for the foreseeable future, such that even if the Taliban resurgence was arrested, AFG would hang like an anvil around the collective necks of western nations, hampering pour ability to then move to the next venue to repeat the process.
I for one would welcome a Taliban regime [in at least the S/SW portion] where they would invite AQ back in. Our accrued GEOINT and SIGINT experience in the region would make them virtual sitting ducks in a permissible environment. I’d wish to engage al Qaeda where they are, rather than where they’re not.
‘Complete victory’ is a fickle and flighty bitch.
CI: I’ll observe that we tried pretty much exactly that once before – from May 1996 to September 2001. That didn’t exactly work out all that well.
@Hondo – We tried nothing of the sort. Lobbing a couple of Tomahawks to satisfy public opinion and with poor intelligence is nothing close to what we could and should be doing to combat AQAM. What we’re doing now isn’t yielding the desired results either, is it?
CI: you’re presuming we’d do more that lob a few standoff munitions if AQ moved back into Afghanistan. History says otherwise. Without a cooperative government that gives up permission to engage, we almost always respect the sovereignty of other nations when it comes to the overt use of military force – or we invade them in strength and force a regime change. North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are about the only exceptions I can think of. None of those turned out well from the US perspective.
CI: and I’d debate you on the “we did nothing of the sort”. Afghanistan was ruled by a Taliban regime from Sep 1996 – late 2001. We stood by and watched that happen. We then had every opportunity then to do exactly what you propose. US national leadership consciously elected not to do so, despite clear knowledge of exactly where AQ was – even after the USS Cole and the US Embassy attacks – relying on piddling half-measures and “legal proof” level of confirmation instead. And if the Taliban takes over and “plays nice” for a couple of years, my guess is we’ll do exactly the same once again.
@13 – We obviously use diplomacy to ensure we can use the tenets of the AUMF.
Re: 14 – We had no reason to oppose a Taliban rise to power in 1996. But your arguments do nothing to alleviate the issues that I brought up earlier. Utterly defeating the Taliban does nothing to eliminate al Qaeda. AQAM is the enemy who attacked us. Expending such vast resources against the Taliban is akin to chasing the mule while the Cartel continues to thrive.
CI: we tried diplomacy with the Taliban from about 1997 or so onwards, and intensively between about 12 September 2001 and 18 October 2001. They ignored us. They will again.
Without a secure basing area and freedom to use same, AQAM is IMO a threat manageable via the IC and clandestine and/or SOF operations on an as-required basis. Give them a secure basing area and freedom to operate, and the situation becomes very different. We’ve already seen what happens if they’re given a secure basing area and a few years free reign in same.
A Taliban regime risks returning to conditions circa 1996-2001 while expecting a different outcome. Don’t see that as a risk worth taking, provided we have a choice.
I’m away from a computer right now….so I will respond later today……its nothing but pain to try and be cogent typing on my phone.
@10&15 – No, my argument recognizes that al Qaeda has a history of opportunistic behavior which indicates they will take advantage of any situation beneficial to their survival. They “need or want” a stable sanctuary anywhere they can find one. No one claimed defeating the Taliban would eliminate AQAM, only that AQAM can’t be defeated so long as the Taliban exist with enough power to give them aid and comfort. And your mule/ cartel analogy isn’t really correct. The mule doesn’t shelter the cartel, fund the cartel, place weapons in the hands of the cartel, or tend to the religious comfort of the cartel. If it did, shooting the mule would be a worthy exercise. As I’ve stated in other posts, I’m an advocate for ‘total war’. I personally believe the only reason we aren’t enjoying more success in Afghanistan is because we aren’t fighting that war to win it, not because we can’t. Our military is being hamstrung in the worst imaginable ways, and no one wants to discuss making the changes necessary to win, they only want to discuss withdrawal, in my opinion that’s wrong headed as hell. Thank the powers that be that our grandfathers had more testicular fortitude while prosecuting the wars against Germany and Japan. We did what was necessary to win, in ways that mattered we became our enemy, then became better at it than they were. The same thing is needed here, want to beat the terrorists effectively? If we do then we need to get comfortable with the idea of becoming as ruthless as they are or we’re just spinning our wheels. As for the Karzi regime, I don’t support it and never said I did. I think it should be dismantled with prejudice and replaced with something more reliable, even if that means putting warlords sympathetic to the US in control and then really backing them. Like it or not CI, Afghanistan has already been an anvil around the necks of western nations for more than a hundred years, time to put an end to that. And if you think the… Read more »
As with Hondo……I’m more than happy to provide my counterpoints…but I’ll wait until I’m home and in front of my computer.
