Who wrote this smoldering turd?
Usually at Associated Press, they put their names on their articles, but this smelly turd is unsigned, and whoever regurgitated this bullshit is obviously embarrassed by it.
The Navy SEAL operation that freed two Western hostages in Somalia is representative of the Obama administration’s pledge to build a smaller, more agile military force that can carry out surgical counterterrorist strikes to cripple an enemy.
That’s a strategy much preferred to the land invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan that have cost so much American blood and treasure over the past decade. The contrast to a full-bore invasion is stark: A small, daring team storms a pirate encampment on a near-moonless night, kills nine kidnappers and whisks the hostages to safety.
Yeah, that’s how you win a war…by surgical strikes at point targets. It worked so well when the French and Dutch Resistance movements employed it as their singular strategy and they beat the Germans and drove them from their countries with pin pricks…oh, wait…no, they didn’t.
Not to be discounted is the feel-good moment such missions give the American public, a counterbalance to the continued casualties in Afghanistan.
Yeah, that’s how you win a war…make people feel good in an election year. Swell.
So if we can arrange to have an enemy that just kidnaps our citizens, wars will be all gravy.
Notice how the article uses Panetta’s term “agile” to describe the new military, implying that today’s military is unreasonably bloated and cumbersome. I’d like them to point to one successful military endeavor in history which was won because the force was merely “agile”. I suspect that this will is only the first of many articles supporting the Obama military by being completely void of substance and facts to support their wishes and dreams.
Category: Barack Obama/Joe Biden, Media
Who wrote it? That empty-suited mron’s press secretary.
“Yeah, that’s how you win a war…by surgical strikes at point targets.”
You certainly don’t win this kind of war by massive conventional operations and nation building….
Yeah. Since it is only the head of the spear that kills, you really don’t need anything but the pointed head. Don’t worry your widdle heads with how you are going to get the spearhead delivered or what might happen is the guy chunking the spearhead might need maybe a rope to get to where he needs to be.
Yeah, man. Let’s just get us a whole bunch of folks out there whittling spearheads.
Should be apply for funding for this new, innovative green industry?
I’m glad you brought that up, CI. This war would have been over years ago if the enemy hadn’t seen, every time they looked up from an ass-whooping, you people waving a surrender flag and talking that nation-building bullshit. Our intention was never to build any nations – but from the moment those three congressmen stood on the roof of Saddam’s palace and proclaimed that Saddam was more trustworthy than GWB, our enemies saw an opportunity to run us off. Every day during the war, they saw the Left ready to surrender.
That’s why the surge worked so well. Our enemies thought they had the US beat when the Democrats won the Congress, but instead Bush increased the number of troops they faced, so they saw no real light at the end of the tunnel, despite the Democrats’ best efforts.
So blame the right people for forcing us into a nation-building exercise.
CI,
I think you miss the point.
Go do more PT
My blame is well placed….both parties. And the campaign in Afghanistan might have been over some time ago, had we not as a nation decided to invade Iraq.
But you’re conflating insurgency with terrorism. An insurgency is both population-centric and geographically based. The terror threat from AQAM is trans-national and has geospatial ties only when it suits their needs or interests.
No amount of ‘determination’ or flag waving in the conventional military sense is going to trump the need for financial intelligence supply chain targeting and an IO campaign.
@5 – Oh, I got the point….it’s the left’s fault, regardless of strategy that spans parties and Administrations. Lather, rinse and repeat….
You are totally correct this sounds like SHIT that some spineless wimp would write– Probably one of Adam Kokesh’s IVAW buddy’s— OH wait they are against WARRRR! Makes me want to puke!
Mike Bradley
US Navy
Vietnam 66/67
I think the point is a smaller military may be fine if the only thing we have to worry about is counter terror operations. Let’s say a million NKoreans come screaming across the DMZ at some point in the future, we had better pray our guys can “agile” their way south as quickly as they can.
@9 – This I agree with. We need to not only continue funding appropriate conventionally based R&D, but the CTC’s and other branches of major training centers need to dust off the HIC scripts and rotate them into the ARFORGEN [speaking for the Army] cycle at varying opportunities.
