‘Kelly Temps’ In Uniform

Yeah, I’m about to get a bit long-winded – and some might say, “wax ignorant” – again. And this article is somewhat (but not exclusively) Army-specific, so read on at your own risk. (smile)

Much of the readership here at TAH has a military background. (Duh!) But even within the military, experiences and commitments vary. There’s a huge difference in terms of experiences, careers, and commitments between those who on active duty and those who serve “part time” – e.g., in the Reserve Components.

That dichotomy is largely by design, and is to be expected. So is a substantial back-and-forth banter – and at times, some animosity – between the Active and Reserve Components. The roles are different, and what’s required and expected of each is different. The Active Component is there 24/7/365, and provides the primary military response in times of crisis.  The Reserve Component, by design, is there to augment the active forces when required.

At least, there’s a difference during peacetime service. During wartime, when serving together those distinctions blur. My background is Army, so I’ll discuss the Army; other services may be different.  When you serve on active duty and deploy to a combat zone, the uniform says “US Army”; it doesn’t say “Active Army”, “Army Reserve”, or “Army National Guard”. So when it hits the fan, so to speak, the distinctions fade. Mission and imminent threat forces that.  But the distinctions resume when one redeploys.

There’s no argument that the Active Component forces have the harder role. They’re required to be fully ready 24/7/365, and to deploy and fight on much shorter notice than the Reserve Components. They train more, and suffer more as a result – e.g., earlier casualties, more time away from family due to training, more peacetime training injuries, etc . . . . They’re doing their job full time; it’s their livelihood and (for many) their career. Yes, the Active Component forces have a more comprehensive support infrastructure. So? They’re serving full-time, after all. The Reserve Components aren’t.

That was once clearly true. But is that really quite true any more – particularly for the Army?

Time for a historical sidebar. And yes, it is related – though it might not initially seem relevant.

. . .

LBJ managed to get the US militarily involved in a major war in Vietnam largely through deceitful, stealthy means. In Vietnam, LBJ presented the American public a fait accompli before virtually anybody fully realized what had happened. At the end of 1964, the US had less than 23,500 troops of all types in Vietnam. By the end of 1965, there were nearly 185,000 – before any serious public debate had even occurred. But by then any such debate was moot.  At that point, with 185,000 troops in-country we were committed militarily for the long haul – like it or not. Read MG H. R. McMaster’s book Dereliction of Duty for the details. (If you aren’t so angry after reading that book that you literally want to curse out loud or punch a wall – well, you’re a better person than I am.)

Although all services fought in Vietnam, the Army provided the vast majority – roughly 2/3 – of all US forces and thus was the service most affected. And Vietnam very seriously hurt the US Army, with effects felt for a decade or longer afterwards. During Vietnam, units worldwide were “gutted” to provide troops and equipment for the war. And the resulting Vietnam after-effects – anti-military backlash within American society, serious drug problems, serious racial tensions, serious breakdowns in discipline, induction/retention of many marginal soldiers due to manpower shortages – reverberated in the Army for years. Full recovery didn’t really occur for about 15 years after the last Army combat forces left Vietnam in 1971. Some would say full recovery didn’t truly occur until after Desert Storm.

LBJ was able to involve the US deeply in Vietnam without large-scale Reserve Component involvement or mobilization.  He was able to do so because the Army’s force structure in the Active and Reserve Components mirrored each other.  LBJ didn’t need to order a large-scale mobilization of Reserve Component forces to commit the US to war in Vietnam – with the corresponding political “heat” and debate that would have caused.  Rather, he could do it by robbing Peter to pay Paul within the Active Army of his day.

And LBJ steadfastly refused to order any large Reserve mobilization during Vietnam, even after Tet in 1968.  He knew a significant Reserve mobilization would have serious political repercussions. In essence, LBJ knew that mobilizing the Reserves might end public support for Vietnam outright – or could cause serious problems for the social programs he championed simultaneously.  Or both.

After Vietnam, the Army’s leadership said, “Never again.” And the Army changed its force structure to prevent this kind of “stealth entry” into a major war from ever occurring in the future.

Much of the combat support and combat service support infrastructure needed to support large-scale combat operations was moved into the Reserve Components, generally into the US Army Reserve. A few specialties – most notably Civil Affairs – became largely Reserve Component entities. The rationale was that this would force national leadership to build a political consensus supporting any large-scale conflict.  Why?  Because any large-scale conflict would now require significant Reserve Component mobilization.