@16 – “They ignored us. They will again.” I’m not saying that they wouldn’t, but fear of another deposition and decade long struggle can have an effect on people. But I also didn’t maintain anywhere in my posts that diplomacy with a Taliban rump state would be necessary. More on that in a moment, as I’m trying to respond to points linearly. “Without a secure basing area and freedom to use same, AQAM is IMO a threat manageable via the IC and clandestine and/or SOF operations on an as-required basis. Give them a secure basing area and freedom to operate, and the situation becomes very different.” Here’s the working assumption that I disagree with; AQ and it’s affiliates [AQAM] already have safe havens and sanctuaries irrespective of Afghanistan. These are not manageable by the IC and SOF beyond observation and select targeting…. precisely because we’re mired in Afghanistan with the vast focus of our projected power. The assumption that AQ wants or needs AFG is an easy one to come by, because it’s not only not refuted by policy makers and the media, it’s rarely if ever discussed. @18 – “They “need or want” a stable sanctuary anywhere they can find one. No one claimed defeating the Taliban would eliminate AQAM, only that AQAM can’t be defeated so long as the Taliban exist with enough power to give them aid and comfort.” In my estimation you’ve debunked your own argument. AQ already has stable sanctuaries irrespective of Afghanistan. Remember, a terror organization doesn’t need real estate per se. “The mule doesn’t shelter the cartel, fund the cartel, place weapons in the hands of the cartel, or tend to the religious comfort of the cartel. If it did, shooting the mule would be a worthy exercise.” Once again, since AQ isn’t in AFG in any appreciable numbers, and doesn’t rely on the Taliban for funding, sheltering or religious comfort….this argument doesn’t seem to have traction. “As I’ve stated in other posts, I’m an advocate for ‘total war’. I personally believe the only reason we aren’t enjoying more success in Afghanistan is… Read more »
I have one final comment, and then I see we’ll have to agree to disagree, CI. Your arguments above neglect one point: as far as I can tell, in none of the other potential “secure basing areas” that you mentioned above (Mali, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, etc . . . ) does AQAM have the active support (financial, political, diplomatic, logistical) of the current national government. (That’s even true in Somalia, where there is no effective national government.) Nor does AQAM have any plausible claim to have helped those national governments in the past. In contrast, under the past Taliban regime in Afghanistan, AQ had that level of support, and was able to make that claim. My guess is they’d have that same support again again if the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, and would make the claim of past assistance once again. After all, AQAM could now plausibly claim to have helped the Taliban recover its sacred homeland from the invading “Great Satan” Crusaders from America and Europe. And they would indeed make that claim – both privately to the Taliban, and publicly to the world. I also don’t think the Taliban would much fear a repeat performance. Look at their history. They were invaded by the British 2x in the 1800s – and ended up evicting the British each time, regaining their independence each time (though they did voluntarily cede some control of foreign policy to the British after the 2nd war in order to keep out Russia). Ditto the 3rd Anglo-Afghan war after World War I – that ended pretty much by mutual consent after a few British bombing raids with Afghanistan formally independent of British influence. Ditto the Russian decade of Afghan involvement in the 1980s. IMO, if we leave the Taliban will view this latest 10+ years worth of warfare exactly as they did all these previous conflicts: just another temporary foreign invasion successfully reversed by largely Pashtun efforts. AQAM will play on that theme, and will stress the fact that they helped the Taliban evict us. Back to the Future, circa 1996. Again,… Read more »
@Hondo – “After all, AQAM could now plausibly claim to have helped the Taliban recover its sacred homeland from the invading “Great Satan” Crusaders from America and Europe. And they would indeed make that claim – both privately to the Taliban, and publicly to the world.”
For clarity, in this instance only al Qaeda is apt, as AQAM refers to al Qaeda and Affiliated Movements. But though this position makes some sense, it ignores the fact that funding and recruitment are weighted by affronts, perceived or otherwise, than by success. In other words, AQ has a better IO case to make when ‘infidels’ are occupying Islamic holy ground. This yields long term and tangible benefits. The propaganda gain from our withdrawal would be present, but short term…and have a net drain on incoming manpower and funding.