“It worked so well when the French and Dutch Resistance movements employed it as their singular strategy and they beat the Germans and drove them from their countries with pin pricks…oh, wait…no, they didn’t.”
The middle east is not Holland, and the Taliban are not the Nazis. Compare apples to apples.
Joe, always a step behind in the conversation. We’re not talking about the Middle East. This administration’s awesome plan is for future conflicts with a focus on Asia, more specifically, China. Please, try to keep up.
Oh, the old China boogeyman. When was the last time China followed an expansionist policy? Since we outspend them six to one in defense, why are you shaking in your boots. There is no front, except cyber war perhaps, that they’re anywhere close to us. We would have plenty of time to respond. You just think of the military as a jobs program for people like yourself.
Except this isn’t a job, it’s a way of life. 😉
Small, well trained units, i.e. SEALS/Spec Forces/Pathfinders, etc.- We need them.
Large land units, navy fleets, AF Squadrons,etc- We need them.
Each of them and anything in between has a purpose, and we need it all. A strong military accomplishes many ends, such as letting the potential adversary know that we will not take crap, plus troops in service are not on welfare, in unemployment lines, and the local job market, and the military gear manufacturers hire many many people.
A strong defense is the best offense is much more than a mere saying.
Just out of curiosity Jonn, as I had thought my earlier response to you was on topic……where is any reference to China in the article or your piece, prior to #12?
Maybe the A.P. considers tactical nuclear strikes “agile”.
Oh, Joe, you really should read the newspaper sometime. Or even my comments when you’re responding to them. China is this administration’s “boogey man”. You’re really starting to look very foolish in this discussion.
The reference to China is in past posts. For weeks the administration has been saying the focus of the new strategy is on Asia and China.
Here’s link to the Boston Globe from October quoting Panetta on the China focus.
OK, Thanks.
A jobs program Joe? I’ve been trying to join the army for over a year, the job I want is extrememly dangerous and demanding, and for you to sit there and call the military a jobs program is frankly insulting. So you can kindly go fuck yourself with a giant black dildo.
Easy Adam, your subtlety may be too much for Joey to comprehend.
Oh, and Joey? You might want to read up on China and what they have in mind. See Taiwan, the Spratly Islands just for a beginning. Then, take a gander at what the Chinese are doing in Laos, Cambodia and Burma. According to some sources, only about 7% of China is arable land, Joey. Eventually, they’ll have more people than they’ll be able to feed, probably sooner rather than later. That leaves the Politburo with two options, take land where they can grow more food and purchase some from other sources, or kill off the workers. Or, both.
When troop levels are cut they are still going to be bigger than troop levels were in 2001.. A smaller more agile force is the way to go there are way too many self licking ice cream cones in the Army today anyway.. A SOF truth is quality is more important than quanity. Glad to see the conventional Army going down that route.
CI you win the war 1 of two ways. Kill the enemy wherever you find him, drag him out by his heals and show him he has no power. OR you prove to them that they were wrong to fight you in the first place. Option two is more difficult because it’s a psychological victory, but it has the added advantage of leaving *some* structures standing and not having killed a majority of the populace.
I would like to add this thought:SOF are net the be all end all, they’re highly specialized, and without proper support will get slaughtered like any other unit (quicker because they’re isolated and few in number). Relying on SOCOM to fight your wars is beyond dangerous, and will only see repeats of Desert One, and Gothic Serpent to name a few.
@ #25- Precisely, Doc! @ #23- UpNorth….You sir are definitely a wise warrior “Eventually, they’ll have more people than they’ll be able to feed, probably sooner rather than later. That leaves the Politburo with two options, take land where they can grow more food and purchase some from other sources, or kill off the workers. Or, both.”
Well said big bro! garryowen!
This new vision outlined by Panetta is supposed to address the needs of the military in the future, a future which he sees no need to have a large ground force, and one which Kim Jung-Un probably endorses. His grandpappy’s plan for a reunified Korea can proceed. Last time I checked Korea was still considered part of Asia.