. . .

This new Total Army force structure worked well during the Gulf War. Reserve Component units were mobilized as-needed to support the Desert Shield buildup and the Desert Storm hostilities.  They were called-up, trained up, went to war, and provided support.  They then came home, demobilized, and went back to being Reserve units. The concept and new force structure was validated.

Well, not so fast.  The concept was “sort of” validated.  But sometimes we find out that what we think is a good solution only works part of the time.  Specific conditions matter.

Desert Shield lasted less than six months.  Desert Storm, just over one (and ground combat lasted about 4 days).  And we were mostly redeployed back to CONUS (or Germany) within 18 months, max.

Fast forward a decade – to 11 September 2001.  We found ourselves at war again. And this time, things went . . . differently.

Unlike the Gulf War, 9/11 ushered in a protracted period of conflict – more than a decade now, much of it until recently in two different sub-theaters of operations. But the Army’s overall force structure and mix hadn’t really changed dramatically between 1990 and 2001 – and still really hasn’t today. A large fraction of the Army’s combat support and combat service support is still in the Reserve Components. But it’s been needed pretty much continuously for the past decade – and has been heavily used.

The Army Reserve now tells Reservists point blank:  expect to serve 1 year out of 5 in on active duty.  It has for at least the past 5 years.  Many Reservists in critically-needed specialties have already served multiple years on active duty since 9/11,  away from home/job/family. And this situation doesn’t look to change anytime soon. The Active Component force structure is shrinking, not adding combat support and combat service support assets to support protracted combat operations.

And that, IMO, is problematic.

The vast majority of Reservists are proud of their service, patriotic, and are willing to serve when and where needed. But they are, by and large, Reservists – not “full-timers”. They have families and civilian careers to think about. The military is not their primary livelihood; their civilian careers are. Being gone for a while during a national emergency is “part of the deal”.  But being gone repeatedly 1 year in 5 (or more often) puts them at a serious disadvantage in their civilian careers. And Reserve units also don’t generally have the same support infrastructure as do the Active Component. So when they deploy, their families often take a substantially harder hit than those in the Active Component.

And remember:  Reservists are in the Reserve Component by choice. Had they wanted to be full-time members of the military, they would have doubtless joined the Active Component (or wouldn’t have left it in the first place). At some point, “vote with their feet” comes into play. The first to leave will likely be the proverbial “best and brightest” – the ones we really need to keep. And if that happens enough, we will have a very serious problem.

IMO it’s already started. I’ve personally seen one absolutely sterling young Reserve officer pack it in. This was an individual who, like TSO, had also completed a law degree – in this individual’s case, while a Reservist.  He could have been one helluva asset to the Army Reserve and DoD had he stayed. But after two deployments (one in-theater, one stateside) and the prospect of more, he packed it in. His primary reason? The prospect of those expected future deployments interfering with any possibility of him establishing a normal civilian career and family life after law school. I suspect there have easily been literally dozens more junior and mid-grade Reserve officers who’ve done the same. And I’m certain that a much larger number of exceptional enlisted Reservists have declined to re-up for the same reason.

The general expectation Reservists had before 9/11 was “I’ll keep myself trained; I’ll serve when and where needed by the nation.” But there was an implicit but understood part of that expectation – that their service would be during a real emergency, when the nation truly needed them. They didn’t expect to be a uniformed version of “Kelly temps” called up at irregular intervals so the Army could avoid hiring additional full-time staff. But for the past several years, IMO that’s pretty much how the Army Reserve and National Guard appears to have been used – as Kelly temps in uniform.

Being “on call” 24/7 for a second job is exciting, and can be fun; ask any volunteer fireman. But it’s only fun for a while. Getting called in at 2AM for something that’s not your primary career eventually gets old. And that’s especially true when it starts happening often enough to cost you bigtime vis-à-vis your peers at your “day job”.

I don’t know how much longer we can continue on our present course before we risk breaking our Reserve forces, at least in the Army. But eventually I fear that could happen. And I also fear we may be far closer to doing that than senior leadership realizes.

Thoughts?

Category: Big Army, Historical, Military issues, Terror War