Your second paragraph didn’t really apply, since the Taliban didn’t exist until 1996 as an entity.
No, we disagree, but it was civil and I appreciate that.
From 20 – “The bottom line, in my assessment, is that AQ is not in, nor terribly interested in Afghanistan in anywhere close to the scale to warrant such a heavy and inflexible engagement.”
AQ is not in or interested in Afghanistan precisely because we are there. That’s what seems to be missing from your equations. We leave, and leave the Taliban in charge, that will change.
@23 – “We leave, and leave the Taliban in charge, that will change.”
But again, you offer no reasoning as to why. Why they would want AFG; why they would need AFG. They’re not there now and their and it hasn’t impeded their existence or franchising.
One of the popular conceptions that I simply don’t understand people latching onto is the effort expended on the Taliban [which BTW, would very likely not rule much beyond an area that spans RC S/SW], at the expense of letting al Qaeda set up shop in many other areas. Kill the disease not the symptom.
Why? Examine why they were there to begin with and you have your answer. Hondo did a good job of explaining that.
Tell me this, with all the other places besides Afghanistan where they’ve found safe haven in the last decade, how effective have they been? Not very. Why would we leave an environment hospitable to them in our wake?
Don’t understand the effort being expended against the Taliban? That’s easy, we broke them in our pursuit of other objectives, it’s now our responsibility to clean things up. Putting problem children back in charge is not the way to fix things.
OK….al Qaeda attacks us on 9/11…and we spend the next decade fighting the Taliban. Yep, makes perfect sense.
Well if you want to boil it down that simply, here ya go, does the driver of a getaway car car get charged with driving a getaway car, or murder, if his associate kills someone during a robbery? 😉
Guilt by association, in my opinion we should be hunting down Taliban as diligently as we’ve been going after AQ.
CI: geez. Today, yes: it’s AQAM. In 1996-2001, the correct term was AQ. AQ was still relatively monolithic then.
OK, I’ll spell out for you why the second paragraph of my previous comment is relevant. I frankly thought that should be obvious, but apparently it wasn’t.
It doesn’t matter that the Taliban was founded in the mid-1990s. First and foremost, they’re Pashtun. And since 1747, the Pashtun have dominated Afghan history.
The Taliban is a native Pashtun movement, fostered by the Pakistani ISI in the mid 1990s in an attempt by the ISI to create a proxy and gain influence in Afghanistan for Pakistan’s benefit. That effort failed, as the Taliban slipped its leash very soon after inception and began working for itself. Today, it’s essentially the major indigenous Pashtun movement. As such, it views itself through the lens of Pashtun – and Afghan – history.
Look at the history of Afghanistan – which, as I stated above, has been dominated by the Pashtuns since the creation of the Durrani Empire in 1747. (Indeed, the terms “Afghan” and “Pashtun” were originally synonymous.) What I gave you in brief form was an overview of Pashtun (Afghan) interaction with foreign invaders since 1838. The Taliban see themselves as the lineal descendants of the historical Pashtun leadership of Afghanistan all the way back to Ahmad Shah Durrani himself. To ignore that history is to thus ignore a major influence on Taliban thinking.
That is why the 3 Anglo-Afghan wars and the Russian intervention in Afghanistan are relevant here. From the Taliban viewpoint, those were merely the last 4 foreign Infidel invasions of Afghanistan that were successfully repulsed under Pashtun leadership. They view our intervention in Afghanistan as #5, and are trying to go 5 for 5 in kicking out the invading Infidels. They’ll take whatever help is available, from whatever source, to do so. And they’ll be grateful to whomever helps them afterwards if they’re successful.
@27 – “Guilt by association, in my opinion we should be hunting down Taliban as diligently as we’ve been going after AQ.”
Then why aren’t we? Our primary effort has been against the Taliban [and in Iraq]. One group has strategic goals of attacking western targets abroad in pursuit of it’s fantasy of a global caliphate. The other group wants an Islamic nation-state. Our priorities and main effort have been reversed by way of poor policies and national pride.