During the late 70’s and early to mid 80’s while I was serving in West Germany we were always being told how we held the tech advantage over the Soviet Union. For some reason that argument really fell to pieces when one morning while doing a border trace they decided to roll the entire 8th Guards Army to the border to wave hello. There is something to be said for having a show of force once in awhile.
I guess if all you are going to do is hostage rescue then this outline fits perfectly, and will get plenty of use.
@25 – I hope you can realize that I respect your opinion and we’ve trod the same general ground, but while your post makes for great talking points, it doesn’t take the realities into consideration.
Why aren’t we killing the enemy where we find him? I would advocate what you wrote, but we haven’t engaged in that activity except in sporadic circumstances.
Nation building exercises may yield fruit in more conventional environs, and is applicable to countering some insurgencies, but it is utterly ineffective against trans-national organizations. For these, you must first take away the financial backing and supply chain, then radically counter the enemies IO campaign. Then, while they start to whiter in the stark sunlight, you eliminate them with prejudice.
Who wrote this drivel? David Axelrod, at the very least.
We ‘lost’ the immediate gratification of winning the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan back in 1995 when the Army (then 1AD) was re-tasked from fighting war to building nations. An Army that must rebuild a country always pulls its punches, always leads with its lawyers. Total war, with no survivors among the enemy and its populace is the cleanest and most enduring goal of war.
The reason why is the moral impact of warfare. Total war profoundly impacts the other side, knocking it out of its course in history and in local/regional/global events. Its culture is wiped out, it history erased, and potential contributions to humanity cancelled. The Germans and the Japanese of 1945 were unable to resist – they had had the fight shocked out of them. A surgical strike by American Rangers could have taken out Hitler, which may have left Himmler in charge, and strengthened the resolve of Germany.
A surgical strike by a SEAL unit, unless it takes out a foreign head of state and his/her entire government, or destroys the basis of the enemy’s economy, isn’t going to take the fight out of any country. By their size, and the need for precision, they will be unable to make a profound moral impact on anyone. Therefore using surgical strikes is a waste of time: it reinforces status quo (optimal solution), or reinforces the enemy’s resolve (the most likely result).
Trans-national terrorist organizations do pose a problem, but also there is a larger problem of US credibility. We’ve cut and run too many time. Made commitments then let those we were going to support fall by the wayside. Poland, Vietnam, South America, Cuba, etc. There are lists of countries a mile long that have legitimate grievances with us. That we egged on the Kurds and Shi’ia to rise up then didn’t support them lost us a lot of face. The same could be said for Lebanon. Do I think the Army should be solely into nation building no. Do I think that nation building is an effective tool. yes. Why? because Al Qadea and affiliated groups do not ever create. They destroy. If we do more creation than destruction, then for the most part we come out on the plus column. The side effect is that people have contact with Americans. Contact they would not normally get. This can counter a lot of propaganda, if handled correctly. Lastly We have failed to acknowledge we are in an information, and propaganda war as much as a military one. We have failed thoroughly to enlist (or perhaps more accurately subvert) Journalists and Hollywood. Bullshit stories like the Green Zone, or that bullshit EOD movie, do as much if not more damage to our cause than Shit heads like PFC manning and Wikileaks. There is so much intel out there on just how truly evil our enemies are that we don’t even need to make it up. What we need to do is start showing that. Our main cultural export are movies. So lets get the movies out there that show us as the good guys for once. As far as journalists, well we need to make it clear to them that they are protecting the most vile scum of the earth, and we need to watch them like hawks. Everything they put out we should be ready with background info to counter it. keep doing that till they *finally* play it strait. We have technology thats supposed to let us see anything… Read more »
@Doc – “Trans-national terrorist organizations do pose a problem, but also there is a larger problem of US credibility.”
Absolutely. But we went into this operation over a decade ago with the intent of eliminations the trans-national organization that attacked us. I think it’s safe to say that we’ve deviated far afield from our original directive.
Everything else you’ve stated, I agree with completely.
“I suspect that this will is only the first of many articles supporting the Obama military by being completely void of substance and facts to support their wishes and dreams.” As Sinatra used to say “it’s all pops and whistles”. Platitudes are spun to fill the lack, or declining lack, of capability. What makes this so strange is this is almost exactly the line of thinking that Rumsfeld was pushing and Liberals went butt-hurt crazy when its lack of manpower became evident. Overreliance on technology, untested concepts, absent certain skill sets, and, a lack of manpower got us into this mess in the first place. Don’t worry we have Special Ops, don’t we. I’m waiting for Panetta to turn SOCOM into a combatant command like Rumsfeld did, that Gates changed back, because we all know how well that worked. #2″You certainly don’t win this kind of war by massive conventional operations and nation building….” Silly comment back to the drawing board CI. #”This war would have been over years ago if the enemy hadn’t seen, every time they looked up from an ass-whooping, you people waving a surrender flag and talking that nation-building bullshit….” Yep Lilyea. Its a simple cop out. Knowing how to do basic police functions or fight irregulars does not nessarily(though could) mean “nation building”. #6″My blame is well placed….both parties. And the campaign in Afghanistan might have been over some time ago, had we not as a nation decided to invade Iraq.” No, that talking point is wrong. Being in 05′ is when Pakistan signed all of the Tribal agreements(which weren’t worth spit) that allowed a resurgent Taliban to reemerge over the next two years. Not the invasion of Iraq, no matter how you feel about it. “But you’re conflating insurgency with terrorism. An insurgency is both population-centric and geographically based. The terror threat from AQAM is trans-national and has geospatial ties only when it suits their needs or interests.” The two are intertwined and can’t be separated in the Afghan/Pakistan border region. #10 Your partly correct, but Full Spectrum means “and/or”, we must reasonably be… Read more »
@Cedo – I like how you caveat your statements with “in the Af-Pak region”….it provides you cover. But you know full well that the overwhelming majority of al Qaeda inspired, funded, supported and related attacks have come outside of theater. You know full well that a majority of al Qaeda fighters reside outside of theater. Perhaps you believe itinerate goat herders with no aspirations beyond their borders to be the primary threat….I believe it to be the organization who attacked us.
“Silly comment back to the drawing board CI.”
You can do better than this.
By all means tell us how a defeat of the ‘Taliban’ will affect al Qaeda.
Sorry, I forgot this part – “Being in 05? is when Pakistan signed all of the Tribal agreements(which weren’t worth spit) that allowed a resurgent Taliban to reemerge over the next two years. Not the invasion of Iraq, no matter how you feel about it.”
I see, so the massive shift in manpower, intelligence and support assets that could have been brought to bear in Afghanistan played no contributing role in the setbacks?
Doc Bailey, #30, Bravo. Very well said. Absent what you cite, one of the most effective tools we have is getting areas to stand up.
#33″like how you caveat your statements with “in the Af-Pak region”….it provides you cover.” The truth may sound like cover but it is the truth.
“But you know full well that the overwhelming majority of al Qaeda inspired, funded, supported and related attacks have come outside of theater.” That point is arguable. Simply because Al Qaeda functions tactically in Afghanistan and Pakistan as an Army like fighting force. We are not sure exactly how many engagments they have been involved in. we do know their presence has tipped the balance in certain battles. You also miss the point that this theater is by all proportion, like committment of the enemy, more important then any combination of the others.
“You know full well that a majority of al Qaeda fighters reside outside of theater.” No I don’t. Frankly since Al Qaeda fields an Army in that region I’d argue your most likely wrong. The only other area of the world that they do anything close to that might be Yemen. Yes Terrorists exist in other locales, but they can no where mobilize the manpower to consolidate a potentional future region for future operations. They realistically can’t overthrow a state anywhere else.
“Perhaps you believe itinerate goat herders with no aspirations beyond their borders to be the primary threat…” When they further the interests of transnational jihadi terrorist organisation they just might.
#34″Being in 05?” I meant “begining” in 05′.
“I see, so the massive shift in manpower, intelligence and support assets that could have been brought to bear in Afghanistan played no contributing role in the setbacks?” Well one no one saw this happening until almost a year or two after it began. We couldn’t react to something we didn’t know was underfoot could we?