Hondo – I appreciate the history lesson, though I’m well aware of it. A careful survey of current Taliban-AQ relations does not lead one to believe that a repeat of pre-2001 would occur. There is likewise no tangible evidence that even senior Taliban leadership were apprised of al Qaeda’s 9/11 plans. In fact, testimony exists pointing to anger of the event occurring, and it’s follow-on impact. The Taliban want an Islamic nation-state. That is their goal, and they are cognizant that coming to power in a portion of AFG and inviting AQ back in, would not engender that goal. They draw, as you point out, influence from their collective history; but that doesn;t mean that they’re going to act counter to their goals. Especially not a second time.
CI: I’d hope you’re correct if a Taliban regime comes to pass – but I’m not particularly confident. Regarding how to live peacefully, as you doubtless know that part of the world (Central Asia) has been “stuck on stupid” since before the time of Alexander the Great. They literally seem to regard war – either against outsiders, or amongst themselves – as the normal and desirable state of affairs.
AQAM also appears to have similar goals (essentially a revival of a fundamentalist Islamic Caliphate). I’d see AQAM convincing the Taliban they were the beginning of same – again. And I simply don’t think the Taliban would avoid falling for it, even having been fooled by AQ once before.
I’m definitely not thrilled with what I’ve seen from Karzai and his cronies. But sometimes the “devil ye know” really is a better choice than the one you don’t.
I share your concerns…this wouldn’t be as large of an issue for me if we were only prosecuting the campaign against al Qaeda half as vigorously as we are against the Taliban.
It is wishful thinking to say that maybe the Taliban would avoid an Al-Qaeda alliance, if we just give them the time and space to take back over in Afghanistan. The Taliban have NEVER renounced the Al-Qaeda alliance, and both terrorist organizations continue to operate in the same areas of Pakistan. And while, the presence of “foreign” terrorists fighting in Afghanistan is not trumpeted by the MSM, nor the Administration that set out to retreat by 2014, the Paki, Chechnyan, Uzbek, & Arab terrorists continue to fight on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Trying to give AQ a new name or argue that actions of one element; AQI, AQAM, or AQAP are somehow not part of the AQ organization is irresponsible. It is the equivalent of saying CentCom and Africom are doing different things, so the DoD shouldn’t be associated with them. Similarly, pointing to low “membership” numbers is purposely misleading. Al-Qaeda has always retained few “members” who were the core of the organization, and those were the leaders of non-member international terrorists. Those members hatched the plans, pitched the plans to higher, led the operations, and funded the operations from AQ, using non-“members.” “Lone wolf” attacks!?!? like Major Hassan and the Little Rock shooter? Both of whom were in contact with Al-Qaeda’s al-Awlaki? The underwear bomber, who was also in contact with Al-Qaeda? Given how many of the “lone wolf” attacks are demonstratably NOT “lone wolf” while the Administration and MSM refuse to acknowledge the connection, the implication is that even more are not. And since the Admin/MSM line continues to deny the AQ connection when it is blatantly obvious, this “argument” must be fully discounted as pure political BS. And it was the Pakistani Taliban that set off the NYC Times Square bomb just a few years ago, yet another “lone wolf” attack. And in a recent video, a Taliban affiliated terrorist blatantly stated that once we leave Afghanistan, they too will follow us to America and Europe. The Taliban are not a popular band of freedom fighters, not even amongst the Pashtuns. They are marauding bands of thugs… Read more »
WOT
WOTN – You certainly traffic in strawmen….but it seems a companion to your partisanship. You may remember that the aggregate number or AQ fighters actually in AT&T has remained fairly constant since well back in the Bush Administration. I suppose they were in league with the ‘liberal’Sheridan MSM as well?
There’s a lot of debunking and I’m typing on my phone right now….but I would suggest reading several of the interviews with past and current Taliban members to ascertain the past and current relationship.
Additionally….it’s al Shabaab….and while they have attacked into Kenya in retaliation for Kenyan campaigns into Somalia….they are not established in that nation.
Damn Droid…..there’s a few words above that I’m not even sure how they got there.
Partisan Strawmen? Yeah, you do seem to be an expert at that.
Another of those Al-Qaeda “lone wolves” was convicted this week, a Boston pharmacist: Tareek Mahenna.
National Defense from our KNOWN enemies is not a “partisan” issue. The RNC has done very little to oppose DNC cuts to the Troops and Military Benefits, and the very premise of this thread is that Republicans are now supporting Obama’s retreat from Afghanistan.
The truth is that the world is far more dangerous in 2012 than in 2008.