Second we have the manpower now don’t we? With the extra manpower in place for just fifteen months look how much further we have gotten. CI I have a feeling if we did have the resources at the ready five years ago, you’d be making the same argument your making now.
@28: While I agree with you about nation building, it did work at the end of WWII. However, those were reasonable people. We aren’t dealing with that now. Were there zealots that held on to the defeated doctrine? Yep, but they were dealt with in the “find them and kill them” way. As you have so rightly stated, we haven’t done much of that lately. It’s almost like we want it both ways; to portray ourselves as the knight in shining armor and not offend anyone as well as playing at trying to win a war. It doesn’t work that way in human nature and conflict. You fight to win first and then work on nation building.
Attempting to project strength while drawing down your military forces only emboldens the bad actors. Stating that you are going to rely on anything and everything except ground forces is stupid. I remember when Carter decided to rely on electronic intelligence gathering versus having humint (human intelligence assets) to keep eyes on things. It didn’t work so well and the vacuum that was created by that had to be filled on the fly after the Iran-hostage debacle started. That took more time, resources, and money than if we had stuck with keeping human assets in place instead.
What’s going to be the line from the government when something happens and we have to go through the whole build up process all over again; “oops, my bad”? How many were lost needlessly when North Korea invaded the South? If assets were readily available I doubt that the North would have even attempted it. Plus, when China got involved and 350,000 Chinese troops came ripping across the river, we were in deep doo-doo. Do we want to justify to the American public why we will be caught with our drawers down around our ankles?
@Cedo – But we do know how many al Qaeda core and affiliated fighters, financiers and facilitators reside outside of theater. The news media doesn’t know it, but you’d better believe that our intelligence, military and policymakers know how many, at least to the extent we can determine.
al Qaeda fields on again, off again Martyrs Battalions in RC-E. One goal for those forces presence is to keep us gainfully interested in remaining in Afghanistan. If the al Qaeda threat were removed completely, there would be more domestic and international impetus to leave. al Qaeda wants our focus to be tied to one locale; this enables their IO campaign of foreign ‘infidels’ on Muslim land and provides them freedom of action in the Sahel, HOA and other locations.
“Yes Terrorists exist in other locales, but they can no where mobilize the manpower to consolidate a potentional future region for future operations. They realistically can’t overthrow a state anywhere else.”
I disagree.
“When they further the interests of transnational jihadi terrorist organisation they just might.”
Strategy-on-a-hunch isn’t something I’m going to subscribe to, especially when there is no evidence to the contrary.
“Second we have the manpower now don’t we? With the extra manpower in place for just fifteen months look how much further we have gotten.”
I likewise don’t subscribe to your optimism. Some successes have surfaced, but extrapolating this current metric along a timeline, it doesn’t lend itself to a desired end-state in a fashion timely enough to deal with a MRC nor the vast remainder of the Islamic terror threat.
@OT – “While I agree with you about nation building, it did work at the end of WWII. However, those were reasonable people. We aren’t dealing with that now.”
Concur. We had dealt with an entity with hierarchical and geospatial ties to the areas in question. That is not the case with AQAM.
And I completely agree on the HUMINT aspect. This is an area that we still drastically lag behind.
I’ve heard the SOCOM-as-panacea shtick before. It lead to our permanent occupation of the Balkans. And to the exponential increase in OPTEMPO, which when multiplied by RIF/drawdown means we’ll be right where we were in September 2001. You’d think they’d wait a generation.
#38″But we do know how many al Qaeda core and affiliated fighters, financiers and facilitators reside outside of theater.” I’d be skeptical of this claim. Not that it isn’t possible but because it has been so wrong before. I’d wager its more an estimate. Second, even if true, what about in this particular theater. “The news media doesn’t know it, but you’d better believe that our intelligence, military and policymakers know how many, at least to the extent we can determine.” Again, I doubt this, though I admit its possible. I think you have more faith in that then I do. “al Qaeda fields on again, off again Martyrs Battalions in RC-E.” It has fielded Martyr units yes, but not all formations are such. The so called “Shadow Army” is not. They have fought with skill, withdrawn, trained replacements(or released long serving members), and, returned again. There is strong evidence of them not only fighting us in Afghanistan but digging advanced fortifications and dealing crushing defeats on the Army, in Pakistan. They have fought alongside Taliban/HIG formations but are distinct. “If the al Qaeda threat were removed completely, there would be more domestic and international impetus to leave.” Yes but again you can’t separate the two. It is impossible to separate the two, you can’t deal with Al Qaeda in this area without dealing with their local allies, of whom they hide amongst. Again, they are not willingly to make any sort of deal to hand over or drive them from their midst. Omar wasn’t willingly to do that right after September eleventh, with war drawing near. Third they were and are an asset fighting local entities opposed to the Taliban, just like they were before the collapse of their government. “I disagree.” I don’t. As I stated above, Yemen is the only real exception and frankly there is no state in Somalia to be over thrown, but we don’t need massive troops there of any kind. “Strategy-on-a-hunch isn’t something I’m going to subscribe to, especially when there is no evidence to the contrary.” It’s not a hunch and unlike… Read more »
I would state that reducing our ground forces by 100K reguardless of “nation building” or just farting around in the motor pool is a bad idea.
If anyone remembers from about 2005-2007 we were stretched near to the breaking point to keep up a force of less than 200,000 in theater. It was insane. We could barely keep up with the mission and I no shit dealt with someone that was there for OIF I, II, and III. The rotation scheme was so bad that we simply couldn’t afford to lose anyone, so people would pick up their clearing papers and the last paper they’d get after their DD-214 and terminal leave papers, would be orders recalling them and giving a report date to (insert fort here) after their terminal leave date was over. The worst part? They’d already cleared post all their stuff was gone, and they had no way to get there.
The threats are only increasing. From brush fire wars to possible 3-4-even 5 way way in the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, China, Russia, and let’s not forget the continents of Africa and South America. This is a really bad time to draw down our military.
@Cedo – al Qaeda numbers are always an estimate, but here’s where I’m coming from. I work in the IC, so my assessments are based on what I work with every day. Obviously I’m not, and wouldn’t talk about any sort of fact or figure that wasn’t available in open source, but my work molds my assessment. This doesn’t mean I’m asking you to take my word for anything I write, you don’t know me from any other joker on the internet, but I wanted to give you at least a general sourcing for my positions. There are a couple of agencies [that I can tell], mine among them, that have a raised awareness of the level of threat that AQAM poses outside of the Af-Pak theater. Some entities appear to focus solely on that theater. When you state that one can’t separate the Taliban entities from al Qaeda, in that region. This is certainly true, but only from the al Qaeda point of view. There is plenty of evidence and testimony that most of the Taliban has little use for acting as an AQSL proxy. Analysts have noted a distinct lack of even mentioning al Qaeda, much less strategic collusion with them, in our collection efforts. This analysis isn’t conducted in a vacuum, nor are the assessments based only upon that facet. AQSL strategic vision has always superseded the Af-Pak region. Our continued presence in Afghanistan compliments this strategy, and ties our hands to collect and react in the other areas where AQAM finds permissible environments. Even if establishing a stable, legitimate government in Kabul, that could defend itself without our military presence [though not without our financial patronage for the rest of my lifetime], al Qaeda core and affiliated movements continue to thrive, largely unabated. We’re nibbling at one edge of the problem, ensuring that the label of ‘the Long War’ will be a colossal understatement. To harbor any hope of quashing Islamic terrorism, multiple and simultaneous assaults where they operate, with a violence of action we don’t see often enough, is the only way we’re going to… Read more »
I just read a story at ArmyTimes.com that General Odinero said he was fine with the cuts to 490K, but the NG will have to step up and play a larger role. The funny part was when he said he had enough to deploy to Korea and do the job, just couldn’t stay ten years. I choked and spit all over my keyboard.