But you *purposely* ignore the fact that *official* Al-Qaeda membership has little to do with the actual threat, as card-carrying Al-Qaeda members(of the various names they use), are generally the minority in the operations they lead. The *official members* operate primarily as trainers and force multipliers. They are and have always been the first truly international terrorist organization, as those terrorists prior acted internationally, while AQ not only acted internationally but were composed of international members.
Al-Qaeda supports, takes over, and/or funds other terrorists to do their dirty, more often than they do it themselves, including the Taliban, and the al-Zawarhi’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
I welcome your example of my partisan stawmen. Beyond that I haven’t found anything in your post worthy of discourse…..since you seem to not be able to rebut my points.
Understandably you wouldn’t have a rebuttal, as the conclusion you based your premise on is empty, precisely because the premise it constructed holds no water.
To arrive at Biden’s assertion that the Taliban aren’t the enemy and won’t maintain an alliance with Al-Qaeda, one must ignore that they have never broken that alliance, and continue to cross-train with AQ, that the Taliban as well as other AQ allies are still fighting alongside each other. One would have to ignore what Afghan Allies, as well as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are saying. Of course, if the lie is repeated often enough, maybe the electorate will believe that the very organization, the Taliban, that we have been fighting for 10 years isn’t the enemy and hasn’t been after Biden’s pronouncement, despite Obama’s previous (2009) declarations to the contrary.
And that makes as much sense as the claim that the 2011 drawdown, announced in 2009, was due to conditions on the ground, and then stubbornly ignoring the advice of Generals, and going through with the retreat on schedule, despite the record levels of violence.
One also has to ignore the fact that the Afghan people, including the Pashtuns, reject and despise the Taliban, as well as the fact that allowing the Taliban to violently impose their rule on Pashtuns and Afghans, is in no way “democracy,” or “self-determination.”
Rebut your points? Your very premise is bunk. They didn’t become benevolent tyrants when they had power last time. Their tactics have not softened. They’re not going to become magically benevolent, just because Obama attempts to force them to accept a modern day Munich Agreement that gives them the Afghans to oppress.
I’m still waiting for examples of partisan strawmen……
Id also welcome evidence that defeating the Taliban would have a tangible effect on AQAM. You might remember AQ as the enemy who attacked us. As your previous post indicates….you have a propensity to combine all of the arrayed entices as one threat….with the requisite one size fits all strategy. A strategy begun nearly decade ago, and one where we’ve seen little gain.
You’re the one that raised the allegation of partisan strawmen. I merely recognized your expertise in such constructions.
Your attempts to distract, diffuse, and confuse by pretending that different branches of Al-Qaeda are different organizations does not alter the reality that Al-Qaeda is an umbrella organization, that unites violent Islamists in their goals of tyrannical rule. It is not unlike attempting to treat the symptoms of an illness and never attempting to find the cause or the actual ailment.
But go ahead, demonstrate to readers here how the Taliban have renounced attacks on Americans, on schoolgirls, or executing Afghan kids they accuse of espionage. Show us where they broke relations with Al-Qaeda, or vice-versa. Explain to us how Al-Qaeda and the Taliban co-exist in the Paki Badlands, but don’t mutually benefit from their continued relationship.
No, I will not play your game of pretending that Al-Qaeda in Yemen are any more or less the enemy than Al-Qaeda in Somalia, the Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, or Afghanistan. And I don’t need to, because I don’t have a particular poltician or party to blindly support.
I see your problem now…..you have a reading comprehension problem. You’re framing arguments against statements I didn’t make.
How about this…..why don’t you answer my pointed question throughout this topic: how does defeating the Taliban have a tangible effect on al Qaeda? AQ does not exist within AFG in anywhere close to the numbers that warrant our involvement. You continue with strawmen and polically convenient distractions.
I’ll wait be here if you desire thoughtful discourse. If you just want to rant and project against statements I didn’t make….I’m not interested…..people like that are a dime a dozen on the internet.
Your statement “close to the numbers” recognizes that Al-Qaeda IS in Afghanistan, though certainly not in the numbers they were there in 2001.
Since you admit they ARE there, tell us with whom are they allied? Would you have us believe they’re just there on vacation? Are you going to pretend that their presence there is not in support of and at the invitation of the alliance they have not ever broken, i.e. the Taliban?
Unless you can demonstrate where some mythological break between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda occurred, then it is pure lunancy to try to convince us that a return to power of the Taliban would not develop the relationship within the Islamist territory that existed when the Taliban were in control previously.
Or as you have previously stated, when the Taliban return to power in the vacuum left behind a US retreat, that YOU espouse, the Taliban WILL remember and reward those that helped them: Al-Qaeda. You don’t like the word retreat? Sorry, I don’t care. That is the word that describes what you are espousing. Perhaps you don’t like the word “appeasement” either, but that too is a word that describes your program to give control to the Taliban.
I don’t care if you prefer politically sensitive words. I prefer words that accurately describe the situation. No, I don’t claim you’ve used those words to describe the things you’re espousing. Those that advocate retreat and appeasement understand that history has proven the policies failures, so they rename them.
By your own admission, the democracy of Afghanistan cannot stand on its own. By your own admission Al-Qaeda IS in Afghanistan. By your own admission, the Taliban will remember those that help them return to power (Al-Qaeda). So, you tell me, how does retreat from the battlefield, not give the Taliban a return to power and a return to the SAME situation that was on September 10th, 2001.
From 40 – “why don’t you answer my pointed question throughout this topic: how does defeating the Taliban have a tangible effect on al Qaeda?”
He has CI, and so have a couple other folks in this thread. I could chalk up your refusal to recognize this to your own lack of comprehension, but your delivery points more toward willful disregard. It’s understandable that folks are getting a little cranky with you, your arguments are not logical and ignore the obvious.
Here’s a great example –
I wrote “in my opinion we should be hunting down Taliban as diligently as we’ve been going after AQ.”
And you replied “Then why aren’t we? Our primary effort has been against the Taliban”
You either completely missed what I was saying, or willfully misinterpreted it. Your response is self contradicting.
@Jacobite – In regards to your quoted statement, I did indeed misread it. I apparently suffered from momentarily dyslexia and reversed the two entities. Trying to post from my phone while walking around Old Town Alexandria wasn’t helpful, and in fact was frustrating. I apologize. Now I’m back in front of my computer. However, WOTN has taken to framing the argument he’d like to have, rather than try and refute what I had posted. He clearly has a political axe to grind, couching his argument in the premise that the current reality is the fault of Obama, Biden or the MSM. My question still stands. The position that WOTN and I presume you to take is that al Qaeda’s main effort, main concentration and lines of logistics, finance and recruitment are centered around the Taliban and Afghanistan [correct me if I’m mistaken]. My question still stands because nobody can formulate a direct answer as to how AQ would be tangibly harmed if the Taliban suffered total defeat. I really care less about TBSL/QST goals or past history, because while they are unsavory characters, they are not the threat to national security that AQAM is. They have not been and will not be. I have no problem with smacking them into oblivion, once the major threat is dealt with. But to claim that defeating the Taliban is an essential milestone on the road to defeating AQ, is to quote WOTN ‘bunk’. Further, to use this strategy as a model, one then must accept that we have to repeat the process in the next 3-4 countries/regions where AQAM is starting to thrive unabated. Whereas WOTN seems to think I favor admitting a Taliban regime into the UN [yest that’s artistic license, but when he uses the buzzwords of ‘retreat’ and ‘appeasement’, it’s sort of appropriate]…….the Taliban are in fact, a dangerous diversion for us to pursue. Labeling them the enemy might make you feel better, but when the true enemy can still strike, it’s a distraction. Worse, our engagement has been, according to AQ, part and parcel of their plan to begin… Read more »
“The position that WOTN and I presume you to take is that al Qaeda’s main effort, main concentration and lines of logistics, finance and recruitment are centered around the Taliban and Afghanistan [correct me if I’m mistaken].”
No, or rather that’s not what I’m saying. I won’t pretend to speak for anyone else. I also don’t believe the current reality is the fault of Obama, Biden or the MSM.I do believe those entities have been making the job more difficult and are just heaping more mistakes on the pile that already exists as well.
It is not necessary to believe that Afghanistan is central to AQ plans in any way, and I don’t, but it doesn’t take genius to recognize that if we leave without securing the AO against AQ that AQ will take advantage of the the situation to rebuild in an environment which is much more comfortable to them than many of the areas they are currently utilizing. It’s not very useful to chase out the cockroaches without also cleaning up the crumbs that attracted them in the first place.
It’s basic to military philosophy that you don’t leave an area of operations unsecured against your enemy when you leave it. Leaving the Taliban in charge would be tantamount to inviting AQ back in.
And above all else, I still maintain that since we crapped in the sand box, we bought the responsibility to clean it up and leave it better than how we found it.
I recognize and appreciate your position, but another tenet of military strategy is concentrating your enemy at a place of your choosing. Right now, AQ is dispersed and difficult to interdict. Your concern rests on a series of possibilities; the possibility that a resurgent Taliban would control a portion of Afghanistan after our departure; a possibility that they would welcome back AQ into their fold, after experiencing the effects of that action in 2001; and the possibility of AQ wanting to occupy space in that Taliban controlled area.
There is something that we and our enemy both know; our ability to maintain a Taliban controlled area as a permissive environment to strike and interdict at times of our choosing, and with the geographic and signals intelligence to provide fidelity for such actions.
al Qaeda concentrating in ‘Pashtunistan’ would be a strategic boon.
Regarding your pottery barn rule, our incursion in 2001 was a reasonable act of retribution for the sheltering of our enemy. I maintain we owe no more lives or dollars from this point forward.
Really CI?!? So all of this is not YOUR “personal” or “political opinion!?!?” So, considering your purported position, this is the official position of an unnamed agency, perhaps even an unnamed agency of the Federal Government?
I think you may need to seriously reconsider what you define as personal opinion and the official position of your employer, as well as what you think should be blasted across the internet by “some guy” that claims to be publishing such positions.
And yes, your support for policies of retreat from Afghanistan and appeasement of the Taliban, since in the nearterm, they would “only” rule the Southeast quarter of Afghanistan, (along with the Northwest 1/4 of Pakistan).
Complete defeat the enemy prevents the enemy from a return to the 9/10/01 status quo. Retreat and appeasement hand it to them on silver platter.
Just as the 1990’s refusal to call Al-Qaeda the enemy did not prevent attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, Saudia Arabia, and New York TWICE, neither will denying that the Taliban is the enemy suddenly make them want to sit around a campfire singing Kumbaya with those that ordered or supported a retreat.
No it’s certainly not my political opinion, though you make yours known quite well. It’s also not my personal opinion, as in ‘what I feel’ It’s an opinion based on the information that comes into my agency and the analysis that leaves it.
The rest of your rant is still predicated on a “complete defeat” of the Taliban having a tangible effect on the existence of al Qaeda. Something you have resolutely failed to counter, instead relying on fallible and political buzzwords such as “retreat” and “appeasement”.
Such a shame that you cannot seem to direct your ire away from the Taliban and toward the network who attacked us.
CI, since this opinion your publishing is the opinion of your employer, and not yours, why don’t you point us to the place where they have published your opinion.
Perhaps, you’ll tell us that your employer also told us Iraq had WMD in 2003 and that Iran had decided to play nice and give theirs up in 2008? Those analysts do have such a great record don’t they. And if you’re providing input into that system, it is a bit easier to understand how they can make such mistakes.
Yeah, I do understand that you don’t want to call it “retreat and appeasement,” though the policy you espouse is precisely defined as that. You recognize that as well, but don’t have the integrity to call it what it is.
“Complete defeat” of the Taliban is what you wanted discussed. YOU asked what the effect of that would be.
If your employer’s assessment of the situation is any where near what you believe to be the case, then you should be espousing an expansion of US Troops, breaking ranks with the current administration’s calls for cuts.
Do I take issue with a politician that has alienated allies, given away allies, and made this entire situation worse, while allowing the enemy to gain territory across the spectrum? Hell, yes, I do. Does that translate into espousing the other party? No, not at all.
“…our incursion in 2001 was a reasonable act of retribution for the sheltering of our enemy. I maintain we owe no more lives or dollars from this point forward.”
How well did that philosophy work out for everyone after WWI?
WOTN: Here’s the fundamental disconnect. “Yeah, I do understand that you don’t want to call it “retreat and appeasement,” though the policy you espouse is precisely defined as that. You recognize that as well, but don’t have the integrity to call it what it is.”
I’d like to destroy al Qaeda as viable entity. You wish to dick around with the Taliban. Knock yourself out.
Jacobite: “How well did that philosophy work out for everyone after WWI?”
It’s not an apt comparison to weigh early 20th century nation-states and market state terrorist organizations. How do you feel about funding an Afghan security apparatus for the rest of your life….while still dealing with the threat from al Qaeda?