#42″I would state that reducing our ground forces by 100K reguardless of “nation building” or just farting around in the motor pool is a bad idea.” “If anyone remembers from about 2005-2007 we were stretched near to the breaking point to keep up a force of less than 200,000 in theater. It was insane. We could barely keep up with the mission…” Doc I completely agree, I have been making the same point constantly. #43″al Qaeda numbers are always an estimate, but here’s where I’m coming from. I work in the IC, so my assessments are based on what I work with every day. Obviously I’m not, and wouldn’t talk about any sort of fact or figure that wasn’t available in open source, but my work molds my assessment. This doesn’t mean I’m asking you to take my word for anything I write, you don’t know me from any other joker on the internet, but I wanted to give you at least a general sourcing for my positions.” I don’t doubt your sincerity, nor do I question your intergrity, I’m skeptical of your sources and/or their analysis’ because they have been proven wrong or very flawed before. Much of that has to do with basic assumption(s) about the enemy’s strength, organisation, and objectives. Second, I appreciate your candor, my position was never meant to be a direct attack aimed at you if that is how it was taken. “When you state that one can’t separate the Taliban entities from al Qaeda, in that region. This is certainly true, but only from the al Qaeda point of view.” I would argue also from the leadership of the Quetta Shura as well. Al Qaeda is a force multiplier for them in their own internal Afghan fights. It may not be the most important aspect, much of the Taliban have respect/affection for those like AL Qaeda, Let, the Uzbeck group(name I can’t recall), etc, who have fought alongside them and share the same ideology if not ethnicity. They will almost certainly be granted somekind of asylum in the nation if the Taliban are… Read more »
@Cedo – Let me work backwords. LH is the largest proliferation of training and the largest facilitator of weapons technology, of any terror group worldwide. They have operations on every continent, and are infinitely more professionally structured and capable than al Qaeda. Against the larger and more powerfully equipped IDF, LH conducted a defense in depth that was utterly unexpected; I’m not sure I would use the term ‘crushing blow’. LH has full funding and support from various states, unlike al Qaeda. We dismiss them at our own detriment. We will clearly always disagree as gentlemen as to the importance of the Af-Pak theater relevant to the threat of al Qaeda, but this statement left me confused: “This is a weak argument, even if correct, our presence didn’t create the insurgency or this movement.” Our presence did create the present insurgency. We ousted the Taliban in timely fashion, and they wish a return to power. The point in my statement was that AQAM is growing and succeeding in other areas while our primary focus is on the Taliban. To that point, I understand your point about analysis being wrong in the past, and our analysis is never fool proof…but we’re pretty good. If the trust in collection and analysis isn’t there…then what are we doing trying to fight? Our network builds, detainee ops and SIGINT hits all point to the overwhelming….and I can’t overstate that, overwhelming numbers of Taliban vice AQ arrayed against us. There is no doubt in my mind, based on the holdings and reporting in the IC, that AQ exists in AFG only in large enough numbers to persuade the QST to fight without negotiation, and to keep our main effort inextricably tied to that country. To treat the threat as regional instead of trans-national, I believe, is a recipe for utter disaster. I also am of the mind that a Taliban autonomy in RC-SW [because they clearly could not seize and hold the nation writ large, would be a boon for us. They would be forced to operate in plain sight, allowing us to intricately diagram… Read more »
I’d like them to point to one successful military endeavor in history which was won because the force was merely “agile”.
I believe this describes Ghengis Khan’s takeover of the civilized world.
#47 JonP: no, there is also the army of, and campaigns of Belisarius and Narses.
Man, let the tangents begin… “Our presence did create the present insurgency.” No it did not. The insurgency was dormant until about 05′ and then had consolidated with in a year. Starting in 06′ in the South and end of 06′ begining of 07′ in the East is when the insurgency really reignited. There was a 9-15 month delay, after Pakitan came to various “understandings” on their side of the border. Later the Pakistanis would in turn have their own problems with such. They completely misread the situation, the relative power and motivation between the Taliban/Al Qaeda on the one hand and the tribal entities on the other. “The point in my statement was that AQAM is growing and succeeding in other areas while our primary focus is on the Taliban.” The other franchises are succeeding in other areas largely independent of Afghanistan/Pakistan. Also Al Qaeda has advanced in areas largely where we are not, like the horn of Africa, and we have no intent of sending large numbers of manpower or even a coherent policy in such. That does not change the fact that the border area is still their primary theater. “To that point, I understand your point about analysis being wrong in the past, and our analysis is never fool proof…but we’re pretty good.” I think we might be pretty good on the numbers of full time fighters the Taliban can deploy but much of that control they exert comes from shadow government networks manned by a small cadre of locals. I don’t think we are very good with them and the part time/opportunistic fighters they are/field. Dismantling them really is the key and simply much of that intel/removal is generated by local troops, which we currently don’t have enough of. Also I don’t think our intel is very good on the sheer number of fighters that Al Qaeda, Let, or, HIG, can deploy. That is simply because the definition that we use for membership in the terrorist entities always seems to be influx. In the East, we don’t have very good sources in Nuristan or parts… Read more »
@Cedo – Tangents make the world go ‘round…literally… “Our presence did create the present insurgency.” No it did not. Fair enough, I’ll concede your point. I wasn’t meaning to imply that the insurgency wouldn’t exist without our presence. “That does not change the fact that the border area is still their primary theater.” And I still maintain that it’s to our detriment that we treat it as such. Establishing any sort of stability from Kabul treats a symptom…it doesn’t address the problem. “Also I don’t think our intel is very good on the sheer number of fighters that Al Qaeda, Let, or, HIG, can deploy. “ It’s not perfect, but we have a pretty thorough laydown of the networks. “Maybe you can expand on this, do you mean the numbers against us are overwhelming or our intel on them is overwhelming? Maybe I’m reading this wrong. Or maybe your referring to the proportions of Al Qaeda/Taliban.” I’m referring to the numbers of Taliban arrayed against us, versus the numbers of al Qaeda in theater. The overwhelming portion of our military and intelligence effort is directed at the QST, Haqqani, HiG, etc. We already disagree on the threat that these groups pose to us vice AQAM, but I maintain my perspective, as you maintain yours. “See this statement CI makes me question your analysis. What do you mean by the RC-SW? Just the Command or the region that includes both provinces of Kandahar and Helmand? They’re mostly dead, that is how we defeated them!“ Consider the analytical question touche’d. What I mean is the areas that the QST finds the most support, and the area that they would be likely to gain some sort of autonomy, by force or by negotiation. This area is generally in my frame of mind as RC-S/SW, but I don’t mean to imply that my brevity equals the boundaries. But those two RC’s still see the most SIGACTS, by far. The insurgency isn’t dead in that area. “You can’t beat an insurgency through decapitation, like the operators are trying, simply because nowhere near enough casualties are… Read more »
CI, above post. “And I still maintain that it’s to our detriment that we treat it as such.” I don’t think we can treat it in any other way. It is of relatively more importance because it is the catalyst for the entire WOT to begin with. It is also our enemy’s primary objective of said war, regardless of our presence. “It’s not perfect, but we have a pretty thorough laydown of the networks.” Again, I believe it is most likely better but my contention is that it is mostly based on full time fighters or moving entities. Now thats good, but the local cadre are the stems and from everything I have read, outside of the South our intel at that level isn’t good at all. We chase the NVA and VC main force units, while the local Cong stay intact. The second must be the first priority. “I’m referring to the numbers of Taliban arrayed against us, versus the numbers of al Qaeda in theater.” Alright thats what I thought you meant. “The overwhelming portion of our military and intelligence effort is directed at the QST, Haqqani, HiG, etc. We already disagree on the threat that these groups pose to us vice AQAM, but I maintain my perspective, as you maintain yours” As I have said they are two distinct entities with a symbiotic relationship. You can’t separate them in any practical way, which leads us to dealing with them as a “front”. I have no problem with that. “What I mean is the areas that the QST finds the most support, and the area that they would be likely to gain some sort of autonomy, by force or by negotiation.” True historically but not so at the moment because said tumor has been removed. Whether they eventually make a come back is the question. “But those two RC’s still see the most SIGACTS, by far. The insurgency isn’t dead in that area.” I will defer to you here. You have piqued my curiosity though because the enemy has been able over the last decade counter our eavesdropping… Read